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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
FIRM FOUNDATIONS: REBUILDING THE EARLY MODERN STATE IN LIMA,
PERU AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE OF 1687
by
Judith M. Mansilla
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Bianca Premo, Major Professor
One early October morning in 1687, the ground under the large Spanish colonial
city of Lima, Peru rumbled. If longstanding historiographical portraits of Spanish
government as inefficient and weak were true, the earthquake that was about to shatter
Lima should have devastated it beyond repair. The study of the aftermath of this natural
disaster reveals that behind the landscape of destruction, the pillars of the colonial state in
Lima not only held up but also permitted its rapid recovery after the event. As part of a
more recent historiographical trend that reappraises the Spanish decline during the
seventeenth century, my dissertation reevaluates the performance of colonial
administration in Lima, the capital of the Viceroyalty of Peru. It focuses on deliberate
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changes carried out during the 1680s, when the metropolis implemented a series of fiscal
and administrative reforms, whose effects were interrupted but not destroyed by the
challenge posed by the earthquake of 1687.
The use of extensive contemporary archival sources, both official and private,
provides a multifaceted vista on the performance of royal agents and colonial subjects
responding to the earthquake. A close reading of these sources unveils the rebuilding of
the state in various facets: government attempts to impose authority and bring order to the
chaos; the patrimonial logic of rules that colonial administrators faced when trying to
implement rebuilding projects; colonial subjects’ expectations of royal agents and each
other; negotiations among authorities and ordinary people over the terms of rebuilding
the city; and the importance of inhabitants’ understandings of justice, founded in law and
custom, to carrying out city reconstruction.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

One early October morning in 1687, the ground under the large Spanish colonial
city of Lima, Peru rumbled. If longstanding historiographical portraits of Spanish
government as inefficient and weak were true, the earthquake that was about to crash into
Lima should have devastated it beyond repair. The study of the aftermath of this natural
disaster reveals the rapid response of the colonial administration in coping with the needs
of the people, and the active participation of both Lima’s residents and royal officers in
the reconstruction of the city. Behind the landscape of destruction, the pillars of the
colonial state in Lima not only withstood the destruction produced by the quake but also
permitted its rapid recovery.
This outcome contrasts with the traditional image of weakness and incapacity to
rule that scholars conventionally have painted in studies of Hapsburg Spain. The study of
seventeenth-century Spanish Hapsburg government, specifically, possesses a long
tradition of economic, political, and, in the last two centuries, historical writings
influenced by the “Black Legend.” Though it originated in the sixteenth century, the
Black Legend-- a set of negative and pejorative portrayals of the Spanish people,
institutions, and activities-- still pervades historical representations of Spain and its
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empire. In particular, in the seventeenth century the Black Legend served to support
contemporary critics of Spain who emphasized its imperial downfall. Philosophers,
politicians, economists and, much later, historians continued to propagate the idea that
Spain’s governance of its territories was riddled with ineptitude, decadence, and lack of
control mechanisms.
As part of a more recent historiographical trend that reappraises the Spanish
decline during the seventeenth century, my dissertation reevaluates the performance of
Spanish colonial administration in Lima, the capital of the viceroyalty of Peru. It focuses
on deliberate changes carried out during the 1680s. During this decade, the metropolis
implemented a series of fiscal and administrative reforms, whose effects were interrupted
by a strong natural event, the Earthquake of 1687. A comprehensive study of the
administration of the Viceroy Duke of Palata, whose tenure spanned most of this decade,
is essential to understanding these changes because he promoted and carried out
innovative crown policies, as well as handling the material, political, and social effects of
the quake.
The main elements of the study cover the post-disaster period in Lima, especially
royal officers’ response to the increasing demands of a population in crisis. Using social,
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cultural, political, economic, legal, and environmental historical approaches, this work
reevaluates the interplay between institutions and people as they rebuilt Lima and, in this
process, reconstituted an early modern state. The creative measures and approaches
implemented during the reconstruction period reveal the effectiveness of Spanish rule in
imposing a widespread and common legal framework used by colonial subjects.
The proactive and expedient response of the colonial administration in Lima,
facing one of the most damaging natural disasters that hit the city and indeed the empire,
demonstrates its capacity of crisis management. The period of reconstruction brought
about a series of challenges for the royal agents who attempted to implement various
rebuilding projects. Secular officials successfully managed to work around a depleted
royal treasury and the political opposition of the main religious authorities in order to
rebuild the city and its administration. Their success in carrying out these projects further
undermines the depiction of imperial Spain as deficient in authority and control.
Through the examination of complex sets of practices and rules that governed the
interactions between colonial administrators and subjects, the post-quake reconstruction
period also reveals the everyday creation of an early modern state. In order to rebuild
property destroyed by the quake, a highly diverse colonial population adopted, adapted,
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and reproduced the forms and mechanism of the Spanish legal system, an ambit of social
and political life that has long been framed as central to state formation.
The final part of this study examines the flexibility and creativity of Spanish
colonial administration in the New World. A close review of a royal audit of Lima’s
treasury and its administrators, well underway prior to the earthquake, demonstrates how
the crown maintained mechanisms to control and bring greater fiscal order to Lima, as
well as to enhance the performance of royal administrators. The secular government’s
response to the Earthquake of 1678 was no mere anomaly; instead, it encapsulated and
indeed galvanized a process of reform and fortification of the royal state already in
process. Ultimately, this examination, and the dissertation as a whole, demonstrates how
a state—for so long deemed inefficient and weak-- could be strong enough to withstand
the turmoil of the quake.
The Black Legend in Spanish History
The concept of seventeenth-century decline is still ubiquitous among scholars
writing about Spain and its colonial domains. Traditional studies use this notion to describe
features of governance such as decentralization, negotiation, consensus and
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patrimonialism, which in turn explain Spain’s weakness and its inability to develop into a
modern state comparable to other European national powers like England and France. 1
This unfavorable portrait is related to the Black Legend, developed by Spain’s
political rivals to attack the missionary Catholic character of the Spanish colonization and
the excesses committed in name of God. 2 Nonetheless, it later served to support Spain’s
own discourses of political and economic backwardness. 3 In the early seventeenth century,
Spanish Hapsburg royal advisers known as arbitristas, who critiqued and suggested
solutions to the king’s problems, were the first to use the term “decline” to describe the
period of economic and political downturn Spain was entering. 4 They criticized bad

1

Schmidt-Nowara, Christopher and John M. Nieto-Phillips, Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empire,

Nations and Legends (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 9.

2

William s. Maltby, The Black Legend in England: The development of anti-Spanish sentiment, 1558 –

1660. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971), 135, 136; Joseph Sanchez, The Spanish Black Legend:
Origins of Anti-Hispanic stereotypes (Albuquerque: National Park Service, Spanish Colonial Research
Center, 1990), 4-8.

3

Jeremy Adelman, “Introduction: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History,” in Colonial

Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin America History, edited by Jeremy Adelman (New York:
Routledge, 1999), 3, 4.

4

Helen Rawlings, The Debate on the Decline of Spain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012),

31, 34.

5

government and economic decay, calling for mercantilist and political changes in order to
reverse Spain to its previous political and economic grandeur.
After dynastic change in Spain in the early 1700s from Hapsburg to Bourbon rule,
ministers of the new royal house and other European intellectuals used the notion of decline
to refer to Spain’s ostensibly retrograde condition in comparison to other European powers.
These writers and policymakers recognized that the idea of Hapsburg decadence originated
from intolerant and ignorant characteristics attributed to Spain by the “Black Legend.” 5
Yet the concept of decline did not disappear. This was because in order to address these
deficiencies, Bourbon ministers attempted to implement a series of enlightened reforms
based on a combination of foreign examples and traditional Spanish ideas. 6 These
politicians deliberately used the concept of Hapsburg decline to justify their reforms, and,
similar to foreign politicians, had a political interest in exaggerating the contrast between
the Hapsburgs and the new governing dynasty. 7

5

Ibid, 50.

6

Gabriele Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its empire (Cambridge:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 31.

7

Jaime Vinces Vives, An Economic History of Spain, translated by Frances M. López – Morillas

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 398, 411; Ruth MacKay, ‘Lazy, Improvident People:’ Myth

6

Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, Spanish and foreign intellectuals used
the concept of decline to explain Spain’s failure to retain its colonial domains and its
transformation into a second-class European nation. 8 By then, scholars emphasized Spain’s
lack of a systematized state structure, meaning a lack of central control and weak
infrastructural power which permitted other European nations to lead the path into
modernity. Hapsburg Spain was, in contrast to these modern states, a patrimonial state that
resorted to negotiation and coercion in order to impose control and authority because it
lacked the institutional means to force its subjects into compliance.
The professionalization of history, the aperture of the archives in Spain after the
end of the Franco era, and the ascendancy of the Annales School of social history decades
later created new tools and approaches to study Spain’s imperial past. With new
developments in the field, scholars began to recognize that Spain’s crisis had been
exaggerated; yet, they still agreed that there was a decline during the seventeenth century
as evidenced by its poor economy, depopulation, and poor administration. 9

and Reality in the Writing of Spanish History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); David Ringrose,
Spain, Europe, and the ‘Spanish Miracle,’ 1700-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
8

Rawlings, The Debate on the Decline of Spain, 92.

9

Earl Hamilton, “Revisions in Economic History: VIII. The Decline of Spain,” The Economic History

Review 8, No. 2 (May, 1938), 168-179, associates the economic decline of Spain to the character of its

7

Starting in the 1960s, the debate over the Spanish decline resurfaced in Past and
Present, a journal that rapidly became a space of intellectual interchange among Englishspeaking academics who began to identify various attempts of recovery and reform during
the last Hapsburg administration. 10 Scholars discovered the existence of a general crisis
throughout Europe during the seventeenth century, and signaled that many of the state
characteristics which had justified previous authors’ portrayals of Spain as weak and its
rulers as inept were also present in other regions of Europe. 11

rulers, which he considers were in progressive deterioration in the seventeenth century; War and prices in
Spain, 1651 – 1800 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), argues the recovery and progress of the
country began under the first of the Bourbons, who he considers were more competent rulers than their
predecessors; Jaime Carrera Pujal, Historia de la Economía Española, vol. 2 (Barcelona: Bosch Casa
Editorial, 1944), contrasts the image of decadence for the seventeenth-century with that of improvement for
the next century. On one hand, he depicts the period of Charles II’s regime as a time of decline reflected in
the inefficacy of the government and economic crisis. On the other hand, he proposes the Bourbon rulers
began to introduce reforms as soon as the Succession War ended. Vinces Vives, An Economic History of
Spain, 385, 411, reinforces the idea that the Hapsburg Spain and the Bourbon regime were regimes of
opposite natures. He argues that the economic recession that took place in the New World by the second
half of the seventeenth century accentuated the decay Spain experimented in the same century. He argues
for French influence in Spanish culture, politics, economy, and technology during the Bourbon regime
contributed to the recovery of Spain from the Hapsburg’s failures.

10

Rawlings, The Debate on the Decline of Spain, 132, 133.

11

John Elliot, “The Decline of Spain,” Past & Present 20 (Nov., 1961), 52-75, states that great part of the

seventeenth century appears as a time of commercial contraction and demographic stagnation for Europe in
general, yet differed from region to region. He also predicted that future studies would confirm the
ineptness of Spain in that period. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley Smith, “Introduction,” in The General Crisis

8

These academics also argued that the Hapsburg administration attempted and
implemented various reforms that slightly improved the condition of the empire, refroms
that laid the bases for the vaunted Bourbon Reforms of the next century. 12 Historians found
that even studies of Spain that had been conducted during the early eighteenth century
underlined the various political and economic reform measures introduced during the last
Hapsburg ruler, King Charles II. The authors argued that scholarly emphasis on the regime
of Bourbon King Charles III and his late eighteenth-century policies have obscured the
multiple attempts of transformation initiated during the last Hapsburg administration and
continued by the early Bourbon monarchs. 13

of the Seventeenth Century, edited by Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (Boston: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1978), 1 -32; Global Crisis. War, Climate Change & Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

12

John Elliot, Imperial Spain, 1492 – 1716 (New York: New American Library, 1963), explains that

Castile and other regions began to show signs of recovery by the 1680s. He identifies as the promoters of
these improvements to the Count of Oropesa, prime minister from 1685 to 1691, whose reforms created the
precedent for future reformative programs under the Bourbon dynasty. John Lynch, Spain under the
Habsburgs, vol. 2 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), recognizes Spanish administration and economy began
to present signs of improvement, between 1680 and 1691, thanks to the labor of the Prime ministers the
Duke of Medinaceli and the Count of Oropesa. Spain did not pass suddenly from obscurantism to
enlightenment with the transference of dynasty, but the last Hapsburg administration left the foundation for
the next dynastic rule.

13

John Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 1700 – 1808 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), explores the transformations

in Spain and its colonies resulting from the dynastic transference during the eighteenth century. He states

9

By the late twentieth century, scholarly reappraisals of the seventeenth-century
Spanish crisis discovered that negotiation, decentralization and flexibility were better or
more appropriate terms to describe the state-society relationship in Hapsburg Spain than
were “crisis” and “decadence.” Contrary to previous historical analyses, scholars did not
interpret these characteristics as conveying obsolescence or signs of failure but as vital
features that permitted the development and permanence of the empire, providing
opportunities for its inhabitants and administrators alike. 14

Studies within this new

that there was a period of recovery, which started in the 1680s under Hapsburg rule, and lasted until the
1740s. Adrian Pearce, The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700-1763 (Hampshire:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 2,11, affirms that the period between the mid-seventeenth century and the
Enlightenment absolutism heyday of Charles III remained scarcely explored. The Late-Bourbon reforms
had overshadowed early waves of reform that the administration, both peninsular and colonial, consciously
promoted in early decades. Luis Ribot, El Arte de Gobernar: Estudios sobre la España de los Austrias
(Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2006), demonstrates that during the government of Charles II, the last Hapsburg
king on the Spanish throne, the monarchy attempted and implemented various administrative innovations.
Allan Kuethe and Lowell Blaisdell, “French influence and the Origins of the Bourbon Colonial
Reorganization,” Hispanic American Historical Review 71, No. 3 (Aug., 1991): 579-607, affirm that the
first Bourbon monarchs, Phillip V and Ferdinand VI, did not introduce great innovations in the empire,
instead they mainly preserved the old system with small repairs. Geoffrey Walker, Spanish Politics and
Imperial Trade, 1700 – 1789 (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979), states that the Spanish
administrators and merchants were effectively conscious of the terrible condition of the mercantile system
since the late seventeenth century. Attempts of reforms began in 1679, even before the dynastic
transference.

14

MacKay, “Lazy, Improvident People”, examines the common belief that Spaniards disrespected labor

and mechanical activities, and viewed workers as vile people. She argues that this notion is distant from
how contemporaries regarded labor and workers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. She

10

historiographical trend argue that, even when eighteenth-century reformers were behind
the construction of many of these negative depictions of Hapsburg Spain, scholars’
insistence on comparing Spain to other, purportedly “modern” European nations such as
England and France serves only to reinforce the notion of Spanish decline. 15 In other
words, the political interests of both historical actors and modern historians influenced the
construction of a biased analyses and critical representation of Hapsburg Spain.

demonstrates that commoners in Castile considered themselves that they were essential because of their
work to their community and the common good. She proposes the disrespect for labor and workers was an
essentially eighteenth-century myth that Bourbon reformers crafted in order to justify the existence of an
irrational labor force that needed transformation, and modern authors later reinforced as real; Regina Grafe,
Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650 – 1800 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2012), xvi, argues that even though Spanish subjects were not equal in the old regime,
they had access to courts and learned to exploit them in their benefit.
She states that the idea of Spanish distinctiveness is well rooted in the Western historiography since the
sixteenth century, when Northern European authors underlined with suspiciousness Spain’s ethnic and
religious heterogeneity. This concept of distinctiveness turned into lack of civilization in the eighteenth
century when Spain was considered unable to adopt enlightened features.

15

David R. Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the ‘Spanish miracle,’ 14, 15; and Xavier Gil Pujol,

“Pensamiento politico español y europeo en la Edad Moderna. Reflexiones sobre su estudio en una época
post-whig,” in Campo y campesinos en la España Moderna. Culturas Políticas en el Mundo Hispano,
edited by María José Pérez Álvarez and Alfredo Martín García, (León, Spain: Fundación Española de
Historia Moderna, 2012), 208, state scholars’ insistence to compare Spain with other North-European
nations, which fit and support better the teleological history of the West, has underlined the notion of
Spanish decline. Grafe, Distant Tyranny, x, xi, shows the idea of Spain’s distinctiveness turned into
uncivilized in the eighteenth century, when it was perceived as unable to adapt to the new enlightened
ideas.
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Despite the progress on the Spanish decline debate, which remains inconclusive,
scholars realize that the notion of Spanish degeneracy is deeply rooted in people’s historical
imagination, even among some in the academic realm. While recent historiography is
beginning to finally uproot the assumption of decline in Hapsburg Spain, we still need to
better understand not only what Hapsburg Spain was not but also what it was. This
ultimately entails reviewing the way the Spanish state governed within its historical
context.
Early Modern State as Historical Subject
Like the economy of the Hapsburg empire, scholars have cast doubts on the solidity
or efficiency of the Spanish American colonial state by comparing it to contemporary
models of the modern state. In The King’s Living Image, historian Alejandro Cañeque
presents the state as a problematic concept that many scholars have used indiscriminately,
without questioning its existence or appropriateness, to describe the apparatus of
governance Spain implemented in the New World. Analysis of the colonial state has merely
focused on evaluating if it was “weak” or “strong.” 16 Scholars’ insistence on examining
Spain in the early modern period according to the current definitions of nation-state
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formation and market building, which are considered the signal milestones of the current
Western model of progress, have underlined Spain’s lack of central power and incapacity
to impose rule as features of weakness. 17
Using these theoretical parameters or models to analyze the colonial state, the
Spanish political system in the New World looks far from modern. Over a half century ago,
John Phelan asserted that Spanish colonial bureaucrats had ambiguous objectives and
conflicting standards regarding the implementation of law. The same body of legal codes
allowed bureaucrats to postpone or evade the observance of norms issued by the central
government. 18 In the following decades, scholars began to identify other features of the
Hapsburg system, such as consensus, negotiation, overlapping jurisdictions, and
patrimonialism, without judging them as indicators of “weakness” or “strength” according
to an imagined modern metric.
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These studies, for instance, demonstrate that the stability of the government relied
on consensus among various corporative interests rather than an absolute monarchy. 19
Negotiation permitted the intromission of local elite’s interest in the development and
implementation of colonial politics, which resulted in a compromise state rather than an
absolutist one. 20 Yet the observation of these features and the functioning of early modern
governance has revealed the stubbornness of the historical category of “state.” According
to some historians, the lack of absolute royal power, the existence of overlapping
jurisdictions, and the constant negotiation between the administration and the colonial
subjects seem indicate not that we develop more capacious definitions of the “state” but
instead that no state existed under Hapsburg rule.
The Rule of the Early Modern States
But perhaps the “state” lies in the eye of the beholder. French postmodern historian
Michel Foucault recognized the existence of a different form of rule, or “governmentality,”
up to the seventeenth century. He defined this kind of government as the proper manner of
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managing things to lead not so much to benefit the common good but rather to an end
“convenient” (befitting or appropriate; in Spanish, “conveniente”) for each of the things or
groups that are to be governed. 21 Foucault reveals that there are many ways to conceive
political rule beyond the parameters of the so-called modern state. Indeed, his reminder is
a helpful one because it encourages us to view Spain within the broader range of modes of
governing that existed in early modern Europe.
When compared to paradigms of early development and modernization derived
from other European nations, such as France and England, Spain’s political system and
form of rule seem more similar than different. Describing the process of state-formation in
England during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Michael Braddick defines the
early modern state as a political system whose local officers were part of a territorially,
centrally coordinated bureaucratic network, backed by a legitimate force that emanated
from the ruler. Public offices were in and of themselves institutions of the state. When an
officeholder occupied a position, he acquired the authority to exercise legitimate force to
secure compliance from the subjects he ruled. Still, even when royal agents received
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legitimation from the monarch, they were also empowered by social authority. Thus they
had to live by the standards of their communities as well as those of their superiors. 22
Within this definition of state, the seemingly contradictory performance of many royal
officers who abstained from implementing royal or top-down laws that they considered
unsuitable for local conditions make sense. Their legitimacy rested on balancing the
interests of the king and the subjects.
In the case of France, William Beik demonstrates that the rise of absolutism was
not the result of a repressive system that reduced all its subjects under control, attracting
nobles to the court while imposing greater burdens on the peasantry. He argues that the
centralization of the political apparatus of Louis XIV became possible because of the
allegiance of provincial elites to the monarchy’s authority, which resulted from the king’s
increasing protection of elites’ interests, rather than repression. Provincial elites became
more willing to cooperate with the central government. 23 The government of Louis XIV
built its strength not by eradicating clientage and venality, understood as the king’s
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inability to control society, but rather through networks of personal and institutional ties
along lines of authority. 24
These studies show that characteristics such as decentralization, venality, clientage,
negotiation, and “conveniencia” are not proof of early modern states’ weakness or
inferiority, yet they had the effect of “demodernizing” seventeenth-century governments.
England, with its early constitutional forms, and France, with its development of a central
state, eclipsed Hapsburg Spain’s “non-modern” features and stigmatized its political
system.
Recently, historians seeking to show that Hapsburg Spain’s political system was
not exceptional employ the concepts of “composite” and “polycentric” monarchies to
describe the seemingly complex Spanish system of governance. British historian John
Elliot defines “composited monarchies” as a myriad of various territorial or jurisdictional
units, whose elites maintained legal and self-government privileges through their loyalty
to the monarch, who maintained patronage to reward and keep such loyalty. 25 Even though
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it was not unique, the so-called Spanish Hapsburg Empire represented the best example of
composited monarchies. This system was practical for its time because it created both
stability and resilience for the extensive Spanish monarchy, where the diverse legal status
of its jurisdictional units, the long distances between its colonial provinces and the court,
and the patrimonial condition of its ruling dynasty made it necessary to resort to
negotiation, “conveniencia,” and decentralization.
More recently, building on the concept of “composite” monarchies, some scholars
propose the concept of “polycentric” monarchies.

They argue that, rather than

relationships between the center and its periphery, there were various interlinked centers
that actively participated in the making of politics in early modern societies. This model
also recognizes the mobility of the political structures, and the need of negotiation,
clientage, and patrimonialism, which provided solidity and malleability to the multiterritorial monarchies. 26
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The Spanish colonies of the New World, called the “Indies,” represented, according
this model, a center among others within the Spanish “polycentric” monarchy. Even though
the Indies was legally an “accessory” province to Castile, its extension produced regional
subdivisions, where Mexico City and Lima were two centers called “viceregal” capitals. 27
Despite their prominent position among other cities in the Indies and their increasing
contribution to the entire monarchy, they were centers in the periphery. The model of
“composited” monarchies seems appropriate for understanding their place in the imperial
structure of Spanish Hapsburg governance because colonial officeholders ultimately
sought legitimation of their political decisions before the monarch. Nonetheless, they were
careful that their behavior remained within the limits of what locals considered a good
royal agent. Otherwise, they could lose authority among colonies subjects and ultimately
the power the king had bestowed on them. In other words, the political privileges and limits
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of the political elite at provincial centers, even those at the viceregal courts, were defined
by their relationship to the main center and the king’s court.
The Colonial Spanish State
The colonial state in the Spanish Indies was patrimonial in nature. The relationship
between the ruler and his subjects was defined both by law and practice, which were
sometimes contradictory. 28 Authority in the colonial state derived from the ruler’s personal
and private rights. Even the legitimacy of law and bureaucracy proceeded from the fact
that they were considered manifestations of the ruler’s personal power. 29 Consensus
between the metropolis and the colonies was built on experience and had permitted the
permanence of the empire by balancing loyalty to the crown and local interest. 30
Overlapping jurisdictions, patrimonialism, and negotiation between the central
government and colonial subjects are not, in the end, characteristics of incapacity and
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failure. They were necessary elements for reaching the goal held by every early modern
state-- to provide to each part of the political body what was most fitting, or “conveniente,”
according to their socio-political condition.
The repetition of practices of negotiation and legitimation, which engaged both
royal officers and colonial subjects, reveals the existence of a set of patterns that became
rooted in colonial society. According to Braddick, royal agents obtained social authority
through legitimating languages or discourses that subjects understood and accepted as
valid. Even when officers’ actions appeared to oppose to the king’s will, they justified their
actions by appealing to the legitimating ideas at their disposal, such as the fulfillment of a
wider range of locals’ expectations, reward for their loyalty, or the maintenance of the
customary political order. 31
This set of legitimizing ideas, valid for both the ruler and the ruled, constituted an
ethos or common framework that gave unity and coherence to the political body,
regardless of its heterogeneous compositions and particularities. 32 The development of
this common ethos was not monopolized or solely regulated by the state, although it was
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central to its functioning. Colonial subjects also regulated and shaped rituals and
mechanisms of power through performance when using such forms of political power.
They were able to use institutions and legal mechanisms of the colonial system, yet
creatively adopted them to build their discourses and tend their particular needs. This was
a process in which both state agencies and subjects participated.
I propose that Spanish colonialism was able to establish a common discourse or
legitimizing framework through the law in the Indies. This dissertation demonstrates the
existence of this common ethos by analyzing colonial subjects’ adoption and
reproduction of the diverse Spanish legal system’s forms offered to colonial subjects.
Even if these subjects did not believe in the power behind these forms of rule, the use and
appropriation of the colonial state’s symbols, words, and institutions, in everyday
activities, both affirmed the power of the state and contributed to shape such forms.
When royal officers designed and implemented administrative innovations, these were
legitimated according to collective values or consciousness. The heterogeneous colonial
population’s participation in these rituals and activities did not necessarily demonstrate
full-scale consent to subordination; rebellion and resistance could still take place. Yet the
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everyday participation in the rituals and performances of rule did affirm and shape the
larger political system of Spanish imperial rule. 33
I argue that the Spanish crown established a state apparatus that was not modern
but functioned according to the parameters of its time. Within the common framework of
the patrimonial colonial state, negotiation and compromise were valid and beneficial for
both rulers and subjects. They provided flexibility and stability to the colonial system,
which served to properly provide for each part of the political body. These were no signs
of the weakness of the colonial state, but instead comprised very foundation of the
political system.
This dissertation’s focus on the post-1687 earthquake period demonstrates
precisely how royal agents’ exercise of power was limited by the common ethos. In the
aftermath of the disaster, colonial subjects had the opportunity to use and appropriate,
officially and unofficially, the state’s forms, institutions, and symbols, including the
culture of contracts and law so essential to Hapsburg rule. Consequently, the
performance of bureaucrats and colonial subjects must be analyzed and understood
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within the flexible and negotiable limits the Spanish system implemented. My
dissertation further shows that, in times of crisis, flexibility, negotiation, and
“conveniencia” allowed Lima’s people to successfully reconstruct their city and the early
modern state.
The Earthquake of 1687 appears in this analysis as a historical actor that tested the
strength of the colonial state and temporarily halted reforms, but ultimately galvanized
the process of early modern state formation. The post-disaster period offers various
episodes that display the success of the colonial state in dealing with the increasing
demands of a dispossessed population. As it imposed control and implemented
reconstruction projects in the face of political opposition among the highest members of
the non-monastic Church and the financial limitations of the royal treasury, the colonial
state underwent a rapid and concentrated process of reformation. The examination of
people’s participation in the city’s reconstruction demonstrates the existence of a
common framework of legal and paralegal forms they validated and used in order to
repair private property in the post-quake period.
Methods and Sources

24

Most of the primary sources employed in this dissertation are official
documentation from various colonial institutions, such as the city council, royal treasury,
and ecclesiastical council. These documents provide diverse perspectives on the events
being analyzed. Official correspondence, descriptive accounts, and even the personal
letters of colonial authorities offer complementing or contrasting views of multiple
administrative actors in diverse institutions, both religious and secular. Other kinds of
official sources, such as notarial and court records, contain information about ordinary
people’s involvement in rebuilding activities and use of forms and forums of the Spanish
legal system. Complementing the bulk of primary sources for this dissertation, personal
letters and accounts offer data about ordinary peoples’ views and participation in such
reconstruction activities.
All together, these primary sources provide a multifaceted vista focused on the
performance of both royal agents and colonial subjects responding to the quake. A close
reading of the sources unveils the functioning of the colonial state and its attempts to
impose authority and control; the restrictive rules that colonial administrators faced when
trying to implement rebuilding projects; colonial subjects’ expectations of royal agents
and themselves; the negotiation among authorities and ordinary people over the terms of
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rebuilding the city; and the diverse social groups’ understandings of justice shaped by
their own interpretation of law and custom.
Overview of Chapters
The story of the earthquake mainly proceeds chronologically, with one exception:
the last chapter goes back in time to provide an overarching analysis of the economic
challenges Viceroy Duke of Palata dealt with during his administration and his
subsequent plans to rebuild Lima. This is a diachronic analysis that examines the impact
of the earthquake on the series of reforms that both peninsular and colonial authorities
implemented during the years previous to the natural events, and how colonial subjects
performed within the parameters set by the colonial system.
Chapter 1 examines Lima as a principal city within the Spanish empire, a center
in the periphery, and focuses on the various dimensions of the early modern state in
Lima. The city’s centrality to Spanish imperialism facilitates an analysis of the interplay
between both local and imperial administrations facing the quotidian and extraordinary
demands of a heterogeneous colonial population. The political and economic position of
Lima within the colonial Spanish territory demanded the constant attention of local and
royal agents in order to preserve the economic vitality of the city’s neighboring port,
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which was the main port of the South Sea. The defensive structures that certain
administrators built at the port of Callao predictably served to ward off pirate attacks. But
the walls also unintentionally protected the port against nature. The chapter concludes by
examining some of the administrative and fiscal reforms that Viceroy Duke of Palata
developed within an environment of political antagonism, to demonstrate that the Spanish
monarchy and its royal agents were able to introduce improvements and impose
authority.
Chapter 2 evaluates the capacity of crisis management of the colonial
administration in Lima after the Earthquake of 1687. The great intensity of the quake and
extensive destruction of the city forced people to abandon their dwellings and look for
alternative areas to provisionally relocate to. The Viceroy assembled the members of the
city council in order to take the necessary measures to provide people with basic
assistance. He also planned, negotiated, and initiated reconstruction projects to rebuild
the main public building of the city, because it housed the principal branches of
government and represented the power of the colonial state. The response by the royal
agents in Lima after the earthquake contradicts dominant models of Spanish imperial
state incapacity.
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The regular and secular clergy of the Catholic Church—long understood as a
central branch of Spanish colonial governance--- responded differently in the postdisaster context of Lima, as explored in Chapter 3. This chapter recounts the material and
spiritual activities of the religious orders, members of the Ecclesiastical Council, and the
Archbishop of Lima. The religious orders actively provided spiritual assistance as soon as
the first tremor hit the city. They also organized the rapid reconstruction of their
monasteries and assisted other religious that were in need. But the members of the
Ecclesiastical Council and the Archbishop were almost entirely absent and thus unable to
provide the spiritual services that people needed. The Archbishop left the capital for
various weeks to recover from injuries he suffered during the quake. The Viceroy took
his place in the various religious functions that people performed in order to appease
God’s wrath, considered to be the cause of the intense quake. The Ecclesiastical Council
and the Archbishop opposed the Viceroy’s plans to reconstruct the cathedral. They were
mainly concerned with tending to their own material needs rather than providing spiritual
aid to Lima’s flock, leaving a vacuum that secular authority had to fill.
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to demonstrate that, beyond top-down efforts, the
success of state building owes to ordinary legal practices that the colonial population
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adopted and adapted in their everyday lives. In order to rebuild their private properties
and estate holdings, Lima’s population used, even informally, the forms and mechanisms
the Spanish legal system offered. People and their corporations reached formal
agreements before the ecclesiastical courts, or they legitimized previously-negotiated
contracts before notaries. In cases where the value of property or money involved did not
match the expense involved in going to court, colonial subjects resorted to extralegal
arrangements, which were not necessarily recorded. Examples of these kinds of unofficial
resolutions remain in the accounting book of a religious sodality whose administrator had
the responsibility to repair the damaged properties of the congregation. Ordinary colonial
people’s practices of negotiation, and use of legal and paralegal forms reveal the success
of the colonial state in imposing a common framework of rule that withstood the quake,
and served as a strong foundation down to the lowest levels of society.
Chapter 5 shows that Spanish colonial administration, as part of a greater imperial
project, promoted a series of inspections and reforms of the royal treasury of Lima that
preceded the earthquake in the late seventeenth century. Beginning in 1677, the Crown
ordered the inspection of royal treasuries of Lima and their administrators. This visita
has been overlooked by most historians, resulting in an underestimation of the Hapsburg
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state’s control over its royal agents and initiative to promote reforms. When the Duke of
Palata arrived in 1681, the visita was suspended because of the death of the last inspector.
The Duke had royal instructions to reactivate the visita, which resulted in the exile of one
of the administrators of the royal treasury and the reduction of the debt owed to the king.
The Duke also implemented measures to improve the fiscal system of the entire
viceroyalty. The Earthquake of 1687 halted the collection activities of the royal
administrators, who were working diligently after the exile of their old friend. In spite of
the financial challenges caused by the 1687 earthquake, Lima’s remittances to Spain
increased between 1685 and 1690 because viceroys had the obligation to send periodical
remittances of bullion to the peninsula, despite the negative balance of the royal treasury.
The visita and the Duke of Palata’s reforms provisionally attenuated the critical condition
of the royal treasury, even as the unexpected natural disaster interrupted them. The
earthquake ultimately permitted both royal agents and subjects to galvanize the process of
early modern state formation. If the reforms accentuated the crown’s control and
authority among the political elite in Lima, the earthquake multiplied the opportunities
for limeños (or Lima’s inhabitants) to reinforce the crown’s authority through their active
use of the Spanish legal system.
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Ultimately, this dissertation explores the performance of the colonial state in Lima
by combining various historical approaches. It portrays the Earthquake of 1687 as a
historical actor that impacted the social, political, and economic structures of the colonial
capital. The earthquake that hit Lima in 1687 laid bare the literal and metaphorical
architectural bones of the colonial state, which were strong enough to withstand the
turmoil and promote the recuperation of the city. The analysis of the post-disaster context
reveals the colonial administration’s capacity of crisis management as a skill in the art of
government, as civil administrators provided for what was “conveniente” for colonial
subjects according to their social standing. The active participation of Lima’s population
in the activities of reconstruction demonstrates the existence of a common legal
framework that penetrated various levels of society and served as a crucial foundation for
the ongoing process of rebuilding the city and the colonial state.

II.

CHAPTER 1. THE EPICENTER OF THE SOUTH SEA: THE CITY OF
LIMA IN THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
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The city of Lima ranked among the main urban centers of the Spanish empire in
the New World. It became the political, economic, religious, and cultural center of the
Spanish domains in South America. A large population of diverse backgrounds settled in
Lima because of the ample opportunities available in the locality. The city rapidly grew in
size and splendor, which required greater attention from the metropolis. As the capital of
the viceroyalty of Peru, Lima hosted the headquarters of various administrative, religious,
and commercial institutions.
Lima’s political and economic development derived from its geographical location
in the midsection of coastline along the South Sea. It became the gatekeeper to the riches
of the Andes and center of the commercial networks in the viceroyalty. Along with these
diverse advantages, Lima’s setting also had certain inconveniences. It was vulnerable to
pirates’ attacks that periodically sailed along the viceroyalty’s coast. Among other natural
events such as droughts, floods, and epidemics, earthquakes hit the city from time to time.
Since early modern people considered unforeseen events as results of God’s will, the
reaction to such events was to plea for divine mercy rather than take any kind of preventive
measures for future occurrences. 34
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Image 1: Lima, capital of the Viceroyalty of Peru 35
Historical records describe colonial authorities’ efforts to implement measures to
defend the city, yet these were more reactive than proactive. Royal representatives and
subjects were more concerned about the tangible threat from pirate crews than natural
phenomena, which were typically unforeseen. Despite the fear and economic threat pirates
represented, authorities were hesitant to invest in building structures that would represent
large expenses to the royal treasury. Royal representatives had the obligation to
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periodically send revenues to the metropolis and had to justify any extraordinary
disbursement of royal treasury’s monies. The subsequent constructions of defense
structures demonstrate how royal agents responded to the demands from locals, for
protection against pirates, and from the monarch, for remittance of revenues.
Despite the prominent position of Lima and recurrent pirate incursions, royal
officers were unable to liberally use the royal treasury’s monies to build defensive
structures along the coast. They faced the predicament of having to balance the interests of
the ruler and the locals. Even though Lima provided significant and constant revenues to
the crown, it never was a priority in the politics of the court in Madrid. While it was an
important center among the New World colonies, it was still the periphery of the Spanish
Empire.
Lima’s position as the center in a periphery is critical to this work because it
highlights the interplay between imperial and local interests. 36 Even though the term
‘periphery’ has a negative connotation, it describes the remoteness that even viceregal
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capitals had in the mind of the metropolis’ authorities. 37 Both peninsular and colonial
authorities recognized that distant colonial domains required a certain degree of freedom
in administrative matters. Certainly, distance permitted some arbitrary practices among
royal officers, yet they were also obliged to bridge the distance. In order to do so, they
recorded their decisions and activities, provided accounts of these in constant
correspondence to the king, and consequently sought royal approval as a means to
legitimate their behavior.
The construction of the wall of Lima, specifically, displays how state practices of
negotiation allowed colonial authorities to rule among the seemingly contradictory
interests of the monarch and a provincial center. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that,
even when authorities pushed innovative ideas or projects, they had to evaluate their
implementation according to the conditions of both the locality and the empire.
The City of the Kings
Attracted by stories of riches in the Incas’ lands, Francisco Pizarro and his party
reached the coast of today’s Peru in 1528. After capturing the ruling Inca Atahualpa and
bringing under control a large part of his domains, the Spanish conqueror decided to found
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a city that would function as capital of a new Spanish kingdom he intended to establish.
Once he eliminated other possible settlements, Pizarro founded the city of Lima or “City
of the Kings” in 1535. 38
The new city was established on the southern margin of the Rimac River, a couple
of miles away from the coast. 39 The limits of the city and adjacent farms extended over an
area formed by the slope of the rivers Rímac, Chillón (on the north), and Lurín (on the
south). 40 The city had a natural port, Callao, that had functioned since pre-Hispanic times.
In a few years, it became the most important port of the South Sea, as the Pacific Ocean
was called. 41
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The Spanish monarch confirmed the foundation of Lima and its name of “The City
of the Kings” in 1536. A few days after the foundation of the city, Pizarro established the
local administration of the city with the appointment of the two first alcaldes ordinarios of
the city. The increasing preeminence of Lima is reflected by the diverse grants and status
improvements it received during the following decades: Pope Paul III promoted Lima to
bishopric in 1541, and archbishopric in 1546; and the Crown elevated it to capital of the
new viceroyalty of Peru, created in 1542, and issued the royal decree to found the first
university of the Indies, San Marcos, in 1551. 42
At the time of the foundation of Lima, Pizarro distributed the first plots among the
30 vecinos, or elite residents, of the city. 43 Lima’s layout was similar to a checkerboard. It
consisted of 117 blocks, each divided in 4 plots. 44 Pizarro assigned the plot in front of the
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eastern edge of the Plaza Mayor (Main Square) to be the first church, which was built by
1540. 45 He chose the lot located on the northern edge for his own residence. After his
death, the Crown seized Pizarro’s properties and his palace became the residence of the
future rulers of the viceroyalty of Peru. 46 The plot Pizarro granted to his brother Hernando
on the western edge of the plaza became the city council’s building, in 1566. 47
Lima rapidly outgrew the initial 13 blocks in length and 9 blocks in width of its
foundation. 48 The dimensions of the city’s growth are evident by the foundation of multiple
convents and monasteries, the addition of new plazas and blocks, and the appearance of
new neighborhoods, such as San Lázaro and El Cercado. 49 Lima received a constant flow
of people from Europe, Africa, Asia, and other parts of the New World. They arrived to
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stay either temporarily or permanently. In either case, they injected vitality to the city,
which became the core of the Spanish viceroyalty in South America. 50
By the mid-seventeenth century, Lima had reached 25 blocks in length and 14 in
width. There were around 2,500 buildings without taking into account two neighborhoods
that were outside the area considered the city properly. El Cercado, along the east side of
the city, was constructed as a “reduction” (something like an urban reservation) of Indians,
and housed around 200 dwellings. San Lazaro, located at the other side of the Rimac River,
held 600 homes. It was originally a settlement of Indian fishermen, yet by the end of the
century, it hosted people from diverse ethnic background as the rest of the city. 51 A few
decades later, in 1687, contemporary witnesses estimated the number of properties
ascended to 4500, and the population of the city had increased to 50,000 people. 52
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Image 2: Plaza Mayor of Lima of the kingdoms of Peru. Year 1680.Oil on Canvas. Museum of America (Madrid)

The Plaza Mayor maintained its position as the heart of the city, surrounded by
political and mercantile buildings. On the northern side, the viceregal palace, formerly the
home of Pizarro, accommodated the offices of the Real Audiencia, Real Acuerdo, Tribunal
de Cuentas, Sala del Crimen, and Real Hacienda; the Royal Jail and the Royal Chapel; and
the viceregal family’s private rooms. 53 The Cathedral, the Ecclesiastical Council’s
building, and the archbishop’s palace shared the block on the eastern side. 54 On the western
edge, behind one of two portals that Viceroy Conde de Nieve (1561-1564) established, was
the city hall with its jail, chapel, and the courtrooms of the cabildo. 55 On the southern side,
behind the second portal stood, various commercial stores of diverse genres. The adjacent
streets to the Plaza Mayor and behind the first row of blocks around it had several artisan
workshops and other diverse stores.
The same Plaza Mayor functioned as a market, called a Tianguez or “El Gato.”56
Vendors filled it with mobile stalls (cajones). In the tianguez, Indian vendors usually
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offered a large variety of crops that they brought from their fields. 57 Beginning in 1548,
the city council assigned a place on the northeastern edge of the viceregal palace, called
the alhóndiga, for the sale of meat and fish. 58 Because of this local commerce, the city had
a constant supply of fresh food products that required city council regulation in order to
maintain fair prices and weights.
The presence of the various branches of the political power and the vitality of
commerce paralleled the religious fervor of the city and its people. By the late 1680s, the
city had sixty-five religious edifices: the Cathedral being the most important, four parishes,
twenty convents, eleven monasteries, fifteen beneficence establishments, schools, and
other similar institutions.59 Although secular priests, meaning priests with parishes, tended
some of these places, religious orders—monks and missionaries-- oversaw most of them.
In only a few decades after the conquest, Lima had become the focus of the
political, economic, and religious life of the viceroyalty of Peru. Its geographical position
also offered several advantages to its population. Even today, the port of Callao is the most
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important commercial gate to the city and several of the interior provinces. Because the
Humboldt Sea current runs along most of the Peruvian coast, Lima enjoys a moderate
weather, neither too hot nor too cold for its latitude. 60 Nonetheless, Lima’s location also
had negative effects.
Threats to the Political and Economic Epicenter of the Kingdom
Since Lima was the viceroyalty’s commercial core, seat of the Consulado or
wholesale merchants’ guild, and headquarters of the Royal Treasury and other branches of
the Spanish government, it enjoyed an economic and political supremacy that concerned
upper-class limeños, who collectively dreaded possible rebellious outbreaks from lower
social groups or attacks from other European powers.
Excluding the Inca attempt to expel the Spaniards from their lands, when Manco
Inca sent an army of 50,000 men under the orders of his general Titu Yupangui in 1536,
Lima did not suffer from recurrent Indian rebellions. 61 In 1544, a group of 600 black slaves
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rebelled against the abusive treatment by the authorities appointed by Gonzalo Pizarro
while he abandoned the city to fight Viceroy Blasco Nuñez de Vela. 62 Even though none
of these movements reached their objectives, Lima’s residents kept the memory of such
events. The idea of possible outbreaks against the political order generated a collective
fear. 63 In the next decades, royal authorities were able to discover and suffocate, before
their initiation, subsequent subversive plots against the capital.
Besides its importance in economic and political terms, the capital’s geographical
location brought another threat to the city. The proximity of Lima to the coast and the lack
of natural barriers to contain enemy attacks from the seashore became a tangible hazard.
During the first decades after its foundation, Lima’s authorities hesitated about erecting
any defense structure to protect the city and the port because they were confident that
adversary armies would be unable to reach the South Sea waters. The only passage
available to Spain’s enemy nations to enter the South Sea was the Strait of Magellan, whose
current and winds were difficult to overcome.
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With the objective of resisting possible rebellious movements, Viceroy Marques de
Cañete III (1556 - 1561) organized the first militia companies, eight in total, to support the
regular forces if necessary. The objective of this first military organization in Lima was to
establish control and defend the city from dissident outbreaks, both native and Spanish,
against the crown rule. Cañete completed the construction of the Casa Real in Callao,
which served as storage for the Armada Real’s equipment and supplies. 64 He also organized
the first salaried troops. Yet the burden of these forces on the royal treasury generated
antipathy among authorities at the peninsula, who pushed for the progressive reduction of
salaries. Cañete’s main concern was to resist any possible Indian uprisings or conflicts
between Spanish rival parties rather than fight against any external threat. 65
When privateer Francis Drake reached the Port of Callao in 1579, royal
administrators realized the vulnerability of Lima. 66 It was after this experience that
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authorities started to discuss the necessity of building defensive structures both in Lima
and Callao. 67 In 1583, after negotiations between the city council and the Real Audiencia,
the construction of the first turret to protect the port began; yet, works were still in progress
when an earthquake in 1586 destroyed it. 68
It was the appearance of English corsairs in the South Sea, led by Thomas
Cavendish the following year, that motivated royal authorities in Lima to reopen the
discussion about the capital’s security. 69 Viceroy Conde de Villadompardo (1584-1589)
rushed the construction of new turrets to protect the port. 70 Despite the evident vulnerability
of both Lima and its port, the next viceroy, Marques de Cañete V (1590-1596) disregarded
the construction of protective structures. Even though he finally decided to build a military
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outpost to store artillery and serve as refuge in case of internal or external attacks, Viceroy
Marques de Cañete and other royal officers continued believing that the military strength
of the kingdoms relied mainly on mobile elements of defense, such as troops and ships,
rather than defensive structures such as fortifications. 71
By the end of the century, pirates sailed across the capital in the South Sea but
without any attempt of an attack. 72 The sense of security among Lima’s authorities and
residents did not last long because German corsair Joris Van Spilbergen, and his Dutch
crew appeared in front of the Peruvian coast by the end of 1614. They approached the
capital in July of 1615 and began to attack the port. Apparently, the defensive structures in
front the port discouraged Spilbergen and his crew because they suddenly halted the
assault. The pirates sailed to the north where they attacked more accessible ports, such as
Paita, which they burned down. 73
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The constant presence of pirates along the western coast of the kingdom and the
destruction of ports motivated the colonial authorities to build defense structures to protect
Lima and Callao from similar attacks. Viceroy Marques de Montesclaros (1607-1615)
initiated the construction of a defensive platform to protect Callao’s Casas Reales and the
port. His successor, Principe de Esquilache (1615 – 1621), followed the same defensive
policy and expanded the work envisaged by Montesclaros. 74 He designed a defensive
system consisting of three bastions arranged along the coast to protect the port.75
Unfortunately, the Consejo de Indias did not support his project and reproved the Viceroy’s
initiation of such works without royal permission, diverting sources from the royal treasury
to such defensive projects. 76 Nonetheless, Esquilache’s efforts became evident few years
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later when the protective system he implemented withstood a long and strong attack against
the port of Callao.
It was the well-informed and armed fleet of Dutch Jacques Clarck L’Hermite that
tested Esquilache’s defensive structure. The enemies besieged Callao for several months. 77
The illness and ensuing death of the leader and many crewmen, and the unsuccessful
attacks to other ports of the viceroyalty depleted the Dutch’s enthusiasm who finally
abandoned the enterprise. 78 As soon as he received the news of L’Hermite’s approach,
Viceroy Marques de Guadalcázar (1622-1629) initiated the works of a complex of military
battlements in Callao. Both Lima’s authorities and residents shared the expenses of theses
constructions. 79 The exigencies of the time demanded such combined financial efforts.
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Image 3: Fortifications under (A) Principe de Esquilache and (B) Marquis of
Guadalcazar. 80
L’Hermite’s long and organized attack on the viceroyalty’s capital also concerned
peninsular authorities because it paralyzed commerce, halted the remittance of revenue,
and destroyed several ships. 81 The Council of Indies initially approved the organization of
a fleet to defend the South Sea. Yet these initiatives rapidly faded. Despite the tangible
effects that the pirate’s attack produced on the viceroyalty’s coastal towns and port, the
peninsular authorities hesitated to spend royal revenues to build protective structures, not
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even to protect Lima, which was the headquarters of the viceroyalty’s royal treasury. It
would take more than a decade to reopen discussions about Lima and Callao’s defensive
constructions in the Consejo de Indias.
For colonial subjects, especially those living along the coast of the viceroyalty, the
threat of the pirates was clear and evident. News of the destruction of various ports along
the South Sea circulated rapidly, accentuating the fear against such tangible dangers of
latent attacks. 82 For this reason, Lima’s population consistently supported the initiatives to
build defensive buildings that some rulers or the city council proposed. They even
demanded from these authorities the construction of these defenses. When Viceroy
Marques de Mancera arrived in Callao in 1639, he was determined to reinforce the
viceroyalty’s capital and main port’s defenses. 83 The news of pirate attacks against the
ports of Valdivia and Portobello at the beginning of 1640 accentuated the necessity of
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reinforcing the security of the port. Mancera gathered Lima’s main royal officers to plan
the construction of a wall around Callao, without burdening the royal treasury. 84

Image 4: Marquis of Mancera 85
Royal representatives’ initiatives to build defensive structures to protect the capital
were frequently obstructed by the responsibility to protect the king’s treasury. The Council
of Indies had reprimanded Viceroy Principe of Esquilache for using funds from the royal
treasury for building defensive structures without requesting previous authorization.
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Viceroy Mancera’s predecessor, Marquis of Chinchón, built four batteries to protect the
interior side of the port, which was vulnerable to incursions from land. Chinchón planned
the construction of additional parapets of stone to complement the defense of the
batteries. 86 Yet he had to desist from this project because he considered it unaffordable. 87
In order to build the wall around Callao, Mancera had to negotiate carefully with
the main authorities in the city the means to afford the building expenses without using
royal funds. The construction project of this wall relied mainly on new taxes and the
compulsory free labor of blacks in the capital. After extensive deliberation, the royal
officers established new duties on meat and sugar, products of basic consumption whose
distribution were supervised by the city council. They also allocated to the building project
12,000 pesos the meat supplier offered to pay annually for the right to sell his product. The
royal agents also ordered that one out of ten blacks in the city would take turns providing
their labor. 88 The building activities began at the end of 1640 and lasted six years.
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Image 5: Fortifications made by (C) Count of Chinchón, and (D) Count of
Mancera. 89
In order to avoid the criticism received by Esquilache, Mancera convinced
peninsular authorities that the construction of this wall would reduce rather than increase
royal treasury expenses. Mancera justified his decision to initiate the project by clarifying
to his superiors that additional taxes and economic obligations would provide enough
revenue to pay for the building and maintenance of the entire project. He also explained
that the new defensive structure would require only a half of the current number of troops
allocated to the port, which would represent a reduction of 100,000 pesos in annual
salaries. 90
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On the other hand, political struggles in the metropolis also increased the urgency
of the construction. The rebellion of Portugal, initiated in 1640, exacerbated fears of the
subjects loyal to the Spanish monarch. They were afraid that the rebels, concentrated in
Brazil, would provide support to the Dutch pirates that constantly circumnavigated the
coast of the Peruvian viceroyalty. Royal officers were concerned that the union of Dutch
and Portuguese enemies would attack the scarcely populated cities of Buenos Aires,
Tucumán, and Paraguay, from where they could reach the mining centers of Alto Perú. 91
The erected wall converted Callao into a fortified commercial port-city, yet it left
out the Indian village of the Pitipiti, which remained exposed to the ferocity of the pirates
and the sea. 92 The construction of this wall amounted to 876,000 pesos, which did not
include labor force costs in order to reduce expenses, because Mancera forced slaves and
condemned prisoners to work for free. He also obligated merchant vessels to freely
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transport the stones available in the islands across the capital to the construction site.
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Unfortunately, the final product was overshadowed by the large debt the construction left
for the royal treasury, and subsequent rulers continued neglect of maintaining and repairing
the defenses. 94
As the incursions of pirates in the South Sea decreased during the following
decades, the fear of tangible enemies, such as Drake and L’Hermite, waned. The military
significance of the Callao’s wall and the other fortifications turned into economic burdens
on the royal treasury. Subsequent rulers complained about the expense of repairing the
defensive structures from time to time. 95 During the following decades, there was not a
serious discussion about improving the capital’s defenses. The fortification of Lima in the
1680s resulted once again from potential threats.
In the late 1660s, two Indian rebellions and a new wave of pirate attacks in the
South Sea reopened the debate on the construction of the city wall in a Junta de Guerra.
From these meetings emerged the project that would materialize in the construction of the
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city wall of Lima. The construction project by Jesuit Juan Raymond Coninck attracted the
interest of Lima’s authorities, who referred the plans and designs to the Council of Indies
for consultation. 96 Unfortunately, the pirate threat faded again and the peninsular
authorities tabled the project, which they did not consider an immediate necessity.
The progressive addition of defensive structures and the construction of the wall to
protect Callao and Lima kept pace with paralleled periods of imminent and perceptible
danger over the city. Even if the population of Lima did not directly see the pirates’ fleets
crossing the South Sea, their presence was real enough. Rumors and official news rapidly
reached and circulated through the capital. Regardless of the extensive distance between
the metropolis and the capital of the Peruvian viceroyalty, peninsular authorities perceived
the danger of pirates’ presence when the customary routes of commerce and revenue
remittances suffered delays. Nonetheless, as soon as the threat subsided, both authorities
and ordinary people lost interest in the building of defensive structures, which became an
economic burden rather than a military advantage. Concerns of tangible and imminent
threats left people, specifically royal authorities, unprepared against invisible, and
unpredictable threats that could strike Lima.
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Lima, the Land of the Tremors
The city of Lima is located over a seismic zone, where the Nazca and South
American tectonic plates merge. This geological confluence is responsible for both the
physiognomic and seismological configuration of the city and its coast. The movement of
both plates produced the formation of both Lima’s alluvial fan, which has a drastic change
in slope in only a few miles, and the maritime placket along the seashore, which generates
periodical seismic movements. 97 For this reason, tremors and earthquakes have constantly
afflicted Lima.
The Spanish chronicles offer the first written records of seismic events in the New
World. These accounts include testimonies about tremors that struck in the decades before
the arrival of the conquering parties. None of these sources provides a precise date, but
only an approximate time with brief descriptions of the events. The first seismic event the
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Spaniards faced in the Inca territory happened in 1533 as Pizarro and his party advanced
through the Peruvian coast to the city of Cusco. 98
In the decades that followed, the viceroyalty’s capital and main port suffered from
quakes and other natural events, such as surges. In the progressive construction of
defensive structures, the authorities had not considered the protection of Lima and Callao
from natural events but instead focused on the imminent and tangible threats of pirates.
Nonetheless, the wall of Callao played a protective role against nature’s forces, which royal
authorities did not foresee. Even though the construction of this wall was not culminated
until July of 1647, it protected people and material property when tidal waves hit the port
in May of that year. On this occasion, the wall shielded 5 million pesos of merchandise
stored in the royal warehouses from flooding. In 1651, the wall played the same function,
safeguarding 3 million pesos of goods. 99 Yet, the lack of maintenance works contributed
to the progressive decay of the wall, as royal authorities began to overlook its defensive
value against pirates, whose presence in the South Sea became sporadic. Despite the
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decreasing military protection it rendered after a few decades, the wall continued providing
protection to the port against natural events.
When the pirates returned in 1680, the incumbent viceroy rejected projects of
additional defensive constructions. Lima’s population reacted with consternation when
they got the news of English pirates approaching the capital. Despite the popular support
to build a wall to protect Lima, Archbishop Melchor de Liñan y Cisneros, who also served
as interim viceroy at that time, dismissed the report that recommended such construction
and the reinforcement of various ports in the South Sea. 100
The Archbishop and the Duke
Among the various royal officers that appear in this dissertation, Don Melchor de
Liñán y Cisneros and Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocaful, the Duke of Palata, were the
most powerful authorities in Lima during most of the 1680s. Their careers in the service of
the Crown were outstanding but not exceptional. They represent bureaucrats who
developed successful careers and accumulated extensive experience in the imperial
domains through the diverse posts they occupied. At the same time, they exemplify the
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frequent clashes, not only between the religious and the secular realms, but also among
royal agents.
By the time King Charles II appointed him as archbishop of Lima in 1676, Melchor
de Liñán y Cisneros had already filled several ecclesiastical posts in both the peninsula and
the New World. 101 Only few months after the new archbishop arrived in Lima in 1678, the
King named him interim viceroy to replace Count of Castellar. The former viceroy
abandoned the capital and headed to the northern port-city of Paita, where he was awaiting
the outcome of the audit process related to his tenure as viceroy. 102
Even though the Archbishop-viceroy had served the Spanish crown since 1661, as
priest of the Spanish court’s parish of San Salvador and calificador (examiner) of the Holy
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Office of the Inquisition, he performed most of his services for the crown in the New
World. In 1664, Phillip IV appointed him as bishop of Santa Marta (modern Colombia). In
the following years, he received the posts of Bishop of Popayán in 1666, Archbishop of
Charcas in 1672, and Archbishop of La Plata in 1674. The King also entrusted Liñán y
Cisneros with the post of Visitor General of the Kingdom of New Granada, which he
exercised between 1666 and 1674. 103 In order to fulfill the various responsibilities entrusted
to him by the King, Liñán y Cisneros had to travel across the kingdom visiting many
provinces and meeting the diverse population of Spanish South America.
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experience he accumulated during these years of service permitted the Archbishop-viceroy
to know firsthand the multiple conditions and needs of the Peruvian viceroyalty. This kind
of mobility was not uncommon among administrators, and permitted royal appointees, who
had similar trajectories, both to recognize the diverse regions that formed part of the
Spanish empire and develop specific policies to deal with the particularities of each region.
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In 1680, when English pirates advanced again towards the capital, the Archbishopviceroy reacted as many of his predecessors had by increasing the number of troops and
ships rather than erecting defensive constructions. 105 Even though peninsular authorities
had forwarded the project proposed by Jesuit Coninck to build a wall around Lima to the
Council of Indies in 1673, the recent pirate attacks on Panamá motivated the Council to
appoint Luis Venegas Osorio to assess the fortifications in Tierra Firme and the South Sea
in 1680. 106 The next year in Lima, Osorio presented his report to the Archbishop-viceroy,
who dismissed the recommendation to build a fortification along the western coast of the
viceroyalty and a wall around Lima. 107 One of the Archbishop-viceroy’s main arguments
against Osorio’s report was that the construction of a wall around Lima would require the
destruction of several properties, which ran along the project’s plans. 108 These properties,
as most others in the city, provided periodic rents mainly to religious individuals and
corporations. Even when limeños became concerned because of the close proximity of
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pirates, Liñán y Cisneros ignored their demands to construct a wall to protect the city. He
maintained a clear tendency to favor the interests of the religious communities rather than
those of the secular population whom he also governed. The task of building the wall of
Lima had to wait a few more years until another viceroy made the decision to turn
Coninck’s project into a reality.
For the few years Liñan y Cisneros occupied both roles, as head of church and state,
he mainly concentrated on reforming the religious orders, and taking advantage of the
rights over ecclesiastical matters he had as viceroy. 109 Overburdened by the responsibilities
of both positions, the Archbishop-viceroy suggested to the King the appointment of a
viceroy that would exclusively fulfill his secular duties. 110 Though he knew he could not
handle both positions, he displayed animus toward his predecessor, the Count of Castellar,
and even greater antipathy toward his successor, Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duke
of Palata. 111 The antagonism between the Archbishop and the Duke would intensify in the
following years.
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In 1654, Navarra y Rocafull, soon to be a duke, began to serve the Spanish crown
when he was only twenty-eight years old. Because of his exceptional aptitude as a law
student in Salamanca, he received the posts of adviser to the General Government of
Aragón in 1654 and Visitor to the Real Audiencia of Barcelona in 1657. He became a
member of the Council of Naples, the Council of Italy, the Council of War, and the Council
of State. He served as Supreme Council of Italy prosecutor, Vice-Chancellor of the
kingdom of Aragón, and member of the Junta de Gobierno (1665-1675) that ruled during
the minority of King Charles II. 112
In 1662, he became Duke of Palata and Prince of Massa, through his marriage to
Doña Francisca Toralto de Aragón in Nápoles. 113 In 1680, the monarch appointed him
General Captain and Viceroy of Perú. After a trip that lasted more than eight months and
took him through Cartagena and Portobello, the Duke and his retinue arrived in Paita on

Castellar within the limits of the viceroyalty accentuated his partisans’ opposition to the Archbishopviceroy’s administration.
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September 13, 1681. When he arrived in Callao the following month, the Archbishopviceroy went personally to Callao to welcome him. The new viceroy’s official entrance to
Lima took place on November 20. 114
Upon his arrival in Lima, the Duke recognized the climate of antagonism created
by the confrontations between the factions of the Archbishop and Count of Castellar, who
had recently departed from Peru, after waiting for years for the result of the inspections of
his administration. The Duke tried to halt these conflicts by choosing ministers unrelated
to both parties. Nonetheless, the appointment of high court minister Don Joseph del Corral
Calvo, a Castellar partisan, as his advisor put the Duke under the direct influence of an
opponent to Liñán y Cisneros. 115
The antagonism between the Archbishop and the Duke placed real constraints on
the latter’s administration. The Archbishop continuously critiqued the measures the Duke
attempted to implement, especially those from his own initiative. Yet the Duke was able to
counteract the Archbishop’s accusations and complaints before the King through the many
improvements he promoted in the colonial administration during his government.
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The Duke’s Reforms and the Lima Wall
During the seven years he ruled the Peruvian viceroyalty, the Duke of Palata
attempted several reforms in different areas of the colonial administration. Some of these
reforms were his own initiatives while others were instructions from the crown or
innovations from previous royal representatives. In order to halt the increasing smuggling
of ore and evasion of the quinto real (tax of 20 percent on mining extraction), the Duke
proposed that a royal mint be established in Lima. He argued to the crown that this Casa
de la Moneda would produce the coinage that public and private commercial transactions
required. After confronting opposition from both Seville and Potosí, which had their own
coining centers, the Viceroy reached his goal in 1683 when the King issued the order to
establish a Casa de la Moneda in Lima. 116
The Duke also implemented new measures to improve the production of silver and
quicksilver. After several meetings, he signed a new contract with Huancavelica miners’
representatives, where he committed the crown to supply the necessary native labor
force. 117 The Duke justified the need for this new contract based on the fact that the
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previous one, signed in 1645, was not fulfilled by the crown. The old contract stipulated
the crown should provide 620 Indian laborers so the miners could produce 6,820 quintals
of quicksilver every year. The royal treasury also owed the miners 600,000 pesos for the
quicksilver received and some repair expenses, which were responsibility of the crown.
After a collapse in 1681, the mine required additional repairs that amounted to 200,000
pesos. The miners agreed to repair the mine if they received 3,000 quintal of mineral in
exchange for their labor. In order to negotiate the terms of the new contract, the Viceroy
gathered three royal ministers that had served at Huancavelica to discuss the requests by
the miners’ representatives. The Viceroy finally granted the miners the quicksilver
requested, which was valued at 225,000 pesos. He also restituted an old grant from a
particular to the crown, which would provide 110,000 pesos annually to fund the hospital
for Indians. In order to reduce laborers’ burden, the Duke stipulated miners would pay
Indians their entire salary regardless of the quantity of mineral they obtained and cover
their tributes to the crown. The new contract transferred the repair cost from the royal
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treasury to private interests, increased the production of mineral, and sought to improve the
conditions of Indian laborers. 118
The Duke also restituted the possession of the Descubridora mine, the largest
mercury mine in the Indies, after negotiating with various creditors, who claimed the crown
owed them several unpaid Indian laborers’ salaries. Don Diego Tamayo, one of the crown’s
creditors, went to the court in Madrid to request a Castilian nobility title from the King, the
corregimiento of Arequipa for four years, and three knighthood habits for his daughters’
partners in exchange for 107,000 unpaid Indians’ daily wages. Eventually, the Duke
reached a settlement with Don Joseph Tamayo, Don Diego Tamayo’s heir and brother, who
agreed to receive only the corregimiento. To other creditors that claimed similar rights, the
Duke awarded either a knighthood habit or a corregimiento, in exchange for the concession
of their claims. 119
In order to increase the workforce in the mining regions of Huancavelica and
Potosí, Viceroy Duke of Palata ordered a massive registration of the Indian population that
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began in 1683. Even though this census concluded seven years later, when another viceroy
was in charge of the viceroyalty, the colonial administration was able to double the number
of forced native workers, mitayos, in Postosí from 10,427 to 20,829.120 The Duke
recognized that this census, as well as other innovations he proposed and implemented,
was necessary to reform the administration and production of the viceroyalty.
The Duke strongly supported fiscal reforms promoted from the metropolis; yet he
also introduced his own initiates. He closely supervised the operation of the royal
administrators in charge of Cajas Reales. He supported the inspection of the royal treasury
and its administrators that the King had ordered in 1662, and reorganized the activities and
personnel of Tribunal de Cuentas, with the intention of improving the fiscal performance
of his administration and obtaining the bullion he periodically had to remit to the crown. 121
The Duke also promoted those initiatives from his predecessors which he
considered useful. For instance, he encouraged the use of small vessels to transport silver
to Panama because they were less expensive to the royal treasury than using the royal fleet
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(armada real). The original purpose of the South Seat royal fleet was to ensure the shipping
of silver to Panama and shipping of merchandise to the capital. From 1664, in response to
the decay of silver exportation, royal officers reduced the sailing frequency of the royal
fleet from every year to every three years. Aware of the excessive cost of construction and
maintenance of large ships required by the fleet, the Duke resorted to private small vessels
to meet similar needs instead of the royal fleet, which in the 1680s only sailed two times.
The Duke encouraged this alternative means of transportation, initiated by his predecessor
Viceroy Principe de Esquilache, because it transferred the cost of the vessels from the
crown to private hands. 122 Despite economic, political, and environmental difficulties,
Duke of Palata was able to dispatch five fleets during the seven years of his government
carrying revenue remittances to the peninsula. 123
One of the most difficult challenges he faced was the presence of pirates in the
South Sea during great part of his administration. During his journey from Madrid to Lima,
the Duke passed through Portobello at the beginning of 1681. Pirates Sharps, Wolmen, and
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Warlen had attacked this port the previous year, and the Duke was conscious of the
potential damage similar attacks could inflict on other ports. When he arrived in Lima, he
found out that a large part of the population appealed for a wall to protect their city. 124Like
many other rulers that preceded him, the Duke perceived the pirates as a tangible and close
threat for the capital and its people. Even though Liñán y Cisneros had rejected Osorio’s
recent report, the Duke was determined to complete Lima’s wall project. The main obstacle
to build the defensive structure was the precarious condition of the royal treasury, which
discouraged royal authorities in both the metropolis and the colony from investing in
infrastructural projects.
Determined to build the wall around Lima, Palata presented Coninck’s project to
the King in 1682, attaching his own comments to support it. Among his suggestions, the
Duke proposed various new means of revenue to support both the construction and
maintenance of the wall, such as a selling tax on meat, monetary fines on crimes, the rents
of some encomiendas, one month of the monthly payments of leases and other rental
contracts, 10 pesos tax for each negro bozal introduced in the city, and the creation of a
monopoly of sealed paper. The Viceroy and the city counselors also recommended that
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those who could not contribute with money would work without compensation, and that
farmers would contribute 4 reales for each fanega produced. 125 Some months later, the
Junta de Guerra in Spain dispatched the plan of Conick to the Duke of Bournonville,
Viceroy and Captain General of Catalonia, who was an experienced architect in military
structures. Bournonville recommended some modifications to the plan, but overall did not
make substantial alterations. 126 In 1685, the Junta de Guerra finally accepted the revised
project.
Nonetheless, news of a pirate attack under the leadership of French Chevalier de
Grammont and Dutch Laurence de Graaf to the port of Veracruz reached Lima in 1683,
reviving anxiety and fear among the population. The commotion generated by this event
was so great that clerics preached about it in their sermons. Every sermon the Viceroy
attended referred to fortresses, towers, and walls. He felt everyone was preaching to him
trying to convince him of the need of a wall. 127 Motivated by this conjuncture, the Viceroy
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summoned the city council on October 23, 1683 to discuss the means to obtain the 700,000
pesos that Coninck estimated for the completion of his project. 128
The Viceroy and the city council approved several measures and new taxes that,
although considerable, were deemed necessary to build the wall. In order to obtain
additional financial support, the Viceroy negotiated with the various corporative groups in
the city. He offered a personal donation of 50,000 pesos before requesting contributions
from different corporations of the city. His negotiations were rewarding. The Consulado
offered to build 3,000 yards of wall. The Ecclesiastical Council, the University of San
Marcos, and the religious orders of Santo Domingo and La Merced donated 10,000 pesos
each; and the Society of Jesus promised to build a bastion om the wall. 129
On November 1683, the Duke sent another missive to the King requesting the
approval of the measures proposed in the meeting with the city council. Without awaiting
royal authorization, the building activities began the next year. Royal approval, issued in
1685, arrived in Lima along with Bournonville’s recommendations. The King granted the
Duke freedom to choose the means to fund the wall, underlining that they would have to
cover also its maintenance. Among the various new income sources, the Viceroy had
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suggested a monopoly on paper bearing the royal seal. Even though the monarch initially
rejected the idea, he finally agreed because of the benefits it would generate to both the
administration and the population. The monopoly was a big concession and a great
administrative innovation. It produced better control on the quantities of official paper
introduced in the capital and fixed the price of each sheet. The royal treasury would obtain
a fixed income according to the quantity sold, and people would be able to purchase paper
at a fixed price the entire year. 130 Given the widespread use of this paper for business and
legal transactions, this was a considerable source of revenue.
By 1687, the city seemed well–protected against pirate attacks because of the new
wall. It covered a surface of 14,000 yards with 34 bastions and 5 gates. The structure left
out the neighborhood of San Lázaro on the other side of the Rimac River, and passed
through El Cercado by the middle. 131 Even though pirates attacked several ports and came
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close to Callao, they never attempted an invasion of Lima. The danger the limeños had
foreseen never arrived; instead, what unexpectedly came was a very destructive earthquake
on October 20.

Image 6: Map of the city of Lima and its fortifications, 1687 132
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On April of 1687, only 6 months before the destructive earthquake of October, four
tremors knocked Lima. The common reaction of the population was the multitudinous
assistance to masses and processions. Nonetheless, people were mainly concentrated on
the construction of the wall, concerned by the concrete threats of pirates in the South Sea. 133
Despite several reactive displays of concern, Lima’s population never really took stock of
whether they were prepared to face another quake.
Conclusion
As the capital of the Peruvian viceroyalty and one of the most important colonies
of the Spanish empire, Lima had a central role in the Spanish world. It was both core and
periphery because it was the heart of a colonial dominion. It became one the main cities of
the New World with a large and diverse population, both transient and permanent. As an
economic and political center, Lima had a constant flow of people and goods from outside
and inside the viceroyalty. In a few decades, Lima occupied a place of supremacy in the
region in commercial, administrative, religious, and cultural matters.
The geographical position of Lima brought some benefits to the city, but it also
produced some hardships. Located next to the coast, Lima’s port, Callao, permitted
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commerce to flourish in the city. Wholesale merchants consolidated power through their
own guild, the Consulado. Pirate fleets, proceeding from Spain’s enemy nations, constantly
approached Callao and other South Sea ports attracted by the viceroyalty’s riches, which
were accumulated in the capital before their remittal to the Spanish metropolis.
Lima’s strategic position was jeopardized by the seismic ground on which it sat.
Lima suffered from periodical tremors and earthquakes. Nonetheless, the recurrence of
these natural events had not motivated authorities to develop a policy to deal with them by
1687. During the colonial period, royal administrators were mainly concerned with more
palpable threats such as the invasion of pirates. Even when facing these tangible
circumstances, colonial authorities hesitated to build defensive structure to defend the
capital and its port, and they were mainly focused on protecting the royal treasury from
excessive expenses.
Peninsular authorities entrusted colonial administrators, especially viceroys, the
duty of dispatching revenues periodically to the metropolis. In order to prevent
overburdening Lima’s royal treasury, royal officers had to resort to alternative sources for
economic support. In order to realize their building projects, both viceroys Mancera and
later the Duke of Palata summoned royal officers under their orders to discuss possible new
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means of revenue. Despite the flexibility they exercised in negotiating with colonial
authorities and corporations, and regardless of the positive outcome of these negotiations,
the viceroys had to ultimately justify their actions before the monarch. The king, along
with his Council of Indies ministers, could either legitimize or censure the decisions of his
colonial representatives. In order to avoid being the object of criticism like Esquilache,
Mancera justified the wall of Callao project by citing the reduction in military expense to
safeguard the port and demonstrating that the construction would not burden the royal
treasury. Similarly, Duke of Palata had to justify his various initiatives such as the contract
with the Huancavelica miners, the administrative reform of the Tribunal de Cuentas, the
use of small vessels to transport silver in the South Sea, and finally the construction of the
Lima wall.
The pending earthquake would cause great destruction and chaos. Lima’s
authorities had to face exceptional conditions that they did not expect. Duke of Palata had
to concentrate his efforts on reconstructing the city rather than promoting reforms. Despite
great obstacles to the rebuilding projects, the Viceroy realized them with the support of
local authorities and ordinary people. The analysis of Lima’s reconstruction, within the
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larger context of Duke of Palata’s administration, offers an ideal context to observe the
interplay of imperial rule, local government, and people.

III.

CHAPTER 2: CAPACITY, CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND COLONIAL
ADMINISTRATION: THE VICEROY AND THE CITY COUNCIL
With the construction of Lima’s wall almost complete, Viceroy Duke of La Palata

saw one of the greatest projects he pursued as head of the viceroyalty of Peru literally built
before his eyes. The frightening idea of pirates raiding the viceroyalty capital disappeared
in the horizon over the South Seas once a tangible form of protection firmly stood
surrounding the city. For many, Lima seemed finally prepared to resist the attack of its
enemies. But an unexpected attack of nature hit instead.
On October 20, 1687, at around four in the morning, a series of telluric movements
woke up Lima’s residents. People rushed to the street; others were trapped by crumbling
ceilings and walls. Dust made the night darker, and confusion prevailed everywhere in the
city. A few minutes later a tsunami hit and flooded Callao, the principal port of the South
Sea, inflicting great damage to neighboring Indian villages. The wall of the city-port could
not contain destructive blast of large tides that destroyed property and took many lives. In
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a matter of a few hours, the city of Lima was in ruins, its population dispossessed and
seeking refuge in nearby open areas. As the head of the central government of Peru,
Viceroy Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duke of Palata, spearheaded the
reconstruction activities. 134 He mobilized and organized other royal officials to maintain
social control, tend the population’s increasing basic needs, and plan the reconstruction of
the city.
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Image 7: The Duke of Palata 135
Analyzing how Lima’s colonial government responded in the wake of this
destructive quake facilitates an evaluation to its capacity of crisis management
and, consequently, allows us to revise the cast of inefficiency that still pervades studies of
the Spanish Hapsburg administration. Managing the aftermath of the 1687 quake in Lima
was beyond the capacity of a single person. In order to tend to people’s basic needs and to
safeguard the social order, the Viceroy gathered and led a contingent of royal officials to
carry out the various tasks that the situation required. The active participation of the
members of Lima’s city council during the post-disaster period shows that these royal
officers were able to effectively react under extraordinary circumstances. The vibrant,
dynamic organizational capacity of the colonial government after the 1687
earthquake contradicts the pale portrait of an inefficient colonial administration.
The capacity of the colonial government to deal with this crisis, caused by a natural
disaster in this case, undermines the notion of Spain’s incapacity to rule. Whether or not
one accepts the idea that Spain was in a long-term decline, there is scholarly consensus that
the last two decades of the seventeenth century were tough for the Spanish
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Hapsburgs. 136 Although beginning in the 1980s several authors began to recognize that
attempts to reform the imperial administration dated from the late seventeenth century and
that many of these initiatives formed the foundation for further reforms during the
eighteenth century, the idea of a steep drop in Spanish governance in the 1680s and 1690s
persists. 137 This is especially true in studies of the American colonies, which portray the
colonial administration under Charles II as poor, corrupt, and lacking the means to
impose the crown’s will on corporate interests, which eventually forced every viceroy to
compromise with the colonial subjects. 138
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This chapter evaluates the performance of the colonial government in Lima vis-àvis the impact of the natural event. 139 Recent studies of natural disasters demonstrate that
the impact of these natural phenomena on human societies reveals social, economic and
political patterns that otherwise remain unremarkable or hidden because they are so
quotidian. 140 A natural event is not necessarily a disaster; it becomes a disaster when it
interacts with human societies’ vulnerability. 141
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Earthquakes in particular are unpredictable geophysical hazards with intense
magnitude, sudden occurrence, rapid onset, and variable geographical extent. 142 This kind
of natural disaster is prone to become a political crisis when the political system is disrupted
and unable to tend to the increase in population’s ordinary needs and the appearance of
more complex demands. 143 Despite the material and social impact seismic events have
produced in human communities across the globe, historians have just recently began to
recognize and analyze their influence on the development of human societies. 144

and illness. The vulnerability of a specific population is determined by socio-economic, political, religious
factors, and lack of prevention and mitigation measures of the disaster’s impact.
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In Latin America, studies of natural disasters, specifically earthquakes, date back
to the early twentieth century. Most of these works consist mainly of simple narrations of
the events surrounding earthquakes in both the colonial and republican periods,
compilation of contemporary witnesses’ accounts, or catalogs of primary sources. 145 They
contain abundant information for future research, yet most of them cover extensive
chronological periods that do not allow deep historical analysis.
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The works of non-Latin American authors have been path-breaking within a
historiography that has grown in the last two decades. 146 For the Peruvian case, most of
these studies focus on the Earthquake of 1746 in Lima, which is considered the most
devastating during the colonial period. 147 Most authors analyze this natural event and its
aftermath as providing the momentum that permitted political, social, and cultural
transformation—the so-called Bourbon Reforms-- in the capital of the Peruvian
viceroyalty. Pedro Pablo Pérez Mallaína’s and Charles Walker’s studies about the 1746
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earthquake emphasize the absolutist reforms that Viceroy Manso de Velasco attempted in
order to increase the colonial administration’s control over the Church and society. 148 Pérez
Mallaína focuses on the government’s economic and political interests behind its postearthquake measures. Walker furthers this analysis and argues that the Viceroy’s reforms
were an early manifestation of the Bourbon reforms, which represented a new way of
ruling. In these accounts, the reforms disrupted traditional and customary relationships
between the colonial state and the royal subjects.
Similar to these contributions, studies on the Earthquake of 1755 in Lisbon
demonstrate that absolutist state representatives used the crisis conjunctures produced by
the natural events to introduce enlightened programs. Unlike Viceroy Manso de Velasco
who had to abandon some of his initiatives and limited the implementation of others, the
Marquis of Pombal, Secretary of State of Portugal, issued measures to improve the
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economic and political power of the Portuguese king, and also promoted the scientific
justification of the natural event in order to undermine the power of the Church. 149
Unlike the studies on these eighteenth-century natural disasters, this dissertation
examines a trajectory of reform that did not follow but rather framed an earthquake. It
examines events particularly during the earthquake’s aftermath to evaluate the capacity of
crisis management displayed by these royal agents. Certainly, it borrows some approaches
from Pérez Mallaína’s and Walker’s works, such as the treatment of the natural events as
historical actors that expose the traditional antagonism between state and church. Yet this
work concentrates on analyzing the nature of the Hapsburg colonial state and the
foundational pillars that maintained it. Therefore, the Earthquake of 1687 is not the central
subject of this dissertation, but rather a historical actor that both halted some of the ongoing
reforms previously initiated, and finally permitted the rebuilding and consolidation of the
early modern state in Lima.
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This chapter focuses on the performance by leading royal officers in Lima,
specifically the Viceroy and the members of the city council, in light of the material, social,
and political turmoil that the earthquake produced, and the conditions of scarcity and
disease that its aftermath brought. Ultimately, this chapter proposes that Lima possessed a
strong and effective early modern government built on compromise and corporate
cooperation. Until the eighteenth century, the rule of a monarch was not geared toward
providing for the common good, but to achieve what was most “conveniente” for every
part of the kingdom. 150 Hence, a negotiating system was not inconsistent with this idea of
government, nor did it denote ineffectiveness or decline.
The sources used in this chapter are mainly official records such as letter, accounts,
testimonies, or meeting records. Despite the official character of these documents, it is
possible to corroborate evidence contrasting one source against another. Testimonies and
official accounts at times differed. Individuals that produced them, either by writing or
through their verbal testimonies transcribed by a third party, offered different perspectives
and information about the same events.
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The Terrible Night
The Jesuit Fray Joseph de Buendía was placidly sleeping in his chamber at the
Jesuit School of San Pablo when strong seismic movements forced him to seek refuge
under the doorframe. Shortly after, his cell neighbor Fray Medina was by his side,
frightened, and asking for confession. Both of them kneeled, cried, prayed, and absolved
each other’s faults. They remained heartbroken on their knees, waiting for a tragic end. As
a last recourse, they raised their hands begging for divine assistance, an the earthquake
suddenly stopped.
After recovering from the initial shock, both Jesuits, along with other members of
their religious order, left the school in order to offer assistance to those who survived the
strong quake. As soon as they reached the street, they witnessed a terrible scene of wanton
destruction and death. The chaos was ubiquitous. Survivors were trying to rescue those
who remained under the debris or recover the corpses of relatives and friends. The scenario
was horrible. People were crying and begging for heaven’s mercy but the earth continued
shaking. 151

151

Joseph de Buendía, “Relación del temblor que arruinó a Lima el 20 de octubre de 1687,” in Terremotos.

Colección de las relaciones mas notables que ha sufrido esta capital y que la han arruinado, edited by
Manuel de Odriozola (Lima: Tipografía de A.Alfaro, 1863), 24.

91

The movement that woke up Fray Buendía was the first of two intense earthquakes
that hit Lima on October 20. According to various descriptions of this event, the shaking
started around four in the morning. 152 Most of Lima’s residents were sleeping when the
first tremor started. As people tried to run away, chaos and confusion reigned. Fortunately,
many were able to escape unscathed though, having the clothes they wore as their only
remaining possession. 153 This first tremor produced the collapse of some structures that
crushed and trapped many people. Because of the intensity of this quake, people remained
in the streets quivering in the cold, afraid of returning to their homes.
As soon as the commotion from this first shock waned, people began to assist the
wounded and rescue the trapped, just as the Jesuits of the San Pablo School did. Suddenly,
a second earthquake, more intense than the former one, struck the city again. It destroyed
those buildings that remained standing after the previous quake. The ecclesiastical
buildings suffered the greatest damage, and only a few did not completely collapse. 154
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The seismic movements also afflicted the port of Callao. A greater tragedy came
from the sea just a few hours later when a tsunami hit the Peruvian littoral destroying Callao
and the surrounding towns of fishermen Indians, Pitipiti y Quilcay. 155 The power of the
tsunami reached various port-towns on the coastline, producing inundations in towns such
as Chancay, on the northern shore, and Pisco, Cañete, and Chincha, on the southern
shore. 156
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Image 8: Indian settlements, Pitipiti and Quilcay, destroyed by the earthquake. 157
At sunrise, Lima’s residents realized the magnitude of the material destruction the
earthquake produced. Almost all their religious buildings had collapsed, and many friars
and nuns died inside their cloisters. The Chapel of Sagrario, located next to the
archbishop’s palace, was the only church that remained standing. Yet, it exhibited so many
cracks that no one dared to enter it. 158 The viceregal palace, home of the viceroy and
headquarter of various branches of government, was completely destroyed. The portals of
the Plaza Mayor and the City Hall were also in ruins.
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Image 9: Lima’s main buildings and plazas. 1. Plaza Mayor, 2. Viceregal Palace,
3. Cathedral, 4. Sagrario Chapel, 5. City Hall, 6. San Agustín Convent, 7. Santo Domingo
Convent, 8. La Merced Convent, 9. San Francisco Convent, 10. Monserrate Church, 11.
San Francisco de Paula Hospice, 12. Plaza del Cercado, 13. San Pablo School and
Society of Jesus Church, 14. Alhóndiga, and 15. Casa de la Moneda. 159
Many private buildings suffered damage, but to a lesser degree than those of the
Church and the colonial administration. Nonetheless, people refused to return to their
permanent residences. They feared that the remaining structures could fall down anytime,
so they looked for alternative places for shelter. They erected temporary dwellings in open
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spaces, away from the crumbling structures. 160 Even religious men and women had to
abandon their cloisters to find refuge in gardens, plazas, and empty lots.
The first place limeños occupied was the Plaza Mayor, the political and symbolic
center of the city. Even the Viceroy and his family had to live there for a few months. Most
people, both lay and religious, spread throughout the city and its outskirts. Some fortunate
religious congregations were able to build temporal adobe structures on land within their
property. For instance, the San Agustín and Santo Domingo friars moved to the gardens of
their convents. Similarly, the religious of the Convent of Merced relocated within a plot,
called Belen, which belonged to their order. 161
Elite residents were also able to find protection in open spaces within their own
property, which also harbored people from diverse social conditions that sought shelter.
For instance, outside the southern section of the city wall, in the yard named San Jacinto,
property of Antonio Jiménez, people built temporary dwellings of different materials such
as wood, mats, reeds, and straws. They even erected a school for children and two chapels
that some priests tended. Close to Monserrate Church, on the eastern side of the city, in
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another yard called El Cuero, property of Don Juan de Aliaga, many families constructed
several chambers and a chapel among the trees. Similarly, people occupied many other
private gardens, yards, and vacant lots around the city, inside or outside its walls. 162
Lima’s population filled every available space without regard for social division.
People of both genders arrived at the yard of the San Francisco de Paula Hospice. Because
the chapel, cells, and rooms belonging to this institution were destroyed, the religious living
at the hospice moved to the yard. During his inspection of the city, notary Diego Fernández
Montaño was surprised to find out that religious men were sharing the same space with lay
people of both genders. 163 The royal officer was also astonished to find a majority of
Spaniard families located at the main square of the Indian town of El Cercado, adjacent to
Lima. 164 The spreading of the population and the mingling of social groups alarmed the
royal authorities.
The large amount of debris on the streets and the fetid odor of corpses accentuated
the rampant disorder. Despite the efforts to rescue people from the rubble, many corpses
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remained buried. Some contemporary witnesses recalled that among those rescued from
the debris, there were some already dead and others alive. A few of the latter were
unscathed, yet many others had wounds. Those severely injured received spiritual
assistance rather than medical treatment. Royal authorities calculated the death toll
between 300 and 400. 165 This amount represented a small fraction of the whole population
of Lima, which ascended to around 32,000 people. 166 Regardless of the accuracy of this
official amount, contemporary witnesses lamented only the loss of influential people, such
as Don Alvaro Ponce de León, who died suffocated by dust; General Don Juan Ramirez de
Arellano, his wife Doña Ines de Rivera, and their son Nicolás, who died when a wall from
their home collapsed on top of them; and oidores Don Diego de la Rocha, Don Alonso del
Castillo, and Don Diego Portales. 167
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The government met compounding challenges trying to rule and control a
dispersed and dispossessed population. The new configuration of the city, with so many
small settlements across the city and its surrounding areas, also altered the ordinary means
of food distribution. Scarcity and hunger became part of quotidian life in the months
following the quake. Disease soon struck survivors’ debilitated bodies.
Describing the general feeling of the population, Dominican priest Fray Domingo
Alvarez said, “Today [Lima] cries, miserable [in] her ruin, all her greatness and buildings
obliterated by the soil.” 168 The condition of the city was critical. The cleaning, ordering,
and rebuilding activities demanded arduous and backbreaking labor. The population also
required basic provisions of food and water in order to survive. All these tasks represented
a grueling trial for the colonial government.
Tending to Temporal Necessities
As head of the colonial government, Duke of La Palata assumed the responsibility
of reconstructing and reorganizing the city. He rapidly mobilized the members of the city
council in order to organize the administration of the city under the new critical
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circumstances. He assumed leadership roles in the activities of temporal assistance and
reconstruction, as well as in religious matters because of the prolonged absence of the
spiritual shepherd from the city, Archbishop Liñán y Cisneros. In the following months
after the quake, the dispersal of population and the new precarious living conditions
generated a favorable setting for the outbreak of diseases, which took a toll greater than the
earthquake itself. Rather than signs of failure, these circumstances were challenges the
administration could not avoid and had to overcome.
During the night of the disastrous event, the Duke and his family abandoned the
viceregal palace when the first quake hit. Once at the Plaza Mayor, the Viceroy left his
family and went to assist those trapped under the rubble who were clamoring for help. 169
He was busy digging out the survivors when the second tremor produced the collapse of
many more buildings. He recalled his greatest fear “was that of the earth I stepped on,
because it did as sea waves, that I could not stand on, and kneeling, to die, was unable to
maintain myself on the ground.” 170 As soon as this second quake was over, he took the first
measures to deal with the critical conditions of the city.
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One of his first decisions was to establish his provisional lodging at the heart of the
city or Plaza Mayor. The Duke had to accommodate himself and his family in a humble
cabin erected at the plaza to lodge them. Despite the poor condition of this new dwelling,
the Duke believed that it provided a strategic and central place to perform his governmental
duties. The Viceroy recalled he “did not want to stay away from the center of the city
downtown, as it seemed to me [the viceroy] it would be a huge grief for everyone to see
their viceroy departing from them; and of much inconvenience any distance for the prompt
and extraordinary actions with which now it has to be ruled, because there are no courts.”171
He realized that his behavior would set an example for the population, so he resolved to
act with strength and determination to instill in others the same confidence. For the Duke,
the service for the people and the crown came before his personal interests.
The destruction of the viceregal palace meant that various branches of the royal
administration lost their traditional space to discuss governing matters. The Real
Audiencia, Court of Crime, Tribunal of Accounts, and Treasury suspended their meetings
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for some months because their members lacked appropriate places to meet. 172 In addition,
many ministers were unable to tend to their administrative duties because they were
providing for their families’ necessities or recovering from injuries. Two high court judges,
Don Diego de la Rocha and Don Diego Portales, died in the quake. For this reason, the
number of ministers available to participate in the Real Acuerdo, or viceroy’s counseling
body, decreased to three active members. 173
A few months later, after the Viceroy and his family abandoned the makeshift
rooms they lived in at the Plaza Mayor, the tribunals finally resumed their activities in the
new available spaces. Nonetheless, the Viceroy did not suspend the tasks of his
administration, as many branches of the government did, during months of the aftermath.
He summoned the members of the city council, which continued actively working under
his orders.
Studies of this corporative body portray it as an institution more emblematic than
pragmatic. However, after the quake its members played important roles during the
recovery and reconstruction period. Scholars criticize the sumptuous expenses of the
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colonial cabildos to organize ceremonies to celebrate the entrance of a new viceroy and
important royal events, such as the birth of a prince or military victories. 174 The expenses
for ceremonial activities account for the shortages of the cabildos’ budgets. 175 Nonetheless,
city councils had many other functions that were more ordinary, such as the provision of
food, the regulation of prices, and control of social order. The Earthquake of 1687 offers
the opportunity to closely examine those other regular activities altered during the disaster.
Two days after the earthquake, the Viceroy held his first official meeting with the
members of the city council. On this occasion, the counselors and the Duke reviewed the
city council’s records for the year 1586, when another earthquake hit the city, in order
to issue the necessary measures to reorganize the city. In this meeting, the Viceroy named
two provisional alcaldes to assist the two officers that already occupied this post. 176 The

174

Pablo Emilio Pérez-Mallaína, “Le pouvoir de l'etat les forces de la nature: la reconstruction de Lima

apres le tremblement de terre de 1687,” in De Séville a Lima, edited by Alain Musset and Pablo Pérez
Mallaína (Paris: Université de Paris X – Nanterre, Laboratoire de Géographie Urbaine, 1997), 171-174.

175

Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 123.

176

Jay Kinsbruner, The Colonial Spanish-American City. Urban Life in the Age of Atlantic Capitalism

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 34; John Preston Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the
Hapsburgs: A Study in the Origins and Power of the Town Council in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1530 – 1700
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1954), 145. Actas del Cabildo de Lima, Libro 31, Archivo Histórico de la
Municipalidad Metropolitana de Lima (hereafter AHMML), f. 157v-158. The number of alcaldes
ordinarios in the city council was traditionally two. The Viceroy duplicated the number as a measure to
expedite the traditional activities of these officers.

103

purpose of this measure was to improve the city council’s efforts to distribute food and
control the social order, which became difficult because of the dispersion of people
throughout and beyond the city.
For royal administrators, the chaos and disorder converted the city in a propitious
place for robbery or other illicit practices of lower groups. Except for two instances, which
occurred outside the city, sources remain silent about criminal activity in Lima. 177 Without
denying that the conditions of the city offered good possibilities for illicit behavior,
authorities’ negative perception of the lower groups, especially of non-whites , drove their
interest to accentuate social control and security in the city.
The Viceroy was also concerned that crumbling building structures might
unexpectedly collapse on top of pedestrians. In the following days, the Duke appointed
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seven commissioners (comisarios) to assess the damage of the buildings located on the
principal streets. These officers had to explore the entire city, along with a construction
master (alarife), to identify the structures that were prone to collapse, so that, according to
the Viceroy’s orders, they could be demolished. He realized the gravity of the damage these
buildings could generate if they finally collapsed.
Colonial administrators tried to control the inflation of wages and building supplies,
which would have increased because of the urgencies of reconstructing property. The
Duke fixed the salary of construction masters and laborers (alarifes, barretones, and
peones) to limit the increasing wages these workers began to request. 178 The Viceroy
attempted to control these wages because they would overburden private owners and
tenants, who had to assume the unexpected expenses of reconstructing their properties. 179
The different measures implemented by Duke during the earthquake’s aftermath show he
aimed to govern in a balanced way.
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In the following months, the city council followed the same policy of fixing the
prices of certain construction materials: the cahíz of cal at 12 pesos, a thousand bricks at
22 pesos, a thousand large adobe blocks at 34 pesos, and a thousand small ones at 32 pesos.
Counselors ordered this measure because these products became essential and of great
demand during the period of reconstruction. If someone was caught reselling construction
materials, the council would confiscate them, assigning two-thirds of the product towards
the rebuilding of the city hall and the remaining to compensate the informer who alerted
the body of the illegal sales. 180
The city council also ruled that those laborers who demanded excessive salaries
would be condemned to work for one month without compensation on the reconstruction
of the City Hall building and its jail. 181 In addition, counselors prohibited natives from
being put to work on reconstruction activities because they were more useful working their
land than in the city. 182 This concern about maintaining Indians in the fields responded to
the necessity of supplying enough food for Lima’s people.
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The provision of food was among the customary duties of the city council, yet it
became a priority after the earthquake in order to battle the waves of disease and hunger
that spread very quickly. 183 The precarious condition of the temporary dwellings exposed
people to the nocturnal cold and the diurnal heat, creating a propitious environment for the
eruption of diseases. 184 Just a few days after the quake, the city council reported outbreaks
of “sudden diseases” among the population. 185 The following months of late spring and
summer brought more discomfort, and hunger accentuated the weather’s harshness. 186
Counselors were afraid of food shortages. One of their main concerns was to
procure the supply of lamb and beef. They ordered the providers to secure enough of these
products. They also agreed to closely supervise the activities of the suppliers, register their
herds and fields, and fine them if they failed to offer enough meat. 187 The provision of
bread and water had also diminished because the earthquake had buried all the bakeries
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and inundated the ditches of the city. 188 For that reason, the city council instructed the
alcalde ordinario Don Diego de Manrique to request testimony from all bakers in the city.
Manrique had to inquire if they had any wheat in their possession, what quantities, and how
they obtained it. 189 The purpose of this investigation was to uncover possible suppliers that
might be selling overpriced wheat.
The counselors were also concerned that the shortage of food and the disruption of
common methods of supply would increase the price of the most sought-after food
products. The dispersion of people throughout the city also obstructed the activities of food
distribution. In addition to controlling the provision of basic food products, such as meat,
wheat, and tallow, 190 the royal officers fixed some prices. For instance, they established
the price of fat at 5 pesos per arroba, tallow at 5 pesos 4 reales, and wheat at 4 pesos 4
reales. 191
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This increased concern to protect Lima’s food provisions became evident in the
counselors’ close supervision of the transactions of goods and services. The constant
inspection of suppliers’ pens, cattle, and products resulted in prosecutions and fines. The
first of these incidents involved the lamb supplier, Alonso Sánchez de Bustamante. In 1685,
the city council had contracted Bustamante to provide meat for six years. In exchange,
Bustamante offered to pay 80,000 pesos to obtain this exclusive right. The royal officers
assigned this money to fund the construction of the city wall. 192 Three months later, after
the quake, the counselors noticed the amount and quality of meat that Bustamante was
selling had declined. After a rapid investigation, they confirmed that Bustamante was
offering poor-quality meat, “bad and thin.” 193 The council’s members punished this
supplier with the reduction of his selling price. Additionally, in order to increase the
provision of meat, the counselors allowed any person to sell meat at a higher price than
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permitted to Bustamante. 194 They cut into the exclusive concession of Bustamante trying
to both compensate the consumers and penalize the lamb supplier. The cabildo also
punished the supplier of fat, Captain Roque Falcón, with 4,000 pesos for distributing very
liquid fat, and levied a fine of 1,000 pesos on beef provider, Pedro Pasqual del Valle, for
selling poor quality meat. 195
Despite the measures to provide enough food for Lima’s residents, the summer
months took their toll. In March, a plague of typhus fever (tabardillo) and tertian fever
(tercianas) ravaged the city. 196 The physicians calculated that around 14,000 people got
sick with “fevers and sudden pains”, and approximately 2,600 had died. 197 The
disorganized dispersion of the people and the short number of physicians hindered the
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provision of medical attention to the sick. 198 In fact, the death toll from the plague was
higher than the estimated 400 casualties from the quake. Even though the administration
took measures to tend the population’s need, the combination of scarcity and poor living
conditions undermined people’s resistance to disease.
Nevertheless, it is evident the counselors improved the performance of their duties.
The Viceroy’s close supervision tightened the operation of the city council. The Duke was
able to organize his subalterns to tend the increasing needs of the population. The cabildo’s
increased control and surveillance of food suppliers demonstrated that its members had the
capacity to at least try to deal with critical conditions. Royal officers took steps to quickly
organize and develop means to deal with the critical conditions of the city. Together, the
Viceroy and other royal officers established measures oriented to provide appropriate
solutions to the demands created during the chaotic post– disaster period.
Spanish Empire’s Bureaucracy
The dynamic interplay of imperial and local government became apparent in the
joint response by the Viceroy and the city council to the earthquake. To examine the
dynamics of imperial rule, it is necessary to set the metropolis and the colony on the same
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analytical ground, and observe the interconnection and reciprocal processes of shaping
ideas, knowledge, and practices in the post-disaster period. These interactions—made
visible after the Earthquake of 1687-- reveal the logic behind early modern government.
In the months following the quake, the Viceroy and the city council implemented
various measures and issued new rules targeted to provide the “right thing”—government
services or recognition-- to each part of the society. This “right thing” was far from a
common good for the entire society. For early modern rulers, the art of government
consisted of providing what was most appropriate, according to social standing, to each
part of society. 199 The Duke attempted to provide each group he ruled (proprietors,
laborers, food supplies, royal officers, etc.) the most appropriate provisions. The city
council understood and followed suit, and applied the logic of early modern governance
through the rules it created and the penalties it imposed during the reconstruction period.
The performance of the Viceroy during the aftermath of the earthquake reflects the
practices of imperial rule in a Spanish colony. The Duke de la Palata was the representative
of the Spanish king and, consequently, embodied the legitimacy of the imperial
government in its colonies. At the same time, he was part of a growing bureaucracy that
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the Spanish crown instituted with the purpose of improving the administration of both the
metropolis and the colonies.
The expansiveness of the Spanish empire meant various and different kinds of
natural disasters afflicted diverse parts or kingdoms. Some disasters, such as disease or
famine, were common in pre-modern times, regardless of the geographic area. Others
natural events such as hurricanes and earthquakes affected only specific areas.
Nevertheless, during the seventeenth century in Europe, the “little Ice Age” had produced
lower-than-average temperatures during the previous century, resulting in weak harvests.
The constant wars that spread throughout Europe accentuated scarcity and made people
prone to contact a disease. Climate change also produced an increasing telluric activity
around the “ring of fire” in the Pacific Ocean.
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of 1665-68, and 1677-83 aggravated the situation. 202 Floods in 1680 and 1681, and
droughts in 1682 and 1683, produced a food shortages, causing famine in the entire
peninsula. 203 Earthquakes hit several other parts of the empire: the province of Cumaná in
Santo Domingo, during the night of May 4, 1684, the provinces of Riobamba, Tacunga,
Ambato, and Patata in Ecuador, on June 20, 1698.204 In Europe, the city of Naples and the
Calabria region also suffered a terrible earthquake on June 5, 1688.
News of the different disasters reached the metropolis, where royal administrators
began to develop a certain familiarity with them and issued measures accordingly. 205 The
expansiveness of the empire promoted the dissemination of such knowledge. In the various
years that the Duke occupied high administrative posts in the metropolis, Castile had
suffered a prolonged wave of disasters. It is possible that during the years he served the
Spanish crown in the Old World, the Duke of Palata developed the knowledge and capacity
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to deal with critical conditions. 206 Compounded with a strong leadership personality, he
seemed a perfect public servant to deal with the 1687 Lima disaster.
As mentioned above, witnesses recalled the Duke personally participated in the
rescue of people trapped under the debris. He rapidly made strategic decisions, such as
when he preferred to occupy a reed cottage in the Plaza Mayor, from where he could
supervise the administration of the city, rather than move to a better accommodation
outside of Lima. He gathered the city counselors and took the measures necessary to tend
to the most needy. Father Buendía recounted the Duke gave alms from his own money to
the people. 207 Another witness praised the devotion of the Viceroy, who led various
processions with the purpose of mitigating God’s wrath. 208 Most of the contemporary
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sources mentioned the active performance of the Viceroy during the months after the quake
in both political and religious matters.
He was emblematic of the Spanish empire: experience in natural disasters and a
moving bureaucracy. The Lima Earthquake of 1687, along with other disasters that hit the
Spanish empire, may have instilled in state officials a new awareness about calamities and
their effects. Even though officials did not develop a universal, systemic imperial policy to
deal with disasters until the end of the seventeenth century, its bureaucrats had learned to
design and implement particular responses according to local circumstances.
Among the most challenging local circumstances the Duke faced in the earthquake’s
aftermath was rebuilding the administrative buildings with the paltry funds in the royal
treasury. Indeed, the treasury was in precarious condition as the crumbling architectural
structures of the city.
The Reconstruction Projects of the Colonial Administration
The earthquake heavily damaged various buildings that were visual representations
of royal power, such as the viceregal palace and the city hall. The Viceroy was conscious
that the royal treasury would have to fund the reconstruction of these former entirely but
he expected to find other sources to repair the latter. He knew the precarious condition of
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the royal treasury represented a financial challenge for his rebuilding projects. Nonetheless,
he was determined to make them happen.
Urbanism played a crucial element in providing power to the ruling elites. The
geography of Spanish American cities embodied the heterogeneous and hierarchical nature
of the colonial societies and their governmental system. 209 The crown delineated the
guidelines for the foundation of the city and the distribution of its blocks. The growth of
Lima brought about many transformations to its architecture, both secular and religious. A
few decades after its foundation, stable and permanent houses replaced the provisional and
experimental ones the conquerors had built. Limeños began to build two-story residences
since the 1570s. They mainly used lime, bricks and stones to build façades, columns, and
foundations, and employed adobe to fill the interior walls. Starting in the 1620s, wood
became the most demanded product used in the upper-stories because of its flexibility and
resistance to tremors. Quincha (mud-covered framework of wood or reed) and reed were
also other original and flexible materials that builders used in their projects. 210
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The frequency of telluric movements in Lima also affected the construction patterns
of religious structures. Religious buildings followed new architectonic plans and vaults as
they required repairs or reconstruction. By 1660s, plaster and wood began to replace bricks,
stones, and limes in the constructions of vaults and arches because they were more flexible
and resistant. It was until after the Earthquake of 1687 that quincha, wood, and plaster
became more popular among construction masters because domes made with these
materials had resisted the intensity of the natural event. 211
The original design of the city followed a symbolic order where every element had
its specific place, and the plaza functioned as a theater from where the political system
displayed authority through both administrative and religious buildings. 212 The appearance
of public buildings had the purpose to manifest the power of the government. 213In Lima,
as in other cities, royal power was concentrated on the Plaza Mayor, which represented the
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core of urban social, political, and cultural life. 214 Because of the symbolic power of
buildings, ruling groups elaborated imposing constructions. Both the viceregal palace and
the city council had two-stories, two interior patios, and several chambers that functioned
as dependencies of diverse governmental branches. Stones and bricks were the main
materials utilized in both buildings for the foundation, ground level columns, and façades.
Wood was mainly used for second story corridors and balconies. 215 Unfortunately, the
expenses of carrying out the reconstruction of these public buildings were extremely
burdensome on the royal treasury. 216
Despite the various financial responsibilities of the royal treasury, the colonial
administration’s primary duty was to remit bullion to the peninsula in order to support the
king’s diverse enterprises. The Duke understood that the King prioritized royal revenue
above rebuilding. He recalled in his memoir, “Even though in defense and safety of the
life, honor, and wealth of such good vassals His Majesty would employ all his treasures
with great joy, I cannot offer them in present times, because the troubles of the Monarchy

214

Osorio, Inventing Lima, 152.

215

Jorge Bernales Ballesteros, Lima. La Ciudad y Sus Monumentos (Sevilla: Consejo Superior de

Investigaciones Científicas, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1972),126, 193, 194.

216

Navarra y Rocaful, “Memoria de Gobierno,” 18.

119

in the closest parts to the heart [the peninsula], need all the aid and assistance of his royal
treasury, without diverting them to another part (Lima).” 217 He underlined that such
troubles at the court were more important than providing financial relief to Lima’s loyal
subjects.
Despite the significant role Lima played in the crown’s imperial structure as a
commercial, fiscal, and administrative center of South Spanish America, peninsular
authorities perceived the immediate material needs of the colonial subjects as distant.218
The Duke, a peninsular bureaucrat in the New World, was aware that the King and his main
ministers understood the metropolis’ economic needs were a priority. Therefore, he had to
fulfill the double task of reconstructing Lima and sending funds to the peninsula.
The destruction of all the public buildings in the city represented exorbitant
expenses for the royal treasury, which was in a chronic deficit. The Duke realized that the
royal treasury would be unable to defray the costs to repair and reconstruct all the buildings.
Yet, when he took on this project, he resorted to various mechanisms to reduce costs or
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obtain alternative funds. In order to rebuild the viceregal palace, the Duke summoned an
emergency meeting, a “junta extraordinaria de tribunales,” where he presented his projects
of reconstruction to the high-ranking royal officers of the colonial administration. 219 When
asked by the civil authorities, bricklayer Manuel of Escobar recommended the demolition
of the viceregal palace’s second level in order to spare some undamaged parts of the first
floor and convert it into a new building. 220 The Viceroy argued that the cost of constructing
this one-floor palace would be considerably less than repairing the entire building. 221 Since
the new palace would have only one story, as opposed to the two levels in the previous
palace, the Viceroy’s project would significantly reduce the useful space in the new palace.
The viceregal family, the royal tribunals, and other dependencies would have to
share the one-floor structure. Nonetheless, the Duke successfully persuaded the junta
members to approve his project. 222 The works on the new viceregal palace began
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immediately, and the first rooms were ready four months later. Aware that the
reconstruction activities had started around the city, and many proprietors or tenants
returned to their residences or found alternative places to move to, the Duke decided to
take advantage of this event to clear the Plaza Mayor, which was still occupied by temporal
dwellings. He ordered those that were still living in the plaza to return to their homes or
find another place to relocate to. 223 As the rebuilding of private property began, there was
also an increased demand to rent because rental contracts became beneficial for tenants
who were willing to repair damaged buildings. 224 Once the Duke and his family moved
back to their palace, tribunals resumed their activities because the royal administrators were
able to meet in the rooms vacated by the viceregal family in the Plaza Mayor.
The city hall was another building of important symbolic power for the colonial
administration, and it required major repairs. The Viceroy wanted to find alternative
sources for reconstructing this building in order to reduce the cost the royal treasury would
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have to cover. Various construction masters appraised the costs of clearing the debris and
repairing the city hall and provided quotes that ascended to 40,000 pesos. 225 Unfortunately,
the city council had no funds to pay for the reconstruction of its headquarters.
This institution had long faced serious economic troubles. Before the quake, at the
beginning of his administration, the Duke discovered the council’s longstanding debt and
that it often resorted to taking loans from the Caja de Indios, a treasury established
exclusively for native subjects in the viceroyalty. 226 The debt this administrative body had
accrued reached 42,000 pesos. The Duke realized that the cabildo could hardly pay back
such debt if its treasury remained in a negative balance. Therefore, he channeled new
income sources to the city council, which was able to increase its budget
by 8,000 pesos. With the Duke’s reforms, the city council managed a surplus, which was
sufficient to repay the Caja de Indios.
Unfortunately, the earthquake brought down the Duke’s recovery plan for the city
council’s treasury. In addition to its headquarters, the cabildo suffered material losses
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amounting to 36,000 pesos on its propios (municipal properties). 227 Facing the unexpected
costs of repairing all these properties, the counselors asked the Viceroy to grant them some
lands in Callao, Carabayllo and Chuquitanta as propios. 228
The counselors argued that these common land (ejidos) included pastures that the
city had possessed since its foundation, or they had plots never assigned previously to any
institution or individual. Therefore, no third party would be affected if the Viceroy acceded
to their request. 229 In order to push forward their request, the members of the cabildo
appointed commissioners to assess the amount of income these properties could generate
according to the quantity of land, houses, and wood available. 230
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Image 10: Location of lands requested as propios by the city council 231
The Viceroy saw this initiative of the counselors as beneficial to the royal treasury,
the city council, and the population. In a letter to the King, he justified his decision to grant
the city council’s petition. He explained that the royal treasury would not have to directly
cover the repairs of the city council’s properties; the city council could rebuild its properties
and repay its multiple debts with the rental proceeds. Lima’s residents would benefit from
the new tenants’ livestock or agricultural production. 232
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The poor condition of the royal treasury motivated the Viceroy to implement such
measures. The city council not only assisted with the implementation, but also with the
development of projects to provide funding. Local authorities, whose lives and interests
were rooted in their own cities, were probably more prone to cooperate with the
administrators of the central government when it benefitted the city. 233 As long as they
perceived the administration of the viceroy as fair and “conveniente”, they supported his
measures and projects.
The members of the city council also responded positively to the Duke’s order to
promptly rebuild the city jail. In a letter to the council, the Viceroy urged its members to
quickly tend to the jail because the order and security of the city depended on securely
guarding

prisoners.

The

counselors

assigned

the

proceeds
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words, social order was funded by disorder: the city jail was rebuilt with the the fines
charged to meat and tallow suppliers for distributing poor quality products, construction
workers who demanded excessive salaries, and the sellers of overpriced construction
materials. 235
The rapid negotiations to restore the rent from the alhóndiga, or granary, also
display the council’s interest in restoring its sources of income. The earthquake had
drastically damaged the building of this granary, which belonged to the city. Because of
the excessive cost of rebuilding, tenant Don Juan de Soto, knight of the order of Alcántara,
requested permission from the council to relinquish the leasing contract (called a censo) he
held. He also paid 400 pesos as compensation for prematurely ending the contract. The
counselors decided to accept de Soto’s request in order to lease the granary to a new tenant
who might be willing to cover the reconstruction of the property. 236
Therefore, the city council was not an administrative body that blindly obeyed the
viceroy’s orders. Its members actively contributed to both develop and implement
measures and plans of reconstruction. As the next chapters will reveal, this distinguished
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them from royal officers of the Real Audiencia, the Tribunal de Cuentas, and other
administrative branches. City counselors worked from the start of the reconstruction
process along the Viceroy.
Conclusion
The Spanish colonial administration’s capacity for crisis management was both
effective and pre-modern. The Viceroy, as representative of the king, fulfilled his
responsibilities in a commendable manner. Amidst the widespread chaos and destruction
of Lima, he was a tenacious figure that brought comfort to the dispossessed population of
city. Even though his capacities were not exceptional, he displayed remarkable leadership
and organizational faculties. He adopted diverse measures to effectively deal with the
growing demands of the city. Along with other royal officers, he pioneered an effective
response to the disaster.
Providing for people’s material needs and the reconstruction of the city’s buildings
was an enormous undertaking that surpassed the capabilities of any one individual. The
Viceroy played a leading role; yet, the large scope of his plans was possible through the
active participation of the members of the city council. Rather than retiring to their homes
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to rest from the earthquake’s fury, the counselors gathered with the Viceroy to design the
various measures to manage the crisis faced by the city.
Altogether, the royal administrators developed different strategies to respond to the
crisis in the short and long term. The new conditions of the city, such as the dispersion of
people throughout the city, limited the distribution of food, medical assistance, and control
of social order. Nonetheless, the administration of the city was able to reorganize its
activities in order to increase the supervision of food provision and the number of officials
in charge of controlling order in the city.
The poor condition of the royal treasury created severe limitations on potential
reconstruction projects. The royal officers chose the least expensive alternatives, such as
the reconstruction of the new one-story viceregal palace. The Viceroy and counselors also
developed new strategies to increase the number of funding sources, such as fines on food
distributors and construction laborers. The city council also negotiated with the Viceroy
new usufruct rights over its holdings to increase its budget. The Viceroy agreed because he
understood that this institution needed the income and would relieve the burden on the
royal treasury.

129

It is evident that the Viceroy implemented diverse measures to tend the different
needs of Lima’s residents after the earthquake. When the Viceroy awarded the city council
the land in Callao, Carabayllo and Chuquitanta, he conceded the grant hoping it would
provide the necessary means for the cabildo to both cover its expenses and repay its debt
to the Caja de Indios. At the same time, the royal treasury would benefit from this measure
because the council would not request additional assistance from the overloaded treasury
after receiving the new grant. When the counselors imposed penalties on rogue food
suppliers, their pursuit targeted a triple goal: punish the offenders, compensating
consumers, and provide the economic means to build the city jail.
Overall, the colonial administration of Lima was able to cope with the crisis context
that the Earthquake of 1687 produced. Royal officers adapted to the critical circumstances
and dealt with the new configurations of dwellings, shortage of food, and predictable scams
that some residents attempted to pull off during the chaos. With rapid organization and
effective measures, the royal administrators were able to manage the effects of the
earthquake. Far from incompetent, the measures of the Duke and the city council
demonstrated a creative capacity to tend to people’s basic needs and initiate the
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reconstruction of the city. Decisions were carefully crafted to provide what was most
“conveniente” or balanced for each sector of the colonial society.
During the months following the quake, the reconstruction of the city involved not
only royal agents but also other people in positions of leadership. Nonetheless, not all of
them were as enthusiastic about participating in the rebuilding activities as were the
Viceroy and city council. Even though the Church was an important component of the
colonial enterprise, its complexity became evident in the aftermath of the earthquake. The
secular clergy, unlike the religious orders in the city, resisted the reconstruction projects of
the colonial administrators.
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IV.

CHAPTER 3: A SEEMINGLY STRONG SURFACE: INTERNAL
DIVISIONS AND INTRICACIES OF THE COLONIAL CHURCH

Even when both secular and regular clergymen shared common spiritual objectives
and functions, the constitution of both religious branches in the New World and their
relationship to the crown influenced their temporal and spiritual activities. The earthquake
unveiled the intricate nature of the Church’s constitution, functions, and interests, which
were not always oriented to serve the needs of the spiritual herd of Lima.
The composition of the colonial church resulted from a contradictory and parallel
process of development of both the secular and the regular clergy in the New World. After
the conquest, the Pope granted the Spanish kings a series of cumulative rights in exchange
of evangelizing the lands recently discovered. In 1501, he conceded to the Spanish royalty
the tithes collected in the Indies. In 1508, the monarchs obtained the right to present the
candidates for ecclesiastical posts in the New World to the Pope. In 1543, the Pontiff gave
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the Spanish kings permission to establish ecclesiastical jurisdictions. 237 Because of these
rights, which constituted what was called “Royal Patronage,” the Spanish crown built a
large ecclesiastical structure of various new jurisdictions within the newly conquered lands.
In contrast to the royal rights that shaped the secular clergy in Spanish America,
the papal bull Omnímoda of 1522 granted broader privileges to the religious orders. It
specifically conceded to them the ability to administer sacraments and gave them
jurisdiction over canon law, which secular clergy traditionally exercised, in areas with no
diocesan presence. 238 In the following decades, regular clerics began to arrive in the New
World in great numbers, and took a leading position in the evangelization of indigenous
people, and the foundation of churches and convents. Even though the bull granted such
rights only in case of absence of the secular clergy, friars resisted giving up these
prerogatives, claiming they possessed superior capacity and morality to tend to the
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Indians’ spiritual needs. 239 The clashes between the secular and the regular clergies
would vex the crown’s attempts to impose strong control on the church’s activities.
The regular clergy developed a strong presence in the viceroyalty’s interior
provinces, where Indians represented a large percentage of the population. Nonetheless,
as capital of the viceroyalty, Lima concentrated an extensive religious population, both
female and male, who occupied the low and high-ranking positions in the various clerical
hierarchies. The Cathedral, the archbishopric palace, and other principal convents and
monasteries of the religious orders made Lima a concretely religious city.
There were sixty-five religious buildings in the city by the time the quake hit Lima,
as mentioned in chapter 2. Located in front of the Plaza Mayor, a few steps from the
viceregal palace, the Cathedral and the adjacent archbishopric palace reflected the close
ties between the crown’s government and the secular church. There were also the parishes
of San Sebastian, Santa Ana, San Marcelo, and De los Huerfanos (The Orphans). 240 The
largest religious orders of San Agustín, Santo Domingo, San Francisco, La Merced, and
Compañía de Jesús had built twenty convents. These regular clerics also took care of two
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hospices, eleven hospitals, an orphanage, and a lay seclusion house. They also administered
the chapels of the university, the Inquisition, three schools, and other chapels in the city.
There were sixteen institutions for females: eleven of them were monasteries of nuns, such
as Santa Clara and Concepción, and 5 beatarios (lay spiritual houses). 241
As representative of the Spanish Crown’s right of Royal Patronage, the Viceroy
attempted to extend some of his pre-earthquake reforms to the Church. Upon his arrival in
Lima, one of his first priorities was to limit the excesses that some priests committed,
specifically against the Indians. The Viceroy issued a viceregal decree on February 20,
1684, that entrusted royal officers to inform ecclesiastical superiors of any misdeeds by
priests and friars. His measures to bring the religious under control produced a strong and
widespread reaction from members in all levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, who
understood the decree as a threat to their ecclesiastical immunity. 242 The numerous
convents and the religious presence in Lima gave an outward appearance of unity and
strength. Despite the unified image both the secular and regular clergies portrayed
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defending its ecclesiastical privileges, their performances during the earthquake’s
aftermath contrasted.
Both private and official accounts report that the religious building structures
suffered great destruction with the quakes of October 20, 1687. 243 These records help us
reconstruct the response, in the short- and long-term, by the city’s religious hierarchies.
Even though most of them are official records, they were produced by different institutions,
both civil and religious, and offer diverse perspectives and interpretations about similar
events or practices. Contrasting these varied documents, it is possible to obtain a reliable
account of the performance of both branches of the Spanish church.
After the quake hit Lima, both secular and regular clergy suffered destruction of
their properties. Some of their members died, while the survivors endured precarious living
conditions. On one hand, religious orders rapidly engaged in diverse activities of spiritual
relief, and organized to rebuild their estates and reactivate the revenue of their rents. On
the other hand, the secular clergy hesitated to fulfill their spiritual activities until building
a temporal chapel appropriate for their functions, and refused to economically support the
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reconstruction of religious property arguing this task corresponded to the king, as patron
of the Church in the New World.
The contrasting performance of both clergies influenced the perception of the royal
authorities, who received collaboration from the religious orders in organizing repentance
activities, while secular ministers became stubborn opponents to the government’s
reconstruction projects. Secular prelates’ refusal to economically support the rebuilding of
the Cathedral required negotiation, legal arguments, and the final intervention of the Pope.
Even when the viceroy was unable to bargain with the members of the ecclesiastical
council, he had the legal mechanisms to compel them to obey the orders of the royal
government.
Spiritual Relief: Where Was the Archbishop?
After the first tremor hit the capital that terrible night, those who were able to escape
from their homes fled to the various churches throughout the city, seeking refuge and
spiritual relief. Since early modern people considered natural disasters, and especially
earthquakes, as manifestation of God’s wrath, the ordinary reaction when catastrophic
experiences occurred was to look desperately for spiritual comfort. 244 They believed that
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natural disasters were warnings or punishment of an angry God for multiple sins. Limeños
thus expected the clerics to provide spiritual assistance to the bereaved souls, receiving and
absolving their sins. Further, they attributed catastrophe to divine power and believed they
could do little themselves to alter the course of events except in the spiritual realm. 245 They
offered public demonstration of repentance for their sins and attended processions, public
sermons, and masses that were accompanied with laments, cries, and self-inflicted
punishments. 246 In Lima, some of these exercises of repentance became so extreme that the
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authorities prohibited the excessive performances in order to avoid the death of the
penitents. 247
Regular clerics took a leading role in these spiritual activities, bringing both
comfort and admonition to Lima’s residents. As soon as the first great quake ended, clerics
such as Fray Joseph Buendía and Fray Pedro Medina left convents and other religious
institutions where they lived in order to assist the hapless souls who were dying or looking
for confession to relieve their conscience. 248 Some religious ministers began to preach in
the streets, and others went to minister in the churches. 249
Those who sought protection at the temples had made a mistake. Two hours later,
with the second tremor, almost all the churches that remained standing collapsed, burying
alive the religious and lay people that were inside. A contemporary witness recalled that
the soil “shook and shook in a way that it was the vivid representation of the Final
Judgment.” 250 A tower of Santo Domingo’s church and the upper part of the choir area
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collapsed on the main aisle, killing those that had conglomerated inside looking for
confession. 251 San Francisco church’s dome and cross suffered great ruin, Nuestra Señora
de las Mercedes temple’s structure fell to the ground, and San Agustin church’s main
chapel and cruise collapsed. 252 The extensive devastation of religious buildings
accentuated the people’s concern because it reinforced their belief that the tremors were
truly the result of God’s wrath. 253 During the hours and days following the earthquake,
Lima’s people paid close attention to the sermons and engaged in processions, contrition
displays, and other demonstrations of devotion as people cried out for divine mercy. 254
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The religious orders of La Merced, San Agustín, and Santo Domingo rapidly built
provisional chapels on the Plaza Mayor from their own funds in order to continue
officiating their daily religious services, confessing and absolving the many persons that
arrived in quest of spiritual relief. 255 At the same time, they diligently worked to repair
their main churches, which were completely destroyed in the quake.
The members of the ecclesiastical council also erected a provisional chapel in the
Plaza Mayor, yet not as fast as the regular religious. More than one month after the quake,
the prelates were still discussing the details about the new temporary chapel. They voted
to assign 1000 pesos to build a place “to put the silver shrine with all the decoration of the
best jewels of the church,” so they could “comply in it with the obligation of the divine
offices, and assist to these the gentlemen of the council so it would appear a more decent
place.” 256 The meeting records of this institution reflect that the construction of the
provisional chapel was more a temporal than an spiritual concern for the prelates. They
planned a chapel that would represent their social prestige, and permit them “to comply
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with its […] obligations.” 257 These sources also remain silent about prelates’ concern about
providing spiritual relief to the population. The members of the ecclesiastical council
appear to have been mainly focused on building a chapel that would visually represent their
social standing.
Despite the prelates’ efforts to build a decent place, they had to conform with a less
sumptuous chapel because the cost of the structure they envisioned reached 6000 pesos.
Because of the limited budget they assigned for the provisional chapel, the prelates had to
resume their obligations in a hut without walls, closing three sides with damask and velvet
hangings to give some decency to the place. 258
While the members of the city council concentrated efforts on improving the
appearance of their chapel, and the friars from different religious orders focused on both
spiritual and temporal activities, the Archbishop was absent. When the earthquake hit,
Archbishop Don Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros was in Callao. On the recommendation of
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his physician, he had moved to the port to recover from choking attacks. 259 He was sleeping
when the first quake hit, and the roof of the bedroom collapsed on top of him. Fortunately,
his steward Francisco de Jauregui and other servants were able to rescue him from the
wreckage. The worst came a few hours later when a tsunami hit the port and flooded the
entire town. The Archbishop narrowly escaped from the water’s power. A witness
described his clothes as damp when four slaves carried him on their shoulders to take him
from the port. After his return to Lima, he retreated to a rural estate in Late, located two
leagues from Lima. 260 His absence became evident during the days of major spiritual
commotion.
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Image 11: Location of Late. 261
Because of the Archbishop’s absence, the Viceroy himself became a central figure
even in activities of religious character. Among his first instructions in religious matters,
he ordered that the most venerable images in the city, the Virgins of Rosario, Merced, and
Guía, be brought to the temporal chapels built in the Plaza Mayor by the religious orders.
Three days after the quake, the Duke and his entire family even accompanied the Virgin of
the Rosario as the image was carried at the Plaza Mayor from the church of Santo Domingo
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in a procession. 262 The Viceroy took special interest in bringing the Virgin of Tears (de la
Lágrimas) and renaming it as the Virgen of Warning (Anuncio) because this image had
miraculously started to cry a few months before the quake. The Duke designated October
20 as the day of this image’s feast as a gesture of thanksgiving for forewarning the city
from the punishment of Jesus Christ. 263
After the quake, limeños participated in diverse demonstrations of contrition along
with the Duke, who even appeared with a rope around his neck as symbol of contrition in
one of many processions he attended. 264 Regular clergy collaborated in the penitent
activities in the city, delivering sermons with messages of exhortation. The best preachers
of the religious orders went to the streets to persuade Lima’s inhabitants to repent. 265 The
secular clergy, on the other hand, only tended to some chapels built by individuals around
the city, without taking leading roles in the spiritual activities of the population.
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Different from Liñán y Cisneros, the Viceroy was present in processions and other
religious activities that aimed to placate divine wrath. His performance contrasted with the
nonappearance of the Archbishop in the following weeks after the quake. Contemporaries
noticed that “he [the archbishop] was unable to return to this city, although he came injured
and wounded to entrust his obligations to the general vicar.” 266 The Viceroy emphasized,
although with certain sarcasm, that it was not the Archbishop’s fault that “God intended to
take away his health and energies” in a moment when his presence was indispensable
among his spiritual flock. 267 Certainly, Liñán y Cisneros had no control of the events that
limited his active participation in the penitent activities that the whole population engaged
in. Yet, his frail health did not preclude his defiance, along with the members of the
ecclesiastical council, of the royal government’s rebuilding projects.
Temporal Obligations: Rebuilding the House of God
According to contemporary witnesses, the earthquake inflicted the most damage on
ecclesiastical properties. Almost all religious buildings, except the chapel of the Sagrario,

266

Relación del Ejemplar Castigo.

267

Letter from the Duke of the Palata to the King, December 8, 1987. BNM, MS.9375.

146

located next to the Cathedral, had collapsed, killing many nuns and friars. 268 The provincial
head of Santo Domingo declared that, under his instructions, the clerics of his order
recovered forty-two bodies from under the debris of their convent, which he considered
just a fraction of the dead. 269 The support to the religious population’s need and the
reconstruction of their cloistered buildings required the attention of the highest colonial
authorities, especially those of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The evidence shows that the
regular and diocesan clergy confronted the destruction of the earthquake differently. The
distinct relationship between the religious orders and the secular clergy produced different
perspectives regarding management of resources and spiritual functions.
Most of the churches, convents, and monasteries of the city had interrupted the
regular religious services in their chapels. Instead, friars and priests attended the
provisional chapels people had erected in the various settlements they constructed after the
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quake. Only at the Colegio de San Pablo, where Fray Buendía and Fray Medina were at
the time of the first tremor, did Jesuits continue celebrating masses in the chapel. 270

Image 12: Map of principal religious buildings in Lima. 1. Plaza Mayor, 2.
Cathedral, 3. Archbishop’s Palace, 4. Santo Domingo, 5. San Agustín, 6. La Merced, 7.
San Francisco, 8. San Pablo School, 9. Concepción Monastery, 10. Inquisition, 11.
University, 12. Trinitarian Convent, 13. Mercedes Church, 14. Santa Clara Convent, 15.
Santa Ana Church, 16. Prado Monastery, 17. Santa Catalina Convent, 18. Guadalupe
Church, 19. Huérfanos Church, 20. San Juan de Dios, 21. San Marcelo Church, and 22.
San Sebastian Church. 271
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Because of the destruction of their monasteries and convents, friars and nuns
abandoned their seclusion to take refuge in open spaces. They had to compete with other
residents for available spaces in the city and surrounding areas. Members of the female
orders were among those who displayed the worst dispossession, and their presence
underlined the social disorder and chaos in the city. The destruction of the Convent of La
Purísima Concepción left dispossessed 310 nuns of “black veil,” many other nuns of “white
veil,” servants, and lay women; the total surpassed 1500. 272 The lack of a place to support
this human contingent required that 162 black-veiled nuns from La Concepción be moved
to the spacious garden of the Convent of Santa Catalina. These elite nuns escaped from
their convent when it collapsed with the quake. Once at Santa Catalina’s yard, they found
the same scenario of destruction. When inspecting the city, the notary of the city council,
Diego Fernandez de Montaño, noticed a big hole in the wall of the convent that prevented
the seclusion of these women, who became exposed to the threats of nature and the perils
of secular life.
The conditions of living outdoors took a toll on the dispossessed religious
population. The arrival of the 162 nuns of velo negro from La Concepción Monastery, who
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probably were accompanied by servants, to the yards of Santa Catalina monastery had also
increased the pressures on resources available at the latter location. There were 300 women,
among them nuns of white veil, secular women, donadas, and servants from Santa
Catalina’s monastery living in the yards. The large number of newcomers accentuated the
lack of food resources. According to the abbess, the nuns were dying of hunger. The abbess
of the Monastery of Nuestra Señora del Prado described a similar scenery because the nuns
of her monastery were exposed to inclement weather, without more protection than the one
provided by the huts they built among the trees. The worst plight was that of the sisters of
Santísima Trinidad, who abandoned their completely devastated monastery and moved to
some corralones next to the church of Guadalupe. During the five months they remained
there, so many of them died as a result of inclement weather that the Inquisitors, patrons
of their monastery, opted to transfer them to some wood huts in a more adequate place. 273
The hardships of these religious women were not exclusive. Surely most of the
population faced them. Yet, the presence of these women, customarily hidden by the high
walls of convents, evidenced the social disorder that reigned in the city after the earthquake.
These casualties probably concerned authorities that had long tried to limit the number of
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women in religious institutions. Yet, women increasingly preferred the life of seclusion
because it offered refuge, virtue protections, and social promotion to some of them. 274
Similar to their female counterparts, male religious orders abandoned their convents and
became exposed to material adversity. The earthquake, thus, unveiled the increasing
economic difficulties of a portion of the city’s population who mainly lived from rents and
other pious activities rather than other productive occupations. 275
Although most of the ecclesiastical population was living in dire circumstances,
there were also rapid improvements. The provincial of Santo Domingo, Fray Ignacio del
Campo, led in person the reconstruction activities in the convent of this religious order. He
ordered the destruction of all two-story structures and the church’s tower to avoid further
collapses. He also rapidly initiated the repair and reinforcement of cloisters and other
offices in the first story or ground level. In a few weeks, he was able to relocate most of
the friars in these cells, which reduced the pressure on available resources and space. He
also sent some clerics to convents and doctrines (missionary outposts) in the provinces to
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decrease the number of clerics in the convent of Lima. 276 Because of theses advancements,
the city authorities praised how fast the Dominicans were repairing their convent and
church.
The possession of extensive rural and urban estates, including monasteries or
missions throughout the viceroyalty, offered religious orders alternatives, such as other
sources of income or places to relocate members, to initiate recovery activities. 277 For
instance, Monastery of La Encarnación spent 20,707 pesos repairing the building
structure of the convent and many other of the order’s properties around the city,
including houses and stores. 278 Even though this amount represented one quarter of the
total income the monastery received in two years, the administrator’s account
demonstrated that there was a surplus of 3,600 pesos in those years. 279 Because the
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monastery had these resources available, it was able to rebuild and repair most of its
urban real-estate in a couple of years.
The proactive response of various religious orders and institutions during the
following days, weeks, and months after the quake contrasted with the activity of the
secular clergy. Royal administrators noticed that secular clergy were recalcitrant and
reluctant to initiate repairs. Rather than supporting the reconstruction activities and
spiritual services in the city, the secular clergy hardly cooperated with the colonial
government at all.
Negotiating with Stubborn Prelates
Like most of the religious buildings in the city, the Cathedral of Lima was
extensively destroyed. The Viceroy’s apparent success of initiating the reconstruction of
public buildings was challenged by the highest members of the secular clergy when he tried
to organize the rebuilding of the Cathedral. The diverse means he proposed to raise funds
for the rebuilding activities met the strong opposition of the ecclesiastical council. The long
debates that placed the Viceroy in opposition with the Archbishop and the ecclesiastical
council illustrates the mechanisms royal authorities employed in order to reach a
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compromise with the highest members of the secular clergy, and how both parties
interpreted law and practices to support their demands.
The Cathedral was so seriously damaged that construction masters had calculated
reconstruction costs at 60,000 pesos. 280 The Viceroy recognized that the civil population
of Lima, overburdened with the expenses of reconstructing their own properties, was
unable to provide financial aid. He also knew that the royal treasury was in a terrible
condition and could not afford the rebuilding of all the constructions that needed repairs.
Estimates for rebuilding the more than fifty Indian village churches affected by the quake
reached 200,000 pesos. Conscious of the importance and conspicuousness of rebuilding
the cathedral, the Duke expected to receive financial support from the ecclesiastical
council’s members, who would be the main beneficiaries.
The Viceroy was confident that the ecclesiastical council’s members would accept
his proposal to share the expenses of the Cathedral’s reconstruction as well as the method
he proposed. Since the total project was estimated at 60,000 pesos, he offered to contribute
with 20,000 pesos from the royal treasury to initiate the project. He expected the prelates
to contribute the remaining amount of 40,000 pesos from the building and maintenance
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fund (fábrica) of the cathedral, and from individual donations from each of them.
Nonetheless, he was greatly shocked by the reluctance of the Archbishop and the prelates
to contribute.
The colonial administration commissioned the magistrate (oidor) Don Juan
Gonzales de Santiago to act as fiscal in order to inquire about the conditions of the
cathedral’s fábrica. Gonzales requested that the steward of the fábrica funds, Don Gabriel
of Sumiano, declare the rents and amounts available from this enterprise. Sumiano
explained that this fund was divided into interior and exterior accounts. The exterior fábrica
account comprised the funds to finance expenses related to the cathedral’s structure, such
as carpentry, masonry, and similar services. 281 The interior fábrica was used for the
ornaments, music, salaries of some ministers, and some goods used for celebrations and
masses, such as candles, wax, wine, bread, and oil.
Sumiano also indicated that, during the four years he had exercised the stewardship
of the interior fábrica, this fund provided 10,000 pesos yearly, even though many rents
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were quite behind in payments. 282 He calculated that debts to the church amounted to
approximately 100,000 pesos, from which 60,000 were impossible to collect. 283 He tried
to emphasize the poor condition of the interior fábrica, indicating that he even had to
reimburse the previous steward, Capitan Miguel de Medrano, 12,301 pesos that he had
provided to cover expenses for masses during the time of his stewardship. Sumiano finally
stated that it was not the obligation of the interior but of the exterior fábrica to finance the
reconstruction of the cathedral.
Rather than convincing fiscal Gonzales de Santiago of the poor state of the finances
of the building fund, Sumiano’s declaration only ignited more questioning from the fiscal,
who saw the division of the fábrica between interior and exterior funds to be an evasive
pretext. Fiscal Gonzales demanded that the judge of the Real Acuerdo, an assembly
appointed to serve as advisers of the viceroy, compel Sumiano to show the fábrica books
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from his present administration and that of his predecessor Medrano. 284 He was interested
in knowing how the ecclesiastical council had disbursed 10,000 pesos each year, when
other parochial churches, such as those of Callao, Santa Ana, San Marcelo, San Sebastian,
and El Sagrario, had annually spent only 200 pesos each. 285 He did not know that the
interior fábrica was paying the salaries of sacristans and other posts that theoretically
should have paid through other sources. 286
The steward Sumiano resisted showing the books, alleging that the church’s
accountant had his predecessor’s records, and his own book had information about church’s
matters that could not be exposed. In the face of this refusal, the fiscal tried to review the
documents that were in possession of the accountant Juan Esteban de la Parra. The fiscal’s
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attempts were unsuccessful because Parra continually declined to show the account records
citing as pretext the infirmities of his age 287
Doctors of canon law Don Melchor de la Nava and Don Gregorio de Loayza, as
representatives of the ecclesiastical council, along with the Archbishop (despite the
enormous pain he was experiencing after almost dying during the quake) gathered with the
members of the ecclesiastical chapter to discuss the reconstruction of the cathedral. 288 They
agreed that the only source they had on hand to rebuild the cathedral was the mercy of the
king, as patron of the church, because the quake had greatly reduced their incomes from
tithes in various parts of the episcopal jurisdiction. 289 They defended their position arguing
that, because of the Spanish king’s prerogative of royal patronage, the monarch was
required to cover the entire cost of rebuilding the Cathedral. 290 They enumerated previous
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occasions in which the royal administration had contributed to reconstruction activities in
conformity with royal patronage. On these occasions, they claimed, the royal treasury took
care of all expenses without demanding any contribution from the prelates. 291
Facing stubborn resistance from the clerics, the Viceroy replied to their requests
founding his argument on the Recopilacion de Leyes de Indias. 292 He explained that
according to one of laws in this corpus of royal legislation, the royal treasury must
contribute with a third of the total cost of the construction of a new church. He argued that
because of the extraordinary circumstances and the necessity of rebuilding the cathedral,
the royal treasury would contribute only 20,000 pesos once the prelates secured the
remaining 40,000 pesos. The Duke additionally offered two alternatives to obtain the
needed funds. First, he suggested the reduction of expenses of the interior fábrica because
10,000 pesos of expenses each year were excessive and unnecessary. He recommended
reducing expenses to 5,000 pesos, and using the rest of the funds for reconstruction works.
Second, he suggested that the prelates offer individual donations and surrender for a few
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years the salaries from vacant Church positions that they distributed among themselves to
supplement to their own. In case the prelates were still unwilling to confirm their
contribution of the 40,000 pesos, the Viceroy would then take the issue to the king. 293
The ecclesiastical council responded that notifying the king and waiting for his
resolution would only increase the expenses of the reconstruction because another quake,
even less severe than the previous one, could shatter the cathedral and increase the repair
costs. They also rejected the Viceroy’s interpretation of the law in the Recopilación, stating
that it was applicable only in case of new foundations. Even if the law made reference to
repairs in case of expansion, the council argued that these were the product of human
initiative while the cathedral’s condition was the product of divine intervention.
Confronted with this legal impasse, the prelates offered a solution derived from
local practice and custom, which were “the best interpreter of the laws.” 294 They argued
that previous viceroys had assigned financial support to the cathedral without informing
the king in the first place. They considered any consultation with the monarch unnecessary
because of the extraordinary circumstances the city. The renowned Catholic zeal of the
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king, who would not permit the cathedral to remain in disrepair, was enough justification
to approve an immediate decision from the Viceroy. They again stated that the gobierno
superior had supplied the repairs of the cathedral from the royal treasury at all times. In
1596, the royal administrators assigned 12,000 pesos to the cathedral’s fábrica. In 1602,
the government increased such amount to 18,000 pesos, which remained the allotted
amount until 1626. The prelates also mentioned that the royal treasury assumed all
expenses of repairing the cathedral after the earthquakes of 1655 and 1678. 295 In addition
to these practices, the religious ministers indicated that a royal decree of 1649 had
instructed to Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra and the Archbishop Don Pedro de Villagómez
to finish the construction of the cathedral’s tower and portals. They concluded that if the
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king had financed aesthetic works during those times, he would be willing to cover the
necessary repairs the cathedral required. 296
The ecclesiastical council’s members concluded that they had no obligation to
contribute to the rebuilding of the cathedral and that the Recopilación was not applicable
because the royal decree of 1649 had endorsed the customary practice of the royal treasury,
showing that the Spanish monarch voluntarily wanted to take care of such expenses. They
also supported their argument with other legislation compiled in the Recopilación. 297 Such
laws stipulated that one-third of the cost of the construction works of a church should be
funded by the royal treasure and another third should come from the encomenderos of the
archdiocese’s jurisdiction. With this argument, which combined practice and law, they
concluded that the royal treasury was required to contribute two-thirds, or 40,000 pesos, of
the total reconstruction costs. 298
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The ecclesiastical council and the Archbishop also argued against each of the
Viceroy’s suggestions for financing the rebuilding works. First, they argued that reducing
the expenses of the interior fábrica from 10,000 to 5,000 pesos each year would decrease
the decency of the mass celebration. They imagined the demoralizing effect it would have
if the cathedral’s interior looked the same as a poor parish. They suggested that the
government should reinstitute a moribund tribute levied on natives because it was the “most
natural” source of funds since the king originally instituted it.299 They also suggested that
the espolios (estates of deceased prelates) of former Archbishop Don Pedro de Villagoméz,
presently used for the assistance to convalescent priests and other pious works, should be
appropriated. 300 The prelates were not concerned that Indians, sick priests, and other needy
individuals might suffer with the measures they proposed. They just wanted to erect the
cathedral to its former grandeur and comply with their obligation of officiating the divine
services. Nonetheless, even this was not important enough to deserve a sacrifice from their
own funds.
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What is more, both the Archbishop and the members of the ecclesiastical council
refused to give individual donations from their personal income. The prelates declared that
the Archbishop was already burdened assisting the large number of poor people produced
by the quake, that he was left with no funds to rebuild his own palace. The ecclesiastical
counselors excused themselves arguing that the salaries they received were insufficient to
afford the excessive cost of living in the city, and the assistance to their relatives and the
poor. Even with the additional income they received from the vacant salaries, which they
distributed by law and custom among the current prelates, they suffered the same
“afflictions as the other needy persons in the city.’ 301 The dean argued that the condition
of the ecclesiastical council’s treasury was defficient because the tithes in the archdiocese
had fallen in after the earthquake. 302 Thus, the prelates finally resorted to asking the
Viceroy to collaborate with the rebuilding of the cathedral from his personal fortune.
In order to initiate the rebuilding works of the cathedral, the Real Acuerdo ordered
measures to obtain financial resources, taking into account the suggestions of the
ecclesiastical council. They agreed to disburse from the royal treasury the 20,000 pesos
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belonging to the crown. They also accepted the plan to reinstitute the Indian tributaries’
payment of the tomín, and assigned 3 percent of the encomiendas’ rents that were not
financing churches in their jurisdictions. 303
Facing the prelates’ refusal to contribute from their own incomes, the Duke decided
to elevate the resolution of the matter to the King. He requested from steward Don Gabriel
of Sumiano a report on the basic salary each of the prelates received. 304 The steward’s
report showed the quantities that each prelate received for the period of five years, from
1683 to 1688. The archbishop had an annual income that exceeded 32,000 pesos. 305 This
salary alone would cover half of the repairs the cathedral needed. The dean received more
than 6,000 pesos; the dignitaries over 5,000 pesos; the canons surpassed 4,000 pesos; other
prelates received 2,000 and 1,000 pesos. 306 In all of these amounts, the members of the
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ecclesiastical council received almost 60 percent more than their regular income because
they distributed the salaries of unoccupied posts among themselves. Nonetheless, they felt
they were as afflicted as the rest of the population and unable to offer personal
contributions.
On his report to the King, the Viceroy suggested that the crown seek a bull from
the pope for the use of the ecclesiastical council’s vacant salaries towards the
reconstruction of the Cathedral. He proposed that the concession should be extended for a
period of at least twenty years or in perpetuity because “earthquakes were ordinary” in the
viceroyalty. 307 If the Pope agreed to award those funds in perpetuity, they should provide
enough reserves for another natural disaster. The Council of Indies accepted the suggestion
and requested the use of the vacant posts’ funds from the Vatican. The Pope Innocent XI
awarded to the royal administration the use for six years of the salaries of two vacant posts,
which represented 36,000 pesos. 308
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By the time the bull authorizing the use of the vacant salaries in the reconstruction
of the cathedral arrived in Lima, the Duke of Palata had already ceded power to the next
viceroy, Count of Monclova. Nonetheless, his negotiations with the ecclesiastical council
and the efforts by fiscal were noteworthy because they provided enough information to
support his request to the King. If it is true that his success was only partial because he did
not obtain the concession to secure funds for twenty years or in perpetuity, he was
ultimately able to reduce the obligations of the royal treasury and compel the prelates to
contribute to the reconstruction of the cathedral.
The members of the ecclesiastical council finally had to financially support the
rebuilding works in the cathedral. The expenses of the repairs surpassed the 60,000 pesos
that were initially calculated, and the prelates had to provide additional funds from their
own budgets in order to continue the construction project. 309 Sources offer no information
about the implementation of the fees the Royal Acuerdo had agreed to extend to Indians
and encomenderos, yet they do corroborate that the salary of the vacant post were finally
used to rebuild the cathedral.
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The prelates were so affected by the reduction of their income and the need to
provide personal donations for the rebuilding works that they requested the King not repeat
the measure. They argued that the vacant posts offered them a necessary supplement to
their regular income because they were overburdened assisting their families and the poor.
At the same time, they had the responsibility of living “with the decency that the post [of
dignitaries] required” in a city that “was head of the kingdom.” 310 In other words, they
deemed their salaries inadequate to fulfill their charitable activities and live according to
the standards of their positions.
The Head against the Body
Despite the image of unity the ecclesiastical council and the Archbishop showed
during the discussion about how to rebuild the cathedral, the highest echelons of the secular
church’s hierarchy were far from homogeneous. Even though on some occasions they
seemed to pursue similar interests--as when they resisted financially supporting the
reconstruction of their church or when they repelled the Viceroy’s attempt against the
ecclesiastical immunity--the Archbishop and members of the ecclesiastical community
were far from a cohesive body. They certainly shared similar perceptions about the royal
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government and its duties towards the church, yet the ecclesiastical council was a group
with similar interests that usually intervened to moderate the archbishop’s antipathy
towards the viceroy. 311

Image 13: Archbishop Don Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros 312
During the weeks following the earthquake, the Archbishop became mainly
concerned with the rebuilding of his palace, located in the same block as the cathedral.
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When he refused to contribute to the reconstruction of the cathedral, he had declared he
was willing to halt the reconstruction of his palace in order to financially assist the poor.
Nonetheless, he diligently sought the initiation of the repairs of his residence. He sent his
steward, Don Francisco de Jauregui, to request funds from the ecclesiastical council to the
cover of the repairs of the archbishopric palace. The Archbishop claimed that he had
already spent 20,000 pesos on his palace by the time he established residence in it, and an
additional amount after the previous Earthquake of 1678. 313
Confronted with this demand, the members of the council protested the
Archbishop’s actions. The Dean Don Luis José Merlo de la Fuente responded that the
Archbishop’s request was contradictory because, as head of the Church, the Archbishop
was the highest judge in the ecclesiastical court and could not be a petitioner at the same
time. Merlo also emphasized that the archbishop had only complied with his duties when
repairing his own palace. Additionally, he indicated that the treasury of the archbishopric
and the ecclesiastical council were depleted because the earthquake had considerably
reduced the tithes of the archdiocese. He argued that the Archbishop should pay for the
reparations of his residence, as other prelates had traditionally done. Thus, the dean
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concluded that the church’s treasury required relief and assistance rather than more
burdens. Merlo also enumerated some of the measures taken by the ecclesiastical council
to reduce the cathedral’s expenses such as reducing the salary of the singers, and the
amount of wax used commonly for the Virgen of the Candelaria festivity. The ecclesiastical
council recommended that the Archbishop proceed similarly by tightening his belt and
making reductions to his own budget. 314
In the following meetings of the ecclesiastical council, the dean openly criticized
the Archbishop. He stated that it was a “monstrosity that the head [the archbishop] proceed
against its members [the ecclesiastical council].” 315 Despite these initial conflicts between
the archbishop and the council, the repairs to the archbishopric palace began after a year
and a half of negotiation. 316 Liñán y Cisneros persisted in demanding his return to the
palace so he could remain close to the cathedral, administer regular religious functions, and
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maintain the government of religious matters. The prelates finally agreed to sell the
principal of some censos in order to obtain the 10,000 pesos necessary for the
reconstruction of the archbishop’s palace. 317Nonetheless, this amount was exhausted in a
few months. The Archbishop had to request one more time that the ecclesiastical council
impose in censo any principal it had in its power in order to to obtain the money to finance
the remaining repairs in his palace. 318
When the Archbishop offered to give up his personal belongings to the poor rather
than use them to finance the reconstruction of his palace, he was apparently attempting to
avoid contributing financially in the cathedral’s rebuilding. The reconstruction of the
archbishop’s palace was his main goal because he decided to demand that the ecclesiastical
council provide funds for its reconstruction, without considering the economic condition
of the council and the financial acrobatics its members would have to perform in order to
obtain the needed resources.
Conclusion
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The evidence in this chapter shows that regular and the secular clergies had
different reactions and interests at stake, and as a result performed differently in the
aftermath of the earthquake. The religious orders diligently organized and participated in
different activities of spiritual relief and exhortation. They also had an active role financing
and organizing the reconstruction of their properties, which were among the most affected
in the city.
Some of the religious orders also joined the Viceroy in the penitence activities he
organized and led. The Viceroy played a central role in these demonstrations of repentance.
He took advantage of the absence of the Archbishop to appear as the leading figure of the
reconstruction of Lima. The Archbishop was so weak after almost dying in the quake and
tsunami that he was unable to participate in the construction activities of limeños, yet he
was not sick enough to participate in the negotiations over the cathedral’s reconstruction.
The actions of the Archbishop were incompatible with the role most religious and civil
people expected him to play. It was evident that he was more concerned with preserving
his personal interests than performing his duties as head of the colonial church.
The members of ecclesiastical council were as stubborn as the Archbishop in
refusing to cede part of their personal incomes for the reconstruction of their church. They
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elaborated a counter-argument to the Viceroy’s use of a law in the Recopilación de Indias,
and used written law to ratify a customary practice, where law merely ratified customary
practice that would alleviate some of the burdens on their finances. Throughout the long
debate regarding the reconstruction of the cathedral, they constantly emphasized the
obligation of the Spanish monarch, as regal patron, to pay for the whole rebuilding of the
church. Nonetheless, it is evident that their final objective was to keep the additional funds
they received as salaries from the vacant posts.
Even though they were a solid and unanimous faction when opposing the financial
demands of the Viceroy, the conflicts between the Archbishop and the ecclesiastical
council demonstrate the internal fractures of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Both the
Archbishop and members of the ecclesiastical chapter fought against providing money
from their own fortunes for the cathedral’s reconstruction. For this reason, the Archbishop
tried to get the cathedral’s building fund to pay for the reconstruction of his palace, and he,
along with the members of the council, tried to evade the obligation to rebuild and pass it
on to the royal treasury. Temporal interests were apparently more important than the
spiritual ones for most of the distinguished prelates in Lima.
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In the end, the colonial administration was able to overcome the obstinacy of the
prelates and obtain the funds to rebuild the cathedral. Despite the lack of cooperation from
high-ranking members of the secular church, most religious men and women contributed
to the reconstruction of the city, willingly or unwillingly. Religious and administrative
buildings were greatly damaged by the earthquake but these were not the only ones to
suffer damage. Most of the properties affected housed ordinary inhabitants of the city, even
many were owned by church clergy. Therefore, the reconstruction of the city would require
the extensive participation of ordinary people.

V.

CHAPTER 4: FROM THE BOTTOM UP: RECONSTRUCTING LIMA
AFTER THE 1687 EARTHQUAKE
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In the wake of the 1687, Lima’s royal agents prioritized the reconstruction of
administrative and religious buildings. In spite of the poor condition of the royal treasury
and the secular clergy’s reluctance to collaborate with the repair project, colonial
administrators successfully initiated a reconstruction project for Lima’s main buildings.
But royal authorities were not the only ones working to rebuild the fallen city. Lima’s
residents– far from being passive observers-- participated actively in the reconstruction
tasks. Through negotiation in both official and unofficial spheres, they recreated,
reinforced, and legitimated the creative, contractual nature of the early modern state.
Contrary to modern states, in which mandates tend to be given from a centralized
locus of government, the Spanish empire instead featured multiple sites of authority and
contention. 319 The initiatives and practices the Spanish crown introduced in the New
World developed into a collective set of values among its colonial subjects, who
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reproduced colonial culture through specific practices that legitimated metropolitan
authority. 320
This chapter demonstrates that ordinary residents adapted and indeed recreated
the Spanish colonial legal system through reconstruction initiatives. The examination of
formal contracts and informal agreements shows the Spanish colonial regime penetrated
the everyday lives of colonial subjects. Consciously or not, when subjects adopted
colonial legal practices, they legitimized or confirmed the authority of the colonial
government.
They were not merely performers of these forms of rule, but also innovators,
adapting them according to their needs and the circumstances of the city. Documentation
produced inside and outside the courtroom reveals limeños’ use and adoption of the
Spanish practices and rules around contract-making, and how important contracts were to
their reconstruction efforts and everyday activities. Lima’s post-disaster contracts reveal
how the city’s diverse population resorted to legal contracting, official negotiation, and
unofficial agreements in order to rebuild their properties. These contracts, both official
and extra-official, also show how people understood and applied ordinary precepts and
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practices of the Spanish legal system in an unexpected and extraordinary post-disaster
context.
Even though the 1687 earthquake interrupted most of the daily political, social,
cultural and economic activities, the authority of the Spanish colonial administration
in Lima remained virtually unopposed. In fact, through their reconstruction initiatives,
Lima’s inhabitants reinforced the authority of the Spanish administration.
The participation of people of different social status and their use of state institutions,
rituals, and rules were essential components of an ongoing process of configuring and
legitimizing the colonial project. 321
Renters and Owners
With the daylight that broke hours after the quake, residents recognized the
magnitude of the destruction. Convents, monasteries, and churches were most damaged.
Governmental buildings, too, required repairs or even complete reconstruction. 322 Not
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even homes and commercial spaces were spared. Proprietors had the onerous task of
covering the high cost of repairs. The Viceroy reported that while most private residences
remained standing, they were drastically affected and required extensive repairs. 323
In the weeks and months following the destructive event, government activities
increased. Royal authorities supervised food distribution, implemented social control
measures, and planned reconstruction projects. They decreed price controls on building
supplies and construction wages. 324 Recognizing that residents would face high repair
costs, the Viceroy attempted to regulate those products to safeguard the interests of
private parties, both corporations and individuals. Nevertheless, constructions costs were
not the only problems private interests faced.
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The destruction of buildings halted the colonial economy since so many of these
structures provided rents to owners or other beneficiaries. In the destruction of any given
residential space, owners saw a reduction in income: occupants either refused to pay rent
for the damaged quarters or even abandoned these spaces. For proprietors relying heavily
on rent proceeds, raising money to pay for reconstruction became a real challenge. In
order to resolve the conflicts resulting from these conditions, people in Lima made
various types of contracts. These demonstrate the extent to which the Spanish legal
system penetrated various levels of colonial society.
The Spanish colonial legal system had an extensive bureaucracy and overlapping
jurisdictions that operated cohesively during the earthquake’s aftermath. 325 The broad
destruction of the city put this bureaucratic machinery in Lima into motion. In the months
after the quake, high-level officials such as cabildo members, the Viceroy, judges, and
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notaries also came to assist in the reconstruction effort. The resulting legal transactions
left diverse documentation showing how limeños sought the intervention of these colonial
authorities in order to settle conflicts, validate agreements, and tend to other specific
needs.
A large part of Lima’s residents paid for the spaces they used for housing and
working, even if they owned such places. Many of the properties in Lima had different
economic burdens such as liens (censos) and future religious obligations placed on
property (capellanía). 326 Censos were the most frequent economic impositions on real
estate. They were disguised forms of money loans secured against real estate. The
censatario (censo borrower) had to annually pay a small percentage of the principal to
the censualista (loan lender). 327 A capellanía was a perpetual bequest instituted when
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landowners commanded their heirs to pay for religious services to save their souls. 328
Together, censos and capellanías represented a heavy toll on tenants and property owners
whose economic capacity became limited after the earthquake’s assault.
The principal censualistas were religious institutions including monasteries and
convents. Religious corporations were the largest real estate holders and had access to
currency from the laity’s various bequests. 329 They rented real estate properties or
advanced cash through censo contracts. In both cases, they received a fixed annuity
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secured on real estate. Censos were profitable and secure investments of capital, for that
reason they became common in the colonial economy. 330
Confraternities were another important group among the beneficiaries of censos
because they had access to both property and specie. These religious brotherhoods
gathered laypeople together to venerate Christ, the Virgin, and other saints. Although
religious in their objectives, the confraternities also played an economic role in the
community, thanks to cash gathered from alms, donations, and membership fees. 331
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The destruction of private buildings affected both censualistas and censatarios,
many of whom faced repair costs without the means to cover sudden expenses. Although
some religious institutions had currency to pay for the reconstruction of properties, most
proprietors-- both corporate bodies and individuals-- lacked the necessary resources.
Some cases aired before Lima’s courts show that conflicts originated between two or
more parties when properties lost value because of the extensive damage after the
earthquake. Many censatarios abandoned the properties and stopped the payments of
censos’ interests and other rents the properties held. In other cases, censatarios tried to get
a reduction of the periodical rents, either the principal or the interests, they paid to the
owners or administrators of the properties they occupied.
The destruction of building properties in the city not only affected tenants and
owners, but also capellanes or beneficiaries of capellanías. In exchange for delivering
masses for the soul of the capellania’s founder and immediate relatives, these priests
received a fixed rent. Various capellanes saw part of their income reduced because many
buildings were often burdened with capellanías. 332
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In the two following cases, administrators of damaged properties requested the
Judge of Legados, Testamentos y Obras Pías to authorize reconstruction projects that
would economically affect the beneficiaries of capellanías, who had a claim on the
income from these properties. A few months after the quake, Don Francisco de Velasco,
steward of the confraternity of the Santísimo Sacramento and administrator of the
chaplaincies founded by Juan Domínguez de Esquivel, presented a petition before the
judge Don Juan de Mansilla. Velasco explained that the properties that provided the rent
for the capellanías he administered were so greatly damaged that they were
uninhabitable. He was concerned that, because of the lack of rent, the chaplain might
discontinue the masses imposed by the pious foundation. The steward requested license
to lease the properties on censo in order to obtain the funds to cover the repairs. He
specifically demanded that the chaplain should not receive any rent until the properties
were restored. 333 In this case, both the confraternity, as owner of the properties, and the
capellán, who benefited from the rents, were directly affected by the damage to those
estates. The administrator asked that the judge compel the chaplain to share the
temporary loss of income with the property owner.

333

AAL, Cofradías, LII: 27, 1688, f. 1v – 3 v.

185

In a similar case, the administrators of the confraternity of Nuestra Señora de la
Limpia Concepción, Alonso Pérez Campos and Pedro de Larreta, presented a request
before the same judge. They indicated that the Licenciado Juan Reales had bestowed on
the confraternity a house burdened with two capellanías, one for the benefit of Fray
Joseph Buendía, and the other for Fray Nicolás de la Cerva. The earthquake had inflicted
so much damage to the property that it became unoccupied, thus ceasing to produce the
rent that paid the chaplains. They asked permission to repair the house, specifying the
friars might abstain from receiving any rent during the time of the property
reconstruction. 334 Once both chaplains consented to the petition of the administrators, the
judge issued the license to proceed with the repairs. 335
The difference in the two cases just discussed is notable. In the first case, the
administrator had asked the judge to compel the chaplain to accept his reconstruction
project. In the second, the judge required the chaplains’ consent. Three administrators
presented their projects before the judge in order to obtain permission to implement them.
Yet, unlike Velasco, who showed no interest in knowing the chaplain’s opinion, Perez
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and Larreta asked the judge to endorse their project in order to present it to the chaplains
for consideration. It seems Perez and Larreta’s legal move, which demonstrated they
were willing to negotiate and settle a “conveniente” agreement with the chaplains who
were most effected by the earthquake, was positive. The repair works began a couple of
weeks after Larreta and Perez presented their request, and the judge finally confirmed
their project.
Taking Plans to Court
The two previous cases illustrate strategies proprietors and administrators used to
hasten the rebuilding of damaged properties. In the months following the earthquake,
residents of Lima from diverse social backgrounds came before the judicial forums to
request permission to implement their own reconstruction plans. Petitioners designed
their own rebuilding schemes and presented them before judges, who intermediated in the
process of reaching a final agreement and getting the city up and running again.
Negotiation before the courts was expensive and usually a long process, which
frequently did not result in a final sentence. Yet, if the parties collaborated in the
negotiation process, they could avoid large expenses and waste of time. Ten months after
the earthquake destroyed his home, Licenciado Don Juan de Villena proposed before Don
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Juan de Mansilla, Juez de Testamentos, Legados y Obras Pías, a series of changes to the
censo contract on the house where he lived in. 336 Villena explained that the house
belonged to the confraternity of the Limpia Concepción, but he had been granted lifelong
possession. 337 The house was so badly damaged that he had to spend 700 pesos in various
urgent repairs. In his petition, Villena offered to cover the works the property still needed
if the administrators of the Limpia Concepción granted him the tenancy in the house for
“three lives”-- meaning his own and two subsequent generations of his heirs. 338 The
administrators, Alonso Pérez Campos and Pedro de Larreta accepted the offer to avoid
the time and expenses of a legal suit. They additionally demanded that Villena should
rebuild the house according to the conditions stated in the original contract, which he
signed at the time of receiving the house. The tenant would also need to continue paying
the same annual rent without receiving any reduction, even though he had already spent a
considerable amount of money in repairs. 339
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The back-and-forth interchange of conditions demonstrates both parties actively
contributed to shape the final outcome of the process. Even when the administrators were
willing to negotiate with the tenant, they tried to add to the contract provisions that were
beneficial for the institution they represented. Villena accepted the extra conditions
demanded by the administrators only if they agreed to consider his wife’s life and his
own as a single one because he was already 50 years old. Once the administrators
consented to Villena’s new petition, judge Mansilla ordered the petitioner to present three
witnesses that would declare the agreement benefits for both parties. 340 The three
witnesses were Juan Ramírez de Vergara, Pedro de Elzagaza, and Lieutenant Don Alonso
de los Cameros. They testified that the house that Villena had in possession belonged to
the confraternity, and ratified that Villena’s proposal was beneficial in that it spared the
congregation of having to pay for the repairs or forgo annual rent. Two months after
receiving the petition, Mansilla licensed the confraternity administrators to renew the
written concession of residence according to the agreed-upon conditions. 341 Here, the
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cooperation of both parties enabled a quick agreement. Likewise, the judge’s assistance
hastened a judicial process that could otherwise take several month or even years.
Similar negotiations greatly helped cases of multiple parties affected by the
destruction of a single property. Agreements circumvented protracted disputes, cut court
costs, and, in catalyzing reconstruction, avoided additional economic detriment to the
damaged property. In such occasions, court procedures led to the ratification of the
parties’ final arrangement and, most important, facilitated resident’s own efforts to share
the burden of reconstruction.
Of course, not everyone negotiated cooperatively. In many cases, opponents
disputed the legitimacy of contracts, citing the extraordinary conditions in which the city
was living. This occurred in the case of Captain Don Gonzalo Andrés de Meneses against
the Monasterio de la Concepción. 342 Nine months after the calamity, the captain
presented a petition before the Licenciado Francisco de Cisnero, Provisor and Vicario
General of the Archbishopric, requesting a discount in the annual rent he paid to the
monastery of Concepción for one of its houses, located in the Pescadería Street, which he
had on lien. Meneses explained that the earthquake had affected both stories of the two-
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level property and some rooms collapsed. He spent 500 pesos to pay the wages of the
laborers that removed the debris and secured both floors. He asked the judge to appoint a
construction master who could verify that such works had been made on the property.
Because of these costs and the additional repairs that the property needed, Meneses
attempted to obtain a reduction of the rent he paid by the property he occupied.
The monastery rejected Meneses’ request even though he demonstrated the
ruinous condition of the property and the large expenses he had already incurred in fixing
it and would have to incur in the future to prevent further damage in the property. By
order of the judge, father Fray Diego Maroto of the order of Santo Domingo, maestro
mayor de fábrica (construction master), visited the property and assessed the expenses of
the works made in the monastery’s house at 3,572 pesos. This amount represented the
repairs the property still needed, so they were additional to the 500 pesos that Meneses
declared he had already spent in some essential repairs. 343 The representative of the
monastery, Don Francisco Gomes de Ortiz, replied that Meneses was responsible for
“maintaining the property [in good condition] regardless of any tremor” according to the
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notarial contract . 344 The censatario claimed that the property was so damaged that he had
to rebuild it almost entirely, and that the contract did not stipulate he must “rebuild it [the
house] from its foundations.” 345 He offered to cover up to 4,000 pesos of expenses in
exchange of a reduction of 50 percent of the annual rent. If the opponent part rejected his
proposal, he requested permission to dissolve the contract so the monastery could rent it
to someone willing to pay the entire annual rent of 1,200 demanded by the owner. 346 The
monastery refused to accept any of these options, arguing that Meneses would just be
fulfilling his responsibility according to the contract. 347 There was not a final resolution
in this case; at least, it was not registered in the court record. It is possible that both
parties were unable to reach a formal resolution. Meneses could either desist from
fighting against the monastery, which had probably more resources at court, or look for
alternative jurisdictional venues to challenge the stubbornness of his opponent. There was
also the possibility that both parties reached an agreement outside the courtroom.
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Image 14: Approximate location of some of the private properties. 1. Pescadería
Street, 2. Mármol de Bronce Street, 3. Mantas Street, 4. Aldabas Street, and 5. Espaderos
Street. 348
Along with official resolutions, there were out-of-court agreements that mirrored
the official ones. An illustration of this type of settlement was the one between the
Colegio de Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, of the order of San Francisco, and the heirs of
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Don Juan Suarez Dionis, vecino of Callao and owner of three stores in that port-town.
The receptor of the Colegio had filed a suit before the Real Audiencia against Don
Alonso Dies Fernandez,and his wife, Doña Petronila Maria de Leon y Suárez, heiress of
Juan Suárez Dionis, because they owed some interests of a principal of 1,510 pesos that
burdened the above mentioned stores. The rent of 75 pesos, 4 reales of principal paid for
a capellanía that the priests of the school served.
Nevertheless, the earthquake destroyed all three stores that supported the
capellanía. For that reason, the receptor of the school, Eulogio del Salto y Arriaza,
offered to condone the interests that Don Alonso and Doña Petronila owned up to
September 11, 1687, if they accepted to cover the reconstruction of the three stores and to
pay the interests posterior to that date. Del Salto underlined he offered that option
“considering some reasons of equity, and also [the effects of] the earthquake.” 349 Three
weeks after the catastrophic event, both parties signed a notarial contract that detailed the
clauses of this agreement. 350 With this legal but out-of-court resolution, both parts ended
with the judicial process that placated them.
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Fighting against a powerful colonial institution was not easy, as the case of
Meneses illustrated, yet such battles were not uncommon. Nor was his argument – to take
into consideration the extraordinary damage produced by the quake. Doña Mencia de
Cáceres y Ulloa, another censataria, requested a discount on the rent she paid for a house
and two adjacent stores, which belonged to the Monastery of La Concepción. She
explained that they were in ruins and the necessary repairs were very expensive. She
explained that when she received those properties in censo, in 1659, she had to spend
around 4,000 pesos repairing the damages they suffered by the earthquake of 1655.
Nonetheless, the Earthquake of 1687 had left the house and stores in such terrible
condition that she was unable to rent the stores and live in the house. She argued that,
although the ninth clause of the contract stated she could not request discount because of
any misfortune or tremor, the clause should not rule in that occasion because the
Earthquake of 1687 had produced a total ruin. 351 Both Gonzalo de Meneses and Mencia
de Ulloa demanded that the clauses obligating the censuatarios to refurbish the properties
be made ineffective in critical occasions of total devastation such as the one they were
experiencing.
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Even though proposals as those of Meneses and Ulloa cited the critical conditions
of the city, opposing parties did not automatically accept them. Negotiation occurred in
different ways in judicial processes involving reconstruction. People used legal spheres
and adopted legal forms to legitimize reconstruction projects; and they recreated or
adapted such legal forms as they did so. Meneses and Ulloa confronted powerful
religious institutions that had personnel overseeing judicial and administrative matters.
The monasteries kept attorneys, accountants, and similar professionals on retainer to
manage and protect their properties. Individuals such as Meneses, himself a clerk at the
Real Audiencia, probably had certain knowledge of laws or legal procedures and
arguments. Yet other petitioners, such as Doña Mencia de Ulloa, were unfamiliar with the
intricacies of the judicial apparatuses. Nonetheless, in both processes the plaintiffs based
their requests on the presumed inapplicability of the contracts’ clauses obligating them to
rebuild the properties, claiming the extraordinary conditions made it impossible to fulfill
them. Nor were tenants the only ones citing the extraordinary conditions in claims for
their reconstruction projects. Similar claims reveal how the inhabitants of Lima advanced
legal arguments that extraordinary situations could trump ordinary agreements.
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A similar reference, though focused on the capriciousness of nature in Lima,
appeared in another reconstruction plan-- this one devised by the administrators Alonso
Perez Campos and Pedro de Larreta who, as discussed above, presented a plan before the
judge Mansilla a year after the quake. They explained that the earthquake had damaged
most of the confraternity of the Limpia Concepción’s properties, which were burdened by
censos, capellanías, and other pious works. They proposed that, as an “accidental event,”
both owners and tenants together should cover the expenses of the repairs. The
administrators even offered to grant a “legitimate reduction” of the annuities to the
censuatarios in order to compensate them for the expenses they had to incur repairing the
confraternity’s properties. 352 In all the three cases, the petitioners mentioned the
extraordinary circumstances of the city required exceptional measures to reconstruct a great
quantity of properties that needed expensive repairs that most proprietors or tenants were
unable to afford. Even the receptor Del Salto claimed that his offer to tenants was motivated
by the earthquake and reasons of equity. It seems most limeños were attempting to reach
fair and reasonable settlements.
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Even though the results of these judicial processes differed, petitioners used these
and similar arguments to obtain a legitimate authorization from the ruling judge to
implement their projects of reconstruction. But plaintiffs did not always obtain the
recognition or authorization to the rebuilding plans they pursued. In the suit that Meneses
filed against the monastery of the Concepción, this institution used conventional legal
arguments to defend its interests and to reject its tenant’s proposal. There is no evidence
on file in the judicial process to know if Meneses finally abandoned the property, even
though he was contractually obligated to repair the property that legally remained under
his stewardship.
Certainly, many tenants simply abandoned the properties they held on censo.
Almost four months after the earthquake hit Lima, the abbess of the Monastery of Santa
Clara requested from the Vicario General of the Archbishopric of Lima license to sell “for
lives” some ruined properties. 353 In this instance, the term “for lives” (por vidas) refers to
a lien held in emphateusis. The monastery would lease some properties for a determined
period of time, which was counted in tenants and their heirs’ lives. In her petition, she
explained that the earthquake destroyed all the houses and other buildings that belonged to
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the monastery. Because of these unexpected damages, the monastery did not have enough
funds to cover the repairs of such properties. She asked for permission to lease “for lives”
those properties that were in need of more repairs. Because there were people willing to
contract censos on favorable terms, the abbess argued that these contracts would keep these
properties producing rent, and transfer the responsibility to reconstruct them to the
tenants. 354
Unlike the authorities of the Monasterio de la Concepción, who refused to concede
discounts on either principal or rents to their tenants, the Monasterio de Santa Clara
accepted the renunciations of possession from some of its censatarios. Concepción’s
administrators supported their position on contract’s clauses that obligated tenants to
rebuild the properties they occupied and forbid them to cancel the agreement. Nonetheless,
institutions had the option to accept tenant’s renunciation. For instance, the city council, as
explained in chapter 2, accepted the request from the tenants of the alhóndiga (city
warehouse) to cancel their possession. Similar to Santa Clara’s abbess, city counselors
understood it was practical to find tenants willing to afford the reconstruction of property
in exchange of fair condition rather than force them to hold unproductive useless buildings.
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As property owners, female religious orders and its members, individually, became
highly involved in reconstruction activities after the quake. Women living in convents and
other spiritual institutions represented 20 percent of the whole female population in
Lima. 355 They were an important population of limeños who helped rebuild the city. In
her petition before the ecclesiastical court, the abbess of Santa Clara, Doña Luisiana
Mesia—head of the monastery and responsible for its possessions—was not negotiating
with other opponent parties, but requesting a license to implement a rebuilding plan.
Similar to the abbess, many other petitioners came before the ecclesiastical court requesting
permission to execute their own reconstruction plans. The most frequent of these requests
came from nuns whose cells had collapsed during the quake. Doña Beatriz de Torres
Solano, one of the oldest velo negro (elite) nuns in the Monasterio de la Concepción,
requested a license that may grant to her brother, chaplain at the same monastery, and other
construction laborers access to come inside the cloister to repair her cell. 356 Doña Maria
Franco, another black-veiled (elite) nun from the same institution, also asked permission
for her nephew, Licenciado Don Fernando de Aller y Franco, to come inside the monastery
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with the purpose of recognizing the repairs her cell needed. 357 The two petitioners claimed
the earthquake had damaged their cells so badly that they had to sleep outdoors. In both
cases, the abbess Doña Petronila de Jesús y Salazar certified that the earthquake had
destroyed all the cells in the monastery. The sisters could not even enter them. Some nuns,
such as Doña María and Doña Beatriz had male relatives willing to cover rebuilding
expenses. Yet even these close relatives required a special license to enter the monastery.
Since nuns also required permission from the ecclesiastical court to perform
temporal activities, nuns left valuable testimonies of their reconstruction activities. Doña
Aldonsa de Mora, black-veiled nun in the Monasterio de Santa Clara, solicited
permission from the Provisor y Vicario General to sell (transfer) a censo of 250 pesos she
had imposed on a house. She explained in her request that she received only 12 pesos 4
reales of interest every year. Since such amount was insufficient to support her, she
wanted to “sell” the censo to have enough currency from the principal to repair another
house ruined by the earthquake that she possessed on lien. 358 Another black-veiled nun of
Santa Clara, Doña Ana de Pereira, requested the license to use 2,000 out of 3,728 pesos
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that she inherited from her aunt and her father for repairing some properties. She
explained that that amount was in power of the executor of the belongings of her uncle,
Licenciado Martín Dominguez Zambrano. She planned to use such 2,000 pesos to repair
two houses of her property that were damaged in the seismic event. She needed to rebuild
those buildings in order to lease them. 359 With these strategies, Doña Aldonsa and Doña
Ana attempted to obtain the economic means to put in repair and make functional
properties that they could lease to receive regular income.
In all the cases seen in this section, the petitioners brought their plans of
reconstruction before court to get the judge’s license or order to implement their projects.
Some of the petitioners requested licenses to put forward their plans, specifically, when
these did not affect third parties. Other plaintiffs brought their projects before the judge in
order to reach a settlement with opponent parties. Even though some of the cases had a
negative or inconclusive outcomes, they illustrate the quest for legal authorization or
legitimization of a plan, or help in compelling the opposing parties to negotiate or
consent to a final project of reconstruction. But the courtroom was not the only place
limeños had to legitimize their rebuilding plans.
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Contracting Before Notaries
The destruction of such a large part of the city represented a critical moment for
many estate holders unable to afford the unexpected costs of reconstruction. Such large
expenses motivated limeños to validate their rebuilding plans before implementing them.
Instead of bringing their proposals of reconstruction to magistrates, proprietors negotiated
rebuilding agreements with contractors and tenants. The Spanish legal system offered
their subjects other official alternatives to legitimatize these agreements: the notarial
contracts. The various parties involved in a negotiation signed a written agreement before
a notary, who certified the veracity of the contract’s content.
Certainly not all property owners were economically limited to afford
reconstruction activities. As seen in chapter 3, large property owners, such as some of the
religious orders, had the economic means to reconstruct their properties. Nonetheless,
even those individuals who had some capital to use in rebuilding works had to make
special arrangements with contractors. Just a few weeks after the quake, Maestre de
Campo Don Luis Alfonso de Rojas y Mendoza contracted with the carpenter Juan
Eugenio and the Lieutenant Cristobal Perez to reconstruct his house. He would pay 200
pesos to Eugenio and Pérez, who agreed to complete the rebuilding works within six
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weeks. 360 The contract specified that the said 200 pesos were for Eugenio and Perez’s
labor because, in order to reduce expenses, Rojas would provide the materials of
construction and directly hire the black peones (laborers) to assist with the demolition
and rebuilding of the ceiling, and the removal of the debris. 361Even if Rojas had enough
money to initiate the repairs on his home, he carefully arranged with the construction
masters the responsibilities of each party in the contract, in order to save time and money
in the reconstruction activities.
Even though some of Lima’s estate-owners had the means to rebuild their
damaged properties in such a short period, many had to bargain or negotiate their plans of
reconstruction with tenants. Lease contracts offer illustrative information on strategies of
cooperation and concession that limeños, both proprietors and tenants, developed with
the purpose of rebuilding their city.
A couple of weeks after the earthquake, a property owner and a capellanía
beneficiary signed a lease contract with a prospective tenant before a notary. According
to this contract, Doña María Monterrey y Castro, widow of Sebastian Gutiérrez, executor
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of his will, and guardian of their minor children, rented to Sebastian de San Miguel a
house and an adjacent store, located on Mantas Street, for a period of six years. Mantas
was one of the main commercial streets in Lima, located next to the city hall. It received
this name from the various stores that initially sold blankets of the land or mantas. Large
two-story residences hosted various ground-level stores, where proprietors had their own
business or which they rented for extra income.
Because the quake extensively damaged Doña María’s property, she decided to
rent it to someone willing to cover the repair expenses. The parties set the amount of the
annual rent on 300 pesos. From this total, they agreed to discount the tenant’s expenses
for demolishing the second story and rebuilding the property as new, following the
alarife or construction master’s instructions. In case the cost of repairs exceeded the
amount the tenant must pay, the Lic. Don Luis de Avalos, beneficiary of the capellanía on
the house and store, would cover the additional expenses. 362 They also agreed that the
contract would start to run from the day the constructor master certified that the property
was habitable. A year later, Doña María Monterrey, one of her children, and the heirs of
San Miguel, appeared before the notary to insert an addendum to the contract. They
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declared the reconstruction of the house and adjacent store ended on April 1, 1688, date
from which the lease started to run as indicated in the original contract. The cost of
materials and salaries reached almost 2,000 pesos, which the proprietor accepted as
payment of the lease. 363 Thus, not only did the proprietor and tenant agree to share the
expenses of the necessary repairs in the property; the chaplain, who also received profits
from the property, also had to participate in sharing the costs.
In another contract, Doña Juana de Orduña, the former abbess of the monastery of
Santísima Trinidad, with license of the current abbess, granted possession of a store
located also at Mantas street to the Lieutenant Mateo de Arzave. The contract, which both
parties signed before a notary, indicated that the store was in such bad condition that both
parties agreed the tenant would pay for the repairs the store needed. In exchange, the nun
ceded the possession of the store for six years, and discounted all tenant’s expenses from
the monthly rent. 364 Similar to the previous case, the lease period would begin from the
date all repairs of the stores were concluded.
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As these two cases illustrate, some leaseholders agreed to pay the costs of
repairing damaged properties in exchange for obtaining possession or usufruct for certain
period of time. Real estate owners had to agree to reduced rent payments for their
property, as in the case of Doña Juana de Orduña, or even lost such income altogether
temporally when the tenant used the money to pay the properties’ repairs, as it happened
to Doña María de Monterrey. In both cases, the owners also agreed to consider the
beginning of the contracts by the date the properties were in good condition. This clause
could motivate tenants to delay repairs in the properties, yet its repetition in many other
contracts seems to show it became a common concession by owners to motivate tenants
into contracts.
Another frequent arrangement between owners and tenants was to share the costs
of rebuilding. Almost a month after the quake, Fray Pedro Gudiño, as Prior of the
Monasterio de la Merced, and the Lieutenant Don Cristóbal Gutiérrez Galán signed a
lease contract before the notary Don Francisco Sanchez Becerra. Gudiño ceded
possession to Gutiérrez for nine years of a one-story house with two adjacent stores for
450 pesos. In this case, Gudiño, as representative of the monastery, declared the
earthquake left the property uninhabitable, so it required several repairs. He did not grant
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a delay in the beginning of the lease, as the other proprietors did in the previous cases; yet
he did discount 150 pesos from the total amount of 450 pesos. The tenant would use
those 150 pesos to pay for the repairs of the entire property. Nonetheless, the monastery
offered to contribute all the necessary materials of constructions such as bricks, adobes,
quicklime, and wood. 365
These kinds of agreements, which show proprietors’ and tenants’ interest on
reaching fair settlements, were not uncommon in the notarial records. In another contract,
the proprietor, Dona Catalina Montero, also offered materials of construction to the
leaseholders Lorenzo de Alvarado and Juan de Albornoz. She rented them some storages
with a house located in the port of Callao for six years at the price of 1,100 pesos each
year. She would receive only 300 pesos, and would provide wood to assist in the repairs.
The tenants would use the remaining 800 pesos to rebuild the warehouses in the first year
of the lease, and the house in the following years. 366 In this case, the proprietor not only
agreed to provide construction materials, but also ceded part of the rent income to be used
for the rebuilding works.

365

AGN, siglo XVII, PN 1698, Don Francisco Sánchez Becerra, f. 1223-1224.

366

AGN, siglo XVII, PN 1674, Juan Romero de Arnero, f. 79v – 80v.

208

Even though these contracts represent just a portion of those preserved in the
notarial records at the Archivo General del Perú, they illustrate both the strategies
limeños adopted to rebuild private property and their efforts to legitimize their agreement
to put the city back together after the earthquake. These documents also testify to
limeños’ interest in recording their agreements in written format. The practice of writing
usually protected the parties involved, even though some agreements were not literally
fulfilled. In other words, the documents provided the individuals legal protection more
apparent than real. Even so, they valued the notarial record enough to regularly seek it.
The notarial records were formal resolutions that the parties in the contracts reached after
some sort of negotiation and bargaining.
These contracts were the result of limeños’ negotiation according to their own
understanding of equity, their will of cooperation, and their needs to rebuild property.
Unlike judges that mediated negotiations and settlements, notaries mainly recorded what
contracting parts had already negotiated. Scribes and notaries could certainly clean-up the
wording in the contracts, making it clear and intelligible according to notarial standards.
But post-earthquake contracts contained specific details in the clauses that exclusively fit
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the needs of each case. 367 Certainly these documents followed customary notarial
formulas similar to other contractual documents, yet each contract provided particular
strategies of reconstruction that were selected according to each case. The value of these
notarial records is that the casuistic and flexible Spanish system allowed limeños to
negotiate and implement “conveniente” agreements for the parties involved.
Informal Valid Agreements
The importance of written resolutions, obtained either in court or before a public
notary, did not overshadow the value of informal oral contracts. These kinds of
agreements are difficult to access because, by their very nature, they were unwritten or
informally registered and thus were not well preserved. For that reason, references to
such informal agreements usually are left out of courts and notaries’ records. But when
we can catch sight of them, we learn that, despite their extralegal nature, these
arrangements were valid, since they had the validity that the parties involved tacitly or
symbolically conferred them. The use of these extra-official contracts shows people’s
desire to reach fair resolutions through application of casuistic jurisprudence and
negotiation.
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The analysis of a series of these unofficial contracts, which the steward of a
religious corporation arranged, reveals the flexibility they afforded the people. In 1692,
the Captain Don Agustín de Castro, steward of the confraternity of the Santísimo
Sacramento, located at the Cathedral of Lima, presented the account of the six years of
his administration before Don Juan de Mansilla, Judge of Testamento, Legados y Obras
Pías. 368 His detailed account of 125 pages with more than 500 entries provides revealing
data about the impact of the earthquake on the confraternity’s properties and how he
managed to repair and maintain the rents of those most damaged.
The Santísimo Sacramento confraternity had around 30 real-estate properties
among houses, stores, and small second-story rooms (altillos) spread throughout the city.
It also collected the fees of provisional stalls or spots in a commercial alley where
merchants sold diverse menial products such as clothes, fabric and other goods. Of these
properties, the earthquake damaged seriously at least 11, which required several repairs
that the congregation could not afford directly. For that reason, Castro set informal
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agreements with some of the tenants to jointly pay for the rebuilding of these
properties. 369
Castro’s first measure was to exonerate from payment those tenants who, because
of fear, abandoned the properties in good condition for a few days. He discounted Juan
Bautista Bentin the five days he abandoned the altillo he occupied. 370 Castro also
discounted from rent some of the expenses the tenants made on the properties or
communal areas. For instance, Castro discounted tenant Juan de Mena 9 pesos of his
monthly payments for cleaning the ditch that ran next to the property. Castro also
exonerated Mena from the payment of 2 months and 19 days out of 24 months that he
lived in the property because he lost all his personal belongings with the earthquake. 371
In another case, instead of using the limited funds of the confraternity to pay for
repairs, Castro informally rented damaged property to people who were willing to rebuild
it in exchange of free occupancy. He rented a store to the Captain Antonio de Herrera,
who took possession on November 28, 1687, one month after the quake. Since Herrera
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expended 113 pesos in repairing the store, Castro established April 10, 1688, as the
starting date of the lease agreement. In other words, Castro granted four and a half
months of free occupancy to Herrera in exchange for repairing the store. 372 This was a
smart and extra-official strategy to prevent extraordinary costs to his congregation and
transfer them to a tenant that had the capital to restore the property.
Like other bodies whose properties were greatly damaged, the confraternity’s
administrator had to look for available means to rebuild real estate. In June 17, 1687,
Castro rented to Bartolomé de Arcos, silver master, a house for 240 pesos annually.
Arcos paid 80 pesos for the four months (20 pesos each) he occupied the house until the
earthquake hit. Because the house was so seriously deteriorated when Arcos returned to
it, on March of next year 1688, Castro reduced Arcos’ monthly payments from 20 to 8
pesos. This was a reduction of 60 percent of the original price. 373 In this case, it is evident
the earthquake caused such severe damage to the property that the administrator had to
reduce the rent with the purpose of keeping the tenant, who would probably make
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improvements or repairs. Reducing the price of a lease payment was more effective than
losing the total rent and having to cope with the repairs on one’s own.
Castro’s recording of his different tactics to reconstruct the property of the
confraternity demonstrates that people commonly set unofficial agreements. These were
practical in terms of costs of money and time. They also reflected official agreements
because they specified the obligations of each part, and were valid and recognized by the
parties involved. In the case of Castro’s ledger, the annotations of all these simple
settlements did pass before the ecclesiastical judge’s eyes at the end of his term as
steward. Nonetheless, they were legitimate long before the judge certified their validity.
Even if the ledger and the arrangements it contained had never reached the ecclesiastical
court, the agreements were deemed binding from the moment the tenants and the
administrator established them, shook hands, and respected them.
Conclusion
Although colonial authorities took measures to initiate reconstruction, ordinary
people had to partake in rebuilding activities of their city. They developed diverse
reconstruction plans according to their own needs. Implementing these projects required
the participation of various individuals, such as colonial authorities, property owners,
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tenants, and contractors, willing to negotiate and accept part of the economic burden of
rebuilding. These reconstruction projects were validated through written contracts,
notarized verbal contracts, and even informal verbal agreements. The Spanish legal
system recognized all three kinds of agreements as legitimate and binding. The abundant
cases referring to each type highlights the value legal negotiations had to colonial
subjects and the extent to which subjects were familiar with early modern processes of
law.
The main difference between official and extra-official contracts is the amount of
money and property involved in each case. Parties fighting over a censo of 1,000 pesos
typically had the means to pay court costs. They invested time and money in hopes of a
sizeable gain. In contrast, the administrator of a small room, providing a monthly rent of
20 pesos, typically preferred to make an informal agreement with the tenant to avoid the
cost of official validation. While weighty disputes moved some parties to negotiate or
confirm agreements in official spheres, the desire to validate contracts was present at both
levels.
Resolutions not only helped rebuild Lima’s physical surroundings, but also
politically contributed to the refortification of the colonial state. Both the colonial ruling
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elite and the colonial subject participated in the process of reconstructing the city.
Colonial subjects engaged the Spanish legal system, both officially and informally. In
doing so, they used and reproduced the forms of the legal cultures according to their own
necessities. Flexibility and compromise permitted the colonial subjects to design their
projects of reconstruction in terms they considered fair and “conveniente” for the parties
involved. Rather than negative characteristics, flexibility and “conveniencia” made the
Spanish colonial state sturdy enough to resist the threat not only of natural disasters but
also of the empire’s political and economic challenges.
Certainly, flexibility and “conveniencia” made room for corrupt administrators
and loose centralization. Royal officers and authorities were not all loyal administrators
of the king’s patrimony. Some of them set their own interests above those of the
monarch. The Archbishop Liñán y Cisneros and the members of the ecclesiastical
council, who received their appointments from the king, provide a clear example of
authorities, in this case religious ones, primarily concerned with securing their material
wellbeing. Indeed, the next chapter demonstrates that flexibility had its limits, and the
king and his peninsular ministers asserted power of colonial administration, and set limits
to self-interested behavior of colonial agents.
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VI.

CHAPTER 5: SERVING THE KING: CONTROL AND

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ROYAL TREASURY OF LIMA IN THE
LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.
The destruction produced by the earthquake demanded costly repairs of most of
buildings in the city. The Viceroy attempted to initiate rebuilding activities in the main
public buildings without burdening the royal treasury, which for an extended period had
maintained a negative balance. The Earthquake of 1687 increased the hardships of a
government, which nevertheless was able to manage the critical post-disaster period. Even
though the colonial administration in Lima was unable to perform its normal activities for
several months after the disastrous event, the royal treasury of Lima drastically increased
its remittances to Castile when the next armada departed from the port of Callao in 1690.374
This seemingly contradictory fact raises an important question: How, precisely, was Peru
able to send such large sums to the metropolis in the middle of social, economical, and
political strife?
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Because the earthquake affected mainly Lima and its port, one explanation for the
rise in remittances was that most of sub-treasuries at the viceroyalty’s interior continued
operating normally, compensating to some extent for the interruption of royal officers’
ordinary activities in Lima. However, data shows that the condition of the royal treasury in
the entire viceroyalty was precarious. It carried a large amount of debt accumulated as the
result of decades’ worth of loose book-keeping and mismanagement. Somehow, viceroys
had continued to fulfill the obligation of sending money periodically to the peninsula. As
the capital of the viceroyalty of Peru, Lima directed politics and commerce for all of
Spanish South America. Similarly, Lima’s caja real served as its main treasury. The
treasury collected the capital’s royal revenue and received the surplus of sub-treasuries
from the viceroyalty’s interior. 375 In theory, Lima’s royal administrators had to send the
surplus to the metropolis; and, for a long time, royal officers fulfilled such obligation
despite the depleted condition of the caja real.
When the quake hit in 1687, in a matter of a few hours, the city was in ruins and its
administration halted. Despite the financial burden created by new expenditures related to
the devastation, the Duke of Palata recognized that the King had other priorities that did
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not allow him to financially assist his loyal subjects in Lima. 376 The Viceroy’s
achievement of realizing several of the rebuilding projects he envisioned is evident when
examining the condition of the royal treasury. By the time the quake hit Lima, the
condition of the caja real was bad, yet it had been worse. Actually, it was showing some
signs of improvement because of a reformist phase that brought positive results that the
natural disaster buried in historical memory.
This chapter explores the government’s attempts to improve the administration of
the viceroyalty’s cajas reales, and the results of such reformist efforts, vis-à-vis the
effects of the 1687 earthquake. It specifically looks at Lima’s general inspection (visita
general) ordered by the crown with the purpose of improving the condition of the royal
treasury and tightening the control over its royal administrators. Even though the visita
began in 1664, two decades before the natural disaster, its results became more evident
during the administration of Duke of Palata, who actively promoted its activities and
supported the visitor (visitador). Overall, a close look at the visita process provides a
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deeper understanding of how the colonial government dealt with bankruptcy and
mismanagement during the late Hapsburg Spanish administration.
The Economic and Political Black Legend of Spain
Interpretations of Spanish decline trace their origins to political and economic
decisions that monarchs made in the early decades of the seventeenth century, such as the
excessive sale of juros (state bonds) and of public posts. The first of these practices,
which started in the metropolis and expanded later to the colonies, generated an excessive
public debt by the monarchy. In turn, that resulted in specie being passed to foreigners, a
reduction of national capital, and privileged groups’ rising dependence on rentas.
According to this interpretation, Spain became a victim of its own debts, unable to
implement a far-reaching program to alleviate and improve its condition. 377 The “sale” of
public offices had the similar effect of dispossessing the Crown of its capacity to control
the administration of the empire. As most of the posts passed to colonies’ native sons
(Creoles) or peninsular residents in Indies, the royal government in the colonies became
unable to rule for its own benefit because most functionaries profited from some
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illegitimate practices their posts permitted. 378 Both practices had strong impact on the
politics of the empire during the rest of the seventeenth century, as they not only persisted
but also expanded. 379
Nonetheless, the Spanish empire in the seventeenth century was not a monolithic
administration condemned by the policies of previous rulers, waiting to be saved only by
the coming of a new dynastic house and its new kind of government. Despite the various
problems the Spanish empire had to deal with, Charles II’s administration had
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characteristics that show it was not as incompetent as scholars have traditionally argued.
Throughout the periods of war, natural disaster, and economic bankruptcy, the Hapsburg
administration developed certain innovations and strategies that have inadvertently been
erased in historiography. 380 Analysis of the viceroyalty of Peru in the last decades of
Hapsburg rule demonstrates that the government increased control of the colonial
treasury, its royal officials, and the remittances of bullion to the peninsula. It was the
Earthquake of 1687 that interrupted the reform and obscured its dividends.
The General Visita to the Cajas Reales
When Duke of Palata arrived in Peru, he attempted to implement various changes in
the viceroyalty’s administration. Some of his measures aimed to improve the fiscal
administration. Yet, they were part of a larger reforming process that the Spanish crown
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had initiated decades earlier with the purpose of regulating and supervising the personnel
and administrative system in its colonial domains. 381
The last decades of the seventeenth century (1664-1690) witnessed a long audit,
through which metropolitan officials assessed the condition of Lima’s caja real and the
performance of its administrators. Because of the visita’s duration, there were various
visitadores, or auditors, that assumed the post consecutively. It is also possible to
distinguish at least three phases of the visita, because there were some intervals in which
inspections halted, such as when the visitor died or was recalled by the Crown (See Table
1).
The first of these stages witnessed the antagonism between the two visitadores, Juan
de Cornejo and Francisco Antonio de Manzolo, who initiated their activities in 1664.
Rather than fulfilling the expectations of the peninsular government, this initial phase of
the visita fueled the factionalism within the political elite of the viceregal capital.382
Cornejo turned some royal officers into sympathizers, who benefited politically in
exchange for loyalty and obstruction of Manzolos’s activities. When news of the power
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and authority he displayed in Lima reached the court, peninsular authorities recalled
Cornejo in 1666. Manzolo continued inspecting the account of the royal treasury, without
any formal accusation against the royal officers, until he left Lima in 1670. Conflicts
between royal agents were not uncommon and even generated factions within the colonial
administration. Just like the deep-seated ill-will between Manzolo and Cornejo, there was
an evident antagonism between the Duke of Palata and the Archbishop Liñán y Cisneros,
and between the latter and the Count of Castellar. These political, and sometimes personal,
rivalries frequently obstructed the regular performance of the government, as some officers
blocked the activities of their opponents.
The second phase of the visita initiated with the queen mother’s appointment of Don
Alvaro de Ybarra, the most senior oidor (judge) of the Real Audiencia, as visitor in 1673.
The progress of the inspection was limited because one ally of former visitor Cornejo, Don
Sebastián de Navarrete, administrator of Lima’s caja real protested the bias of Ybarra’s
procedures. 383 In 1675, the Council of Indies finally rejected Navarrete’s appeal, and
ordered Ybarra to resume the visita. Nonetheless, Ybarra died before the decree arrived in
Lima. The next year, after receiving the news of visitor Ybarra’s death, the king appointed
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Don Agustín Mauricio de Villavicencio, the most senior oidor of the Real Audiencia, as
new visitador by royal decree of June 1, 1676. 384
Years
1664-1670

Inspectors (visitadores)
-Francisco Antonio Manzolo.

Royal Treasury’s Administrators
-Sebastian de Navarrete (Controller
imprisoned in 1681).

-Juan de Cornejo (Recalled in
1666).
1673-1680

-Francisco de Colmenares (Treasurer)

-Alvaro de Ybarra (Died in
1675)

-Cristobal de Llanos Jaraba (Business

-Agustin Mauricio de

manager).

Villavicencio (Died in 1680)
-Francisco Antonio de los Santos
(Interim controller).

-Juan de Saiceta y Chucho
(Secretary).
1680-1696

-Juan de Penalosa.

Table 1: List of inspectors and administrators of the Caja Real (1664-1696)

384

Translation of the Royal decree that commissioned the Audit. Lima, March 3,1683. Archivo General de

Indias (hereafter AGI), Lima, 289, f. 1 – 7v. Ismael Jímenez, “Don Alvaro de Ybarra: el Criollo más
poderoso de su tiempo (1621-1675),” América en la memoria : conmemoraciones y reencuentros / Begoña
Cava Mesa, Coordinación y edición (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, Asociación Española de
Americanistas, 2013), 324.

226

Even though the visita progressed relatively slowly in this second phase,
Villavicencio performed important tasks that would be useful for his successor in the
inspection. His activities as visitor were in part obstructed by the unavailability of the
records left by Ybarra. Visitor Villavicencio had to file a suit against the executor of
Ybarra’s will, who had sent Ybarra’s documents concerning the visita, to Spain in the
armada of 1675. It was not until March of 1679 that Villavicencio had access to such
records. Nonetheless, he was disappointed to find out that most of Ybarra’s papers
contained information related to the recusal of Navarrete. 385
Despite these initial setbacks, Villavicencio worked hard to fulfill the royal order
to inspect Lima’s treasury. Evidence shows that this royal official was determined to
comply with royal instructions in every detail. Beginning in 1676, when he received his
appointment, Villavicencio moved the investigations of Lima’s treasury and its
administrators’ performance forward, until his death in 1679. Assisted by Don Juan de
Sayceta y Cucho, Senior Accountant (Contador Mayor) of the Tribunal de Cuentas,
Villavicencio’s detailed investigation led to a long judicial process against the
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administrators of the caja real of Lima, the comptroller (contador y veedor) Sebastián de
Navarrete, the business manager (factor), and the treasurer (tesorero), who were charged
with suspicious practices and omissions.

A few months after taking his new post,

Villavicencio requested a sworn statement (relación jurada) from the officers of the caja
real, detailing the debts owed to the treasury. 386
Clear omissions in this account motivated secretary Sayceta and visitor
Villavicencio to increase their scrutiny of the treasury’s accounts. The officers of the caja
real delayed presenting the documents that might corroborate their declaration for several
months. The statement they submitted by the end of 1677 contained 755 entries that
enumerated the uncollected amounts accumulated since the creation of the caja real of Lima
in 1607. 387 The total of debts owed to the caja real reached 232,967 pesos. 388 Once Sayceta
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reviewed this first account, he realized that there were 218 entries that lacked certain
information such as the amount and the object of the debt. 389 Therefore, he asked
administrators to submit documents that could be used to verify each entry. Visitor
Villavicencio compelled the administrators to provide the papers asked by Sayceta three
times without success. 390 Facing new obstruction of his activities, Villavicencio began to
send notifications to the debtors compelling them to pay, and supervising the activities of
royal administrators. He also recorded all new deposits to the royal treasury. In only five
months, from December 10, 1677 until May 28, 1678 -- when the Viceroy Count of
Castellar ordered Villavicencio to submit an account of the available money to send to the

converted pesos ensayados to maravedíes, at the exchanged rate of 450 maravedíes per peso ensayado, and
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following the calculation performed previously, we multiply the pesos ensayados with decimals figure by
450and divide by 272. I have also rounded up the figures as necessary. For instance, in this particular
statement, they royal officers declared a debt of 224,584 pesos 2 reales de a 8 pesos, and 5,067 pesos 4
granos ensayados. I converted the 5,067 pesos 4 granos ensayados to pesos de a 8 reales. Using the above
mentioned formula, I obtained 8,382.97 pesos de a 8 reales which was rounded to 8,383. Then, I added this
amount of 8,383 pesos de a 8 reales to 224,584 pesos de a 8 reales and arrived at 232,967 pesos 2 reales.
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metropolis -- the visitador had collected 54,476 pesos, nearly a quarter of the treasury’s
outstanding debts. 391

Image 15: The Count of Castellar 392
A few months later, the appointment of a new viceroy and the death of Villavicencio
brought another twist to the inspection of Lima’s treasury. The King removed the Count of
Castellar from his post of viceroy in July 7, 1678, and appointed the new archbishop of
Lima, Don Melchor de Liñan y Cisneros, as interim-viceroy. The new representative of the
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king spent the first months of his administration reviewing the various treasuries of the
viceroyalty. He reported to the King that he found a debt of almost 4 million pesos. 393 The
caja real of Lima alone had a debt of 254,785 pesos 6 reales, accumulated as of December
19, 1679. 394 Villavicencio had continued working until the first months of 1679 when his
health decayed. His death in September of that year represented another halt to the
inspection process.
Ultimately, this second phase of the visita revealed royal officials’ fraud and shady
book-keeping. But Villavicencio was unable to levy any harsh punishment on the royal
officers because he lacked the authority to do so. His interrogations revealed that some
officers, like Sebastián de Navarrete and Cristobal de Llanos Jaraba, lived ostentatiously,
spending more than what their salaries could allow. 395 The end of this phase also marked
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the change in accountant Navarrete’s position. It is uncertain what caused his fall from
royal grace. It is possible that his activities of recusing Ybarra changed the king’s
perception of the accountant.
The third phase of the visita began a year after Villavicencio’s death, in 1680, when
the King ordered Don Juan de Peñalosa, judge of the Real Audiencia, to continue the
investigation of Lima’s treasure. Yet, in practice, it took more than appointing a new
visitador to resume the inspection of the caja real of Lima. By the royal decree of October
23, 1680, the king named Peñalosa auditor of the cajas reales and ordered him to resume
the inspection along with Don Juan de Sayceta, who remained as secretary of the visita. 396
Charles II also entrusted the imprisonment of the Don Sebastian de Navarrete and his
banishment to New Spain to the new visitador. He specifically instructed Peñalosa to
carefully inquire about the excesses and procedures of Navarrete and sequestrate his estate
and personal belongings. The royal officer was imprisoned. Apart from this, there was no
substantial progress in the visita during the administration of the Archbishop-viceroy. 397
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After his arrival in late 1681, the recently installed Duke of La Palata reactivated the
audit process which yielded positive effects. Without noticing any progress in the visita,
the Viceroy commanded the Audiencia minister Peñalosa to begin his activities as
visitador. 398 Peñalosa requested an exemption to take his new post. This was a normal
procedure since inspecting Lima’s treasury earned visitors the animosity of most fellow
royal officers. 399 Even though Peñalosa provided reasons for his request, the Duke
compelled him to formally take his new post and resume the visita.
Once the minister began his activities as visitador, his main goal was to send
controller Sebastian de Navarrete, who along with two officers had been accused of fraud,
to New Spain, place where he would wait for the sentence by the Tribunal de Cuentas, or
the comptroller’s court, as the royal decree of 1680 ordered. 400 Once Navarrete embarked
on a ship to Acapulco at the end of 1682, the new visitador was able to concentrate on the
inspection of the treasury and the collection of debts.
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According to the royal treasury administrators’ sworn statement presented on
March 31, 1683, at Peñalosa’s request, the uncollected debts dating from the creation of
the caja real in 1607 reached 255,472 pesos 7 reales. 401 From 1683 until 1690, when the
process against the royal treasury officers ended in a sentence, Peñalosa requested
periodical reports from the administrators disclosing the progress on the collection of debts.
He used the statement of 1683 to measure any progress in the collection activities. 402
These reports demonstrate an increased effort by the royal officers to collect the
delayed obligations to the Crown. According to the periodical reports presented by the
royal officers, the debts in favor of the treasury decreased consistently. Using the report of
1683, Peñalosa sent a detailed account to the King, indicating that because of his efforts
Lima’s treasury had gathered 120,528 pesos 2 reales, representing almost half of the debt,
in a period of eight months. 403 Nonetheless, in a letter dated a few days later, the royal

401

This was a third declaration presented by the royal officers stating that the debt owed to the caja real was

of 234, 380 pesos 2 reales and 12,749 pesos 2 tomines 5 granos ensayados. They submitted the first
statement at Villavicencio’s request in 1679, and the second statement at Archbishop-viceroy’s request in
1681. Letter of Villavicencio to the King. Lima, August 4, 1678. AGI, Contaduria 1780B.

402

These certifications are available in AGI, Lima, 290, and 291.

403

Letter from Oidor Juan de Peñalosa of Lima to His Majesty about the condition of the visita. Lima,

November 4, 1683. AGI, Lima, 288, f. 2. This letter stated that he had specifically collected 234, 380 pesos
2 reales, and 12,749 pesos 2 tomines 5 granos ensayados.

234

administrators indicated that the large amount presented in the auditor’s account contained
quantities collected after the remittance of bullion in 1678 by the former Visitor
Villavicencio. 404 It is probable that Peñalosa intentionally failed to mention that the amount
reported at the end of 1683 included amounts collected by his predecessor. Even though he
used the material (testimonies, inventory, etc.) gathered by Villavicencio, Peñalosa never
complimented the activities or procedures of the previous visitor.
The amounts reported in subsequent reports offer a more credible record of the royal
officers’ collecting capacity. Efforts by administrators Francisco de Colmenares, Cristobal
De Llanos, and Francisco Antonio de los Santos, who replaced to Navarrete as interimcomptroller, reduced progressively the debts shown on their declaration.
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incurred until April 8 of that year. 406 This new account represented a considerable increase
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of debts the administrators were responsible for because it included the uncollected
amounts of three additional years.
This new statement was split in three categories, one including debts since the
creation of the treasury in 1607 until 1659, another that comprised debts from 1659 to 1679,
and the last one that contained the most current debts (See Table 2). According to the new
sworn statement of 1686, the first group of debts reached 12,315 pesos, the second 20,090
pesos 2 reales, and the third to 67,584 pesos 6 reales (See Table 2 ). 407 The total debt of
255,472 pesos 7 reales, shown in the statement of 1683, had decreased to 99,999 pesos by
1686.

Statement of 1607 4081686
1659

407
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Total Debt
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Debt

12,315 pesos

20,090 pesos 2
reales

67,584 pesos 6 reales

99,990
pesos

Table 2: Debt of the Caja Real de Lima by 1686
Despite adding previously uncollected funds to their accounts, the royal officers
continued collecting debts and maintaining their accounts up-to-date. The report presented
ten days before the Earthquake of 1687 shows the debts to the royal treasury had
diminished, in all the three categories, within a period of 18 months. 409 Even though the
earthquake obstructed the work of the royal officials, it would only do so for a surprisingly
short period of time. The report of 1690 shows they were unable to collect any quantity
until September of 1688, almost a whole year after the natural disaster. 410
Nonetheless, peninsular authorities kept pressuring on the administrators of Lima’s
caja real. In a royal decree, dated February 5, 1688, they expanded again the obligations of
the royal officers, ordering the judges of the Tribunal de Cuentas to consider all obligations
that were six months old as debts. 411 As a result, colonial officials arduously aimed to
collect debts before the six-month period. In 1690, the Tribunal sentenced the officers of
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Lima’s caja real responsible for a debt of 16,245 pesos. 412 This amount was considerably
smaller than the debt of 255,472 pesos 7 reales the caja real had in 1683 (See Table 3). 413
Year

Debt

1683

255,472 pesos 7 reales

1686

99,990 pesos

1690

16,245 pesos

Table 3: Decline of the debt in the Caja Real de Lima from 1683 - 1690
Contrasting the amount of the 1683 and 1690 reports, it is evident that the inspection
of Lima’s treasury generated, although to different extents, certain pressure on colonial
administrators. They cleaned up their books and began collecting the extensive debts the
treasury had incurred over decades. If they had previously committed fraud on purpose, the
increased scrutiny surely stopped or reduced such behavior. By 1690, the royal fleet
departed from Callao with a shipment of bullion that was three times bigger than the
previous one.
The Duke’s Fiscal Reforms
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When promoting the visita’s activities, Duke of Palata was mainly following
instructions carefully detailed in various royal decrees signed by the monarch. Yet, he did
not limit himself to merely implementing orders, but also designed and implemented some
ideas of his own. His fiscal measures targeted to reform the inefficiency of the Tribunal de
Cuentas by reviewing the viceroyalty’s cajas reales and end the chronic scarcity of currency
in the capital.
The Duke was concerned about maintaining an updated account record of the various
cajas reales in the viceroyalty. The task was difficult for the royal officers working at the
Tribunal de Cuentas, who supervised the activities of all the cajas reales. The accumulation
of the unrecorded debts obstructed collection activities, which in turn increased the
amounts due. 414 The Viceroy appointed two auxiliary auditors (ordenadores) to support
the Tribunal de Cuentas’ senior accountants to organize the delinquent accounts. The
Viceroy also decided that these new officers’ salaries would derived from future debts
collected in order to avoid burdening the royal treasury with more remunerations.415
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Additionally, he reorganized the duties of all five senior accountants and eight Tribunal de
Cuentas’ ordenadores by assigning specific provincial treasuries to each accountant and
his assistants. 416
In this manner, the Duke promoted order within the Tribunal de Cuentas, making
each senior accountant responsible for inspecting specific cajas reales. Before this reform,
accountants indiscriminately selected the accounts they wanted to review, alternating
between various cajas reales and without following any chronological order. As a result of
this practice, none of the cajas reales at the interior regions of the viceroyalty had its
accounts up-to-date.
The Duke also promoted and realized the creation of a Royal Mint in Lima with the
purpose of solving the continuous lack of coinage in the capital. Beginning in 1650, royal
officers usually received their remunerations in bars of silver because pesos of 8 reales
were scarce. 417 In order to pay officers’ salaries, fixed at pesos of 8 reales, royal treasury
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administrators had introduced the flawed practice of exchanging a silver bar at the rate of
142 pesos of 9 reales, when the value of each bar was actually higher, at 147 pesos of 9
reales. 418
Visitor Villavicencio had previously noticed this practice, and realized its negative
effects on the royal treasury. He notified the King that this procedure represented a loss of
5 pesos in each silver bar, and recommended a fine of 500 pesos to each senior officer of
the caja real who made the exchange. 419 The officers attempted to defend this practice by
arguing the value of the silver bars constantly fluctuated on the market. They argued a
silver bar only reached its nominal value of 147 pesos in the months preceding the
departure of a royal fleet, yet it remained mainly between 135 and 140 pesos. They argued
that the former Viceroy Count of Castellar had endorsed the customary rate of 142 pesos,
after he verified the lesser value of the bars in the market.
Despite the attempt to defend the exchange practices, the royal officers had to pay
the fine for contravening the legal value and exchanging of the silver bars at unfavorable
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rates for the royal treasury. 420 The production of coinage at Lima’s Mint House
progressively eliminated the payments of salaries in pesos ensayados, whose official value
was fixed at 143 pesos of 9 reales, in 1685. 421 When the Casa de la Moneda began to
operate in 1683, the royal treasury entered a new stage where the peso of 8 reales became
the standard coinage used to pay royal officers’ salaries. 422 The new institution also
provided the much-needed currency for the diverse fiscal, commercial, and private
transactions in the capital.
The Danger of Living on the King’s Peso
A careful review of the Comptroller Sebastián de Navarrete’s case reveals how the
revival of Hapsburg governance impacted mid-level colonial administrators in Indies. He
was a creole from Lima who forged a respectable career in royal service, yet his fate
changed according to royal will. As the comptroller and his defenders tried to demonstrate
his loyalty to the crown, they left behind material that provides a window to early modern
notions of justice, law and custom, and colonial subjects’ appreciation for written
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documents. Ultimately, Navarrete’s career and life illustrates that flexibility and emphasis
on “conveniencia” in the Spanish system had its limits. Royal officers could not hide
behind claims of customary law and decentralized practices to justify personal gain. His
prosecution and final outcome of his trial demonstrates that metropolitan authorities did
not interpret flexibility as corruption.
Navarrete’s father planned his young son’s career well before he was able to take a
position in the royal administration. He bought him a post in the royal treasury when the
future comptroller was only 15 years old. 423 He purchased this office in futura, which
meant Navarrete would occupy one of the senior posts that might become available in
Lima’s caja real. Nonetheless, this meant that Navarrete would have to wait at least until
he was 25 years old to enter in royal service.
Navarrete’s opportunity came in 1651 when he replaced royal officer Bartolome de
Astete, who was suspended from his office for a few years. Navarrete served as futurario
comptroller until 1654. There were rumors that Don Sebastian was behind the suspension
of Astete and another royal administrator, because he was the main beneficiary from such
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punishment. 424 Navarrete received other appointment in the royal administration until he
obtained full possession of the post of comptroller in Lima’s royal treasury in 1663. 425
Nonetheless, his ascending career hid a convulsive personal life. There were rumors that
he had an affair with the wife of a Basque merchant. In an attempt to kill his opponent one
night, Navarrete attacked him with the assistance of one of his slaves. Instead, he murdered
a cleric, Fray Juan de Carbonero, by mistake. 426 There seemed to be no long-lasting
repercussions for this criminal act. In 1662, he was elected alcalde ordinario of the city,
even though the Holy Office of the Inquisition excommunicated him because of his
immoral acts in an attempt to obstruct his admission to the post. Navarrete’s political power
was evidenced by his ability to overcome the greatest condemnation that the Church could
inflict on a person with the payment of a fee. He had to pay a fine of 1,000 pesos before
assuming the post of alcalde ordinario. 427
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Despite his tumultuous personal life, Navarrete’s career continued ascending. He
established strong connections with important families and other royal officers in the city.
He married the daughter of Bartolome de Salazar, minister of the Real Audiencia, and
became an open ally of visitador Cornejo. 428 After his affair with the Basque merchant’s
wife, the Viceroy Count of Santisteban banished Navarrete to the coastal town of Pisco,
where he remained for a few months. Yet, after the death of the Viceroy in 1664, Visitador
Cornejo took control of the Real Audiencia, recalled Don Sebastian from exile, and
appointed him as supervisor of the royal fleet and galleys. 429
Even after Navarrete’s protector, Visitor Cornejo, left the city in 1666, he did not lose
his social standing. He actually improved his status by getting a promotion. By then, he
had formally assumed the post of comptroller, and was a knight of the order of Calatrava. 430
When Don Alvaro de Ybarra, minister of the Real Audiencia, resumed the activities of the
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visita in 1673, Don Sebastián resisted the activities of the new visitor, who was enemy of
his former protector Cornejo.
In an attempt to stop Ybarra’s investigation of Francisco de Colmenares, a colleague
in the administration of the caja real and a relative, Navarrete resorted to a legal resource
known as recusación, or recusal. 431 This mechanism allowed a plaintiff to put into question
the capacity of an authority to properly perform his duties, without biases. Navarrete’s legal
move had the effect of delaying the inspection of the royal treasury, yet in the end the
Council of Indies rejected his demand against Ybarra, and corroborated the authority of the
visitador. Even though Ybarra, who died in 1675, was unable to receive the news of the
Council of Indies’ decision, his successor, Don Agustin de Villavicencio, initiated
interrogation about the activities of the royal administration’s officers. 432 He questioned
various witnesses about the royal officer’s performance of duties, suspicious activities, and
public life.
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During Villavicencio’s investigation, witnesses’ most salient observation against the
administrators of the royal treasury was their excessive living expenses. Contemporaries
agreed that the officers were living with the decency that their post demanded. Yet they
identified Sebastian de Navarrete and Cristobal de Llanos as the royal administrators that
had the most ostentatious expenses. In contrast to Francisco de Colmenares, the third senior
administrator of the caja real, who had a more frugal life, Navarrete and Llanos participated
in ostentatious events reserved for elite gentlemen, dressed in livery and surrounded by a
retinue. 433
When Villavicencio asked witnesses if they knew how Navarrete and Llanos could
afford lifestyles that exceeded their income as royal officers, witnesses simply answered
they believed both administrators had the wealth to live in such luxury. 434 Only one
witness, Don Diego de Segura y Lara declared, when interrogated about the expenses of
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the two officers, that visitor Ybarra told him several times that the royal treasury had been
defrauded. 435
It is unclear whether Villavicencio continued this investigation or sent a report of the
interrogations to the King, yet news of Navarrete’s overindulgences circulated through the
court in Madrid. By 1679, the members of the Council of Indies knew about Navarrete’s
constant excesses and obstructions of the visita. Navarrete’s denouncers claimed the
comptroller spent wantonly, spoke with arrogance, and made threats to peers. 436 Because
news about Navarrete had circulate, when Charles II appointed oidor Juan de Peñalosa as
visitor of the cajas reales, he ordered the imprisonment of Navarrete, the confiscation of
his belongings, and his exile to New Spain. 437 Even if they had not received an official
denunciation against Navarrete, peninsular authorities ordered the visitor to investigate
Navarrete’s excesses.
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The Archbishop-viceroy and the Real Audiencia rapidly implemented the first two
orders of the decree. During the night of June 7, 1681, the Alcalde del Crimen, the Alguacil
de Corte, and 30 soldiers arrived at Navarrete’s home to detain him and confiscate his
goods. The alcalde took the comptroller to the court jail, where Navarrete remained for 2
months until he commuted jail for house arrest. 438 Like many elite prisoners, Navarrete
spent the following months enjoying certain freedom to move around the city, under a
soldier’s guard. 439 When the new viceroy of Peru, the Duke of Palata, arrived at the end of
that year, he was surprised to find out that Navarrete was still in Lima, contravening royal
orders.
The new viceroy was determined to fulfill all the instructions of the royal decree,
including the banishment of Navarrete. In 1682, the Duke attempted to send Navarrete to
New Spain on a ship that would sail to Realejo. The officer tried to convince the Viceroy
to concede him permission to remain in Lima, where he would be capable of preparing and
conducting his own defense. In a final attempt to delay his departure, Navarrete indicated
that Realejo was very distant from Acapulco, which was his official final destination. He
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explained that he lacked the economic means to afford the trip by land from one port to
another, because his salary was sequestrated. 440 Finally, the Viceroy found the opportunity
to send Navarrete in the ships that were set to sail to Acapulco carrying 3000 quintals of
quicksilver. 441
Soon after Navarrete arrived to Acapulco in early 1683, he claimed that the local
weather took a toll on his health. He requested permission from the viceroy of New Spain,
the Marques of Laguna, to travel to Mexico City. The Marquis accepted Navarrete’s
request with the condition that he would travel guarded by four soldiers paid from the
prisoner’s own belongings. 442 Don Sebastian had to sell a slave and his clothes to cover the
expenses of his move to New Spain’s capital. 443 The once powerful officer arrived in
Mexico City on the night of August 5, 1683. He made his entrance to this city not with a
retinue, as he was accustomed in Lima, but with the soldiers in charge of his custody. He
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immediately was put in the city hall jail, where he would spend the remaining months of
his life. 444
Determined to reverse his situation, Navarrete prepared a detailed record of his
services and attached it to a letter sent to the King, requesting permission to either return
to Lima, where he could better defend himself, or appear before a Madrid court to
demonstrate his innocence in person before the monarch. In the letter, he indicated that his
unfair exile to New Spain was promoted by the animosity of his enemies who hated him
for his loyal service to the crown. He argued that his loyalty to the crown was evidenced
by the result of his activities as administrators, which increased the royal treasury of Peru
by 3 millions pesos.445 The King did not agree with his strongly documented request. He
simply ordered royal officials in Lima to move forward with the investigation of
Navarrete’s case. A second attempt by Navarrete to persuade the king was also
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unsuccessful. 446 Finally, Navarrete died a few months later, on August 24, 1684, in a city
hall cell in Mexico City. 447
Navarrete’s unsuccessful attempts to leave New Spain demonstrate that the crown
had set certain limits on the behaviors of their royal officers’ behavior. The King and the
Council of Indies were unwilling to hear the claims by the royal officer. In other words,
the number of charges against Navarrete had exceeded the parameters of his flexible
authority as a loyal administrator. For that reason, they entrusted the visitor and the viceroy
to perform a careful and detailed investigation to uncover Navarrete’s faults. At the end,
the comptroller had fallen out favor with the King.
The Fighting Wife
After Navarrete departed from Peru, his second wife, Doña Constanza de Loaisa y
Mogrovejo, niece of late Archbishop Jeronimo de Mogrovejo, became his main advocate
and legal representative. As soon as he received notification of his trip to Acapulco,
Navarrete granted legal power to her to represent him in the visita process. 448 She left
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abundant legal material from the multiple request, letters, and appeals she presented before
the visitor. These documents offer elaborate arguments that unveil the early modern
political elite’s notions of justice and loyalty.
After the imprisonment of Naverrete in June of 1681, he continued to receive a
customary payment of 2 pesos for each receipt (certificación) issued to any individual that
made a deposit in the treasury. In 1683, the new assistant comptroller, Francisco Antonio
de Los Santos, claimed the rights to collect the fee. 449 However, Navarrete’s wife argued
that her husband was still the proprietor of the post because a condemnatory sentence had
not been issued against him. 450 Nonetheless, visitador Peñalosa ruled to suspend the
collection of the fee because he considered that the royal officers’ salaries covered their
administrative activities and the fee “ was an abuse introduced in common damage” of
particulars. 451 Both parties agreed that practice confirmed the comptroller’s right to collect
the fee. What was at issue was which of the two comptrollers should receive it. The visitor
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decided to overrule the customary fee on grounds that it was not a prerogative of the post
and it overburdened individuals with an extraordinary charge. 452 In other words, the
visitador decided to end a practice that was not legally contemplated in the office’s
privileges and was “inconveniente” to the large number of individuals that requested
receipts for payments to the royal treasury.
When the news of Navarrete’s death reached Lima, his wife was in midst of another
legal battle to lift the embargo of her husband’s salary and her dowry, which she claimed
amounted to 30,000 pesos. Even though the royal decree that ordered the detention of
Navarrete also commanded the embargo of his salary, the royal treasury’s officers had paid
a salary to their old peer until he sailed to New Spain at the end of 1682. When Visitor
Peñalosa discovered this loophole for paying the royal administrator, he moved to seize
Navarrete’s salary, but the administrators had already disbursed it to him for the eighteenth
month after his imprisonment. 453 This irregularity also demonstrated that Navarrete was
overstating his poverty when he requested permission from the King to return to Lima or
appear before a Madrid court.
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The most disturbing fact is that Doña Constanza, knowing about the salary
disbursement, continued demanding Navarrete’s remuneration from the day of his
detention in June 1681 until the day of his death in 1684. She supported her demand on
three clear points. First, she stated that, even though the royal decree ordered her husband’s
detention and instructed the confiscation of his salaries, it was Navarrete’s “divine, natural,
and positive right” to make his defense, and that the king had provided that in such
circumstances his royal orders “were obeyed, but not executed.” 454 Second, she claimed
that the accusations against Don Sebastian were defamations manufactured by the enemies
he gained through his loyal services to the king. Third, he had the right to receive his salary
until a sentence of culpability was given against him. Finally, she added that her condition
of a royal officer’s consort and a former archbishop’s niece made her incapable of asking
for charity or live in need.
This argument clearly demonstrates that people elaborated their demands based on
notions of what they deserved according to their social standing. Doña Constanza
demanded preferential treatment as both the wife, and later widow, of a royal officer and
niece of a former archbishop. She highlighted that her social status did not permit her to
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live from charity. She was appealing to caustic jurisprudence, which ruled according to the
specificities and statuses of the people involved in the case.
In her petition, she combined notions of law and custom. She argued that her husband
had not lost rights over his salaries because a final sentence on his functions as royal officer
was still pending. This was an argument based on law, which required a final sentence to
apply the punishment. She attempted to devalue accusations against her husband, arguing
that they were crafted based on enmity and animosity. It was customary practice, and
legally accepted, that a defendant could undermine adversary testimonies on the grounds
that they were provided by personal enemies.
Finally, Doña Contanza’s request appealed to the preeminence that divine and natural
law had over the king’s individual order in her husband’s case. Her arguments did not deny
her loyalty to the king or challenge his authority. When she highlighted the legal recourse
of “Obedezco, pero no cumplo,” she pointed out that the king himself recognized divine
and natural right as prevalent. According to Doña Constanza’s legal elaboration, the king
himself had crafted a legal mechanism that both validated supreme law and his authority.
Visitador Peñalosa, however, rejected all of these arguments and ruled against all of
the various requests Doña Constanza presented, even after years her husband had died. He
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argued that evidence confirmed Navarrete’s faults during his administration, so it was
imperative to sequester his salary because it came “from the king’s purse.”
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Constanza had to wait many more years to get the results of the visita and a resolution to
her requests.
In 1693, when the visitor had the final report listing the amounts owed by the caja
reales’ royal officers from 1620 to 1685, Navarrete was responsible for a debt of 30,590
pesos 5 reales. 456 This was a substantial amount considering that the senior officers of the
caja real earned annual salaries ranging between 3000 and 3500 pesos. 457 One more time,
Navarrete’s family demanded the restitution of the salaries, which they argued belonged to
Don Sebastian until his death, to pay part of the debt. 458 Yet the demands by Navarrete’s
family became fruitless when the visitor discovered that Navarrete had hidden from
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inspectors a rural estate, which he entrusted to the Maestre de Campo Don Fernando Nuñez
de Sanabria. 459 When Peñalosa found this property, it undermined the comptroller’s claims
of loyal service to the king and confirmed the multiple accusations against him.
Conclusion
Certainly, the visita did not meet the expectations of the peninsular ministers and the
King because it was unable to completely resolve the chaotic condition of the Peruvian
treasury. There were various obstacles to the activities and improvements that a handful of
officers could make, such as collecting large and old debts, factionalism between royal
officers, ties to local interests, and more. The colonial government of Lima, as in other
parts of the Spanish empire, had several royal officers who failed to accomplish the duties
of their posts or committed excesses while they generated certain benefits to the crown.
Navarrete was a clear example of the latter; however, there were other ministers that
behaved similarly yet never received the same punishment.
Nonetheless, the late Hapsburg administration did not passively accept the
misconduct or errors of representatives in the colonies. The visita to the Cajas Reales of
Lima in the late seventeenth century demonstrates that the Spanish government had not
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lost its capacity to bring officers, and institutions under control and order. The notable
decrease of the total debts of the caja real of Lima, the imprisonment of Navarrete, and the
final sentence against the royal officers demonstrate that the visita gained some centralized
control and, most importantly, increased some of the productive capacity of the colony.
The prosecution of Navarrete demonstrates that the Spanish administration was not
impotent or unable to control its royal representatives. This early modern system permitted
flexibility of governance to officeholders. Nonetheless, flexibility had limits that officers
could not breach without risking punishment or even their lives. Officeholders, as well as
other royal subjects, developed their own notions of justice and legitimacy. They enjoyed
the privileges of their post and demanded specific treatment according to their position.
Nonetheless, in their quest to prove loyalty to the crown, they ultimately understood that
their authority came from the king. Even if they were thousands of miles away from the
monarch, he was the source that legitimated their authority.
Navarrete and his wife, as well as many other corporative bodies and individuals seen
in the previous chapters, expected a certain type of treatment from authorities based on
their social standing. They understood that authorities should impart justice according to
people’s social standing after a careful analysis of law and custom. If people effectively
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contributed to new notions of justice when crafting their own legal arguments, it was the
state apparatus and its representatives that ultimately set and applied justice in the end.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The concepts of crisis and decline have pervaded the history of Spain since the
sixteenth century. Studies by foreign and Spanish intellectuals, particularly since the
eighteenth century, have reduced Spain’s seventeenth century to a tale of crises,
associating the destiny of its empire with the destiny of the ruling Hapsburg dynasty.
More recent scholarship, employing new approaches and examining new research topics
about the seventeenth century, have not completely dispelled the specter of Spanish
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crisis. What is more, the specter of a weak or deficient Spanish Hapsburg state also lives
on in popular intellectuals’ writings. 460
Yet, within these new waves of scholarship lie clues that suggest that the time has
come for scholars to reappraise the Hapsburg decline narrative. According to the “crisis”
theorists, one of the main signs of crisis was in Spain’s government and administrative
structure and political culture, which have been defined as inept, inefficient, and unable
to impose central authority on the extensive domains of the Spanish empire. But this
representation of Spanish administration, in both the metropolis and its colonies, comes
from comparing the Spanish state not to contemporary early modern governments but to
modern nation-states.
When placed in its proper context, it is clear that the Spanish imperial state was a
patrimonial system well aligned with its times. Governmental practices and rules,
however flexible in practice, were ultimately legitimated by the monarch’s royal power,
and in turn contributed to the legitimacy of Spanish imperial rule. Even when
bureaucrats’ authority emanated from the king, their performance was limited by local
interests and ordinary subjects’ perceptions of justice. The overlapping jurisdictions of
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bureaucrats and institutions, extensive corpuses of laws, and the value of the customary
practices required constant negotiation and compromise from royal agents and colonial
subjects. Other early modern states, such France and English, also relied on continual
negotiation because it was necessary to obtain the support of local elites to implement the
central government’s new policies. Negotiation allowed the inhabitants of early modern
societies—and particularly the heterogeneous inhabitants of Spain’s colonies-- to defend
their purported privileges or seek protections according to the role they played in the
socio-political body.
Since the ultimate objective of early modern administration did not aim to fulfill
the common good but provide to each part of society with what was “conveniente,” or
appropriate, the application of laws was not universal but applied on a case-by-case basis.
Judges sought to reach mutually beneficial sentences for the parties involved in a suit,
requesting determined procedures according to each case.
When rules contradicted practice, solutions were reached and legitimated
following the same objective of “conveniencia”. “Conveniencia” was not dictated by the
interest of powerful figures alone but by reference to a greater sense of fairness for all
actors involved. For instance, when the interim comptroller De los Santos demanded
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rights over the fees that Navarrete traditionally collected when expediting royal treasury’s
receipts, the visitador rejected the idea, concerned that it was not just. In spite of the fact
that both parties recognized the customary collection of such fees as valid, the visitador
denied its legitimacy because those fees unfairly burdened the large number of
individuals that requested receipts from the royal treasury to confirm payments.
Understanding the Spanish empire within the paradigm of the patrimonial state
offers new perspectives on the performance of the royal administrators and the political
system implemented by the Spanish Hapsburgs in the New World, particularly in a
moment of intense crisis. The performance of royal agents after the earthquake was
dynamic and the capacity of the crown to impose control and authority was substantial,
even after the destruction of the capital by the severest earthquake up to that moment in
the colonial life of the city.
The ability to respond dynamically and with flexibility might have been
showcased after the earthquake, but it was not new. The presence of pirates on the coast
of the viceroyalty of Peru had for a century been a crisis that popped up from time to
time, beginning with the first English corsairs circumnavigated the Straits of Magellan.
Most of the planning and construction of the series of defensive structures along the
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coastline of the main port Callao resulted from the imminent threat of pirates on the
viceroyalty’s capital. Despite of the importance of this port for the colonial
administration and economy, viceroys hesitated to build these structures because of the
economic burden they represented for the royal treasury. The royal authorities
demonstrated more concern on sending bullion remittances to the metropolis than on
improving the defenses of the viceroyalty’s main port.
The wall of Lima finally was constructed in the seventeenth century after a new
wave of pirate raids in the South Sea and the entrance of one of the principal actors in this
dissertation, Viceroy Duke of Palata. He had to design a new plan not only for the
construction of the structure but also the cost of future repairs. In order to reduce the
costs of the wall, he obtained economic and personal contributions from the different
members of Lima’s corporate groups. With the creation of new taxes, the Duke attempted
to relieve financial pressure on Peru’s royal treasury.
Similar to his predecessors, the Duke’s main responsibility was to send periodical
remittances of bullion to the King. His performance during the reconstruction of Lima
after the quake of 1687 demonstrated the continued concern in protecting the royal
finances above all else. Like other early modern officeholders, the Viceroy was in charge
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of implementing the crown’s instructions; yet he realized that, in order to protect the
royal treasury, he had to negotiate the expenses related to construction projects with the
colonial population that they directly benefited. Negotiation was an effective tool for the
Viceroy to obtain economic support from corporative groups to build the devastated city
wall and consent from royal officers to construct a smaller viceregal palace.
The wall of Lima did little to protect the capital against the attacks of nature.
Some sections crumbled on top of adjacent properties when the Earthquake of 1687 hit,
and there was damaged property and dispossession all over the city. Amid the disorder
and destruction of the city, the Duke rapidly ordered the other royal officers to deal with
critical matters such as the dispersion of the population, distribution of food, and the
clearing of dead bodies and rubble. The Viceroy and the city counselors met in a
provisional cabin built in the Plaza Mayor, and planned and promulgated the essential
measures to respond to the immediate needs of the population. The colonial
administration in Lima was both primed for the event and flexible enough to react to the
new circumstances they faced.
Because of the destruction of the viceregal palace, which was headquarters of the
main branches of the colonial administration, most government institutions suspended
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their activities for some months. For this reason, the Viceroy organized the recovery and
reconstruction of the city by enlisting the members of the city council. The viceroycabildo alliance implemented new measures to deal with the new needs of the
populations, such as the provision of good, fair food prices, and access to affordable labor
force and materials to rebuild properties.
Once the Viceroy organized the immediate response to the critical situation of the
city, he focused on the activities of reconstructing those buildings that embodied the
authority of the crown, including the viceregal palace, the city council, and the cathedral,
among others. Once again, he had to undertake his tasks while causing the minimum
burden on the royal treasury.
The earthquake interrupted the plans the Duke had made to support the council’s
long-term finances. In order to create new income to pay off the rebuilding of the city
council, the Viceroy conferred it another land grant. Meanwhile, the counselors tried to
raise more funds through the penalties imposed on the food suppliers, construction
laborers, and suppliers of construction materials that did not follow the new regulations
of the council. These attempts to reduce the cost of constructing the viceregal palace and
improve the city council’s budget demonstrate that royal administrators were judicious,
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innovative and not inept. They recognized the colonial institutions’ problems and
developed new means to deal with them. In order to implement these innovations, royal
officers carefully weighed both benefits and risks of potential measures.
The rebuilding of the cathedral represented not only another challenge to the
Viceroy, but uncovered cracks within the highest echelons of the secular religious
hierarchy. The performance of the prelates during weeks and months after the quake
paled against the active participation of the members of the regular clergy. Members of
the different religious orders actively participated in the spiritual assistance of people as
soon as the first quake passed. Meanwhile, the members of the ecclesiastical council
spent months discussing the construction of a decent provisional chapel at the Plaza
Mayor, where they would be able to perform their regular duties. They seemed more
concerned about building a decent chapel in accordance with their social condition than
with fulfilling their spiritual obligations. The Archbishop of Lima remained absent for
several weeks after the quake, recovering from injuries sustained when the earthquake
hit. In his absence, the Viceroy assumed religious functions such as organizing
processions, performing penitence acts, and attending sermons.
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When the Viceroy assembled the Archbishop and members of the ecclesiastical
council to discuss the reconstruction of the cathedral, they refused to accept any of his
suggestions to raise funds for the rebuilding activities. The Viceroy’s first step was to
deliberate, determine what was most suitable for the Church, and reach consensus. When
no agreement was reached, the colonial administration resorted to other available
mechanism to persuade stubborn opponents to comply. Since the Viceroy initially was
unable to reach his objectives through negotiation, he finally escalated the issue to the
highest level of ecclesiastical authority that granted a positive resolution for the royal
treasury. In other words, despite the inflexible resistance from the ecclesiastical ministers,
the colonial administration was able to compel them to contribute to the cathedral’s
reconstruction through effective means.
The reconstruction of Lima’s private property also reveals a customary practice of
negotiation among ordinary people, as well as the adoption and adaptation of official and
unofficially forms of the Spanish legal system. People from different social conditions
negotiated and set formal and informal contracts to rebuild property. In court, individuals
elaborated and set reconstruction plans with the mediation of judges, while notaries
mainly validated agreements previously negotiated by the parties. Courts and notaries
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were the official spaces the colonial subjects used to legitimate agreements. The
rebuilding projects contained in these official contracts are similar in that they all dealt
with reconstruction of property, yet each case proposed specific solutions or plans
according to its own particularities, replicating the larger casuistic culture of law.
Alongside these official contracts, colonial subjects also reached and
implemented informal agreements. Unlike the cases presented before judges and notaries,
which usually involved large sums of money in properties, unofficial contracts dealt with
smaller sums of money and were resolved between the parties involved without an
overseeing authority; yet they pursued the same objectives of rebuilding a property in that
they benefited or satisfied both the owner and the tenant. A judge or notary did not
legitimize these informal contracts, yet they were valid for the parties involved.
The different cases presented show that ordinary people in Lima, standing in the
destroyed rubble of their city, actively rebuilt not only buildings but also the colonial
state using the cultural materials they had on hand—namely legal negotiation. They
adopted the formal forms the Spanish legal system had implemented in the New World
and also adapted them to fit their own needs. The unofficial contracts mirrored the
official ones in both the objectives pursued and the flexibility they provided to
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individuals to elaborate their own rebuilding projects. These contracts also demonstrate
how limeños engaged broader discourses before colonial authorities about what was fair
or unfair in terms of fulfilling certain contractual obligations amid the critical conditions
of the city, while devising “conveniente” resolutions to the parts involved.
Finally, by moving backward in time, to the visita general to the cajas reales of
Lima during the reign of Charles II, the dissertation reveals that, while the contours of
patrimonialism fit colonial society well, not everything was always perfect. The crown
and its agents recognized the necessity of reforming and improving the performance of
various institutions and officers of royal administration. The inspection of Lima’s
treasury lasted several years, and various inspectors took the responsibility of scrutinizing
the institution and its officials. Until now, the accomplishments of this visita have been
lost in history. The Earthquake of 1687 halted fiscal reform plans Duke of Palata first
introduced in the city, and brought an end to the increased collecting activities of the
royal administrators. But in the short period of the Duke’s tenure as viceroy, the
condition of the viceroyalty royal treasury was significantly improved, and Lima’s
treasury debt was considerably reduced.

270

Although the crown granted local administrators flexibility, negotiation also had
its limits. The Spanish early modern state had the tools necessary to impose control and
authority when officeholders exceeded their power. For instance, Sebastian de Navarre
was imprisoned, his belongings confiscated, and finally exiled to New Spain, where he
died without defending his case after he fell from royal grace. But Navarrete’s response
also reveals that crown subjects believed that their social status—so important in a
patrimonial state—might provide relief from royal scrutiny. Before departing to
Acapulco, he had collected abundant certifications of the various services he had
performed for the king. He did not attempt to disprove negligence in the performance of
his post’s duties, but constantly stressed that his administrative activities, although
questionable, generated benefits for the royal treasury. After Navarrete left Lima, and
even after he finally died in Mexico, his wife, Doña Constanza de Navarrete, continued
disputing the confiscation of his salaries and her dowry. She based her demands on legal
and customary practices and argued that her husband had not been found guilty or
sentenced yet; therefore, he was entitled to his salaries in order to support his family.
Just as the members of the ecclesiastical council that claimed it was impossible to
contribute to the cathedral’s rebuilding because their social status did not allow them to
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live decently with reduced incomes, Don Sebastián and Doña Constanza elaborated their
requests for royal favor according to the social “quality.” If read carefully, the arguments
by the prelates, and Don Sebastian and Doña Constanza, together demonstrate that
members of the colonial society shared a common framework in which law and custom
had to conform to the demands of social class and status. The validity of both law and
custom permitted individuals to build their own discourses of justice, which captured
their understanding of the privileges they deserved according to their station in the sociopolitical body. Even those individuals that appeared before judges and notaries in order
to obtain legitimate resolutions to their building needs developed discursive assertions of
fairness and “conveniencia.”
Colonial subjects’ use of broader patrimonial practices and values, including
discourses of law, and extralegal contracts and practices, reveals a dynamic, open and
strong colonial system. The lack of a rigid centralization allowed flexibility, and thus
royal administrators and ordinary people could creatively contend with crisis, innovating
during times of hardship by combining legal and extralegal practices to rebuild. Contrary
to the image of decadence or incapacity, the Hapsburg colonial state in Lima responded
effectively to the earthquake, sustained various fiscal reforms, and improved the critical
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condition of the royal treasury. Ultimately, the flexibility of the system bolstered the
common framework of colonial rule so that it was able to withstand even a devastating
event.
Rather than halting the Hapsburg reforms, the earthquake simply temporarily
suspended them. Royal agents redirected their attention to the immediate needs of the
population, and the reorganization of the capital’s administration and reconstruction.
Lima was able to recover as everyone, colonial authorities and colonial subjects, tacitly
put themselves in a fast-forward mode to cope with the new circumstances of the city.
The earthquake did not undermine the colonial state but instead strengthened it. When the
ground shifted under their feet, Lima’s residents kept themselves steady by leaning on the
practices and discourses of the Spanish colonial system in order to rebuild their city.
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